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KlLVlLLl: SCIPTIC 
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PUJ'ACB 
Meldlle ... cn artiat, .ot a philoaoph.r. lat h. v .. an artiet with 
a peraiat .. t tat.reat ta phil_aphy, .. eI tid .. tat.reat coloreel all the th ... 
ad •• y of the ta .... of hia aajor worb. III cODDection rith M.l.1lle, the 
t.XII "philoaophy" is .eel ia ita "icleat COIlIlotatioaa .. a broad patt.na of 
iat.rrelat.d ael queri.d cemcepta. 
It ia aot Mc:uaary to prove that Hel.ille " .. a aceptic. Ii. acepti-
ciaa h.. b... recopi... for • ceatury. Se .. ral of lI.l.ill.·. fuad __ tally 
_taph,..ical probleaa h ..... ncei .. d ext ..... tuatlMat alone ad in .aU re-
lat.. ,:roup.; .... rthel ••• , little att..,t hu h ... JUde to clefi •• what hia 
sceptici_ .. tails .. scepticiaia, that is, u a fairly co1ler_t, relate ... el 
.equential a.t of philosophical .ttitudea ... qa •• U .... 
0.. or aother of MalYill.'s .ceptic aouree. hu reeei ... atteatiem ia 
relatiem to hia .cepticia, bat acholal'8hip h .. y.t to brillS toa.ther the 
rather aarpriaillS a.h.r of eaineat sceptic writ.rs that COIltd'nat.4I to the 
aaar.,ate sceptici_ that v .. his. '!'be _ouat of ..,hasi. ,i ... each sceptic 
writ.r ia thia stuely .... aot • ., •• d OR hi. presti,e ia the fi.ld of philosophy 
bat em the proporti_ of hia .iscerubl. 01' probable iafl ... c. OR Meldll •• 
MODtaipe i. th.refore couid.red ia ... detail, bec .... HelYiU. pUl'chu.ct 
hta woru, show.ct ."i ... ca, of harlaa re.d h1a car.fuUy, :lacerporatecl hia 
thoasht iato hi. wom, aaiatal •• cl a ab1.:I.Da iatereat :In Ilta, .. d Moatalp. 
s."ed .. _eator to __ ,. ph11_oph.r. who likewi •• :lalla .. oed MalYill., 
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.," 
particularly Pierre Bayle. probably Hume. The inclusion of Descartes and Kant 
under Melville's sceptic sources by no .eana tap1ie. they were intentionally 
sceptics. On the contrary, they labored to solve doubts raised byscepticisa. 
In a restricted sense, however, they may be included under a consideration of 
scepticism, since, for many. the questions they raised, and the problems they 
trested, proved more powerful than any answers given. 
No two problems, nor attitudes toward them, are precisely the saae in 
any two philosophers; nevertheless, a certain .. oeboid core of common e1ementa 
and underlying questions emerges from the writings of these sceptically philo-
sophic writers who represent a common heritage of influence and philosophical 
inbreeding. This is not a study in minute, direct borrowings. The selected 
quotations from these sceptic writers offered at the beginning of sections of 
this study suggest the sources from which Melville derived the terms and direc-
tion of his own arguaents and questions and his sceptic attitude toward thea. 
It is said of the Petrarchan ideal man that he may be indebted to others for 
ideas but never for style. In like manner, this study suggests that many of 
Melville's sceptic ideas are derivative but clothed in his own artistic 
rhetoric. 
The present approach to Melville may be neither philosophic enough 
for the philosopher nor literary enough for the literati, but its intended 
value lies in showing the bearing of the former upon the latter. This is one 
approach to MelVille _ong many and should be recognized as such, but it is an 
importan tone. 
In their introduction to History of Political Philosophy (Chicago, 
iii 
1963), editors Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey observe: "The great intellectual 
revolution of the seventeenth century which brought to light modern natural 
science was a revolution of a new philosophy ~ science against traditional 
(chiefly Aristotelian) philosophy H. science." Much of modern thought, in 
fact, had its stimulus as a reaction to "traditional (chiefly Aristotelian)" 
thought. Because positions are often better seen in juxtaposition, certain 
passages from Aristotle and a pre-Renaissance Aristotelian philosopher and 
theologian, Thomas Aquinas, have been introduced as a representative type of 
the thought against which mueb of scepticism militated. 
I have not specifically entered into the debate over Melville's spokes-
man. When views from Melville's works are offered as Melville's own, they 
are generally based on accumulative evidence, tone, or substantiation in more 
directly personal sources such as journals or letters. 
The format of the study follows Kate L. Turabian's manual for writers. 
I have not standardized spellings: my own preference is "sceptic, U but the 
spelling "skeptic" has been left in sources which use it. A variation for 
"Pyrrhonian,,-nPyrrhonean"-also occurs. 
I once heard Vernon Louis Parrington praised for announcing his own 
personal stance before offering his thought; this he did so that any bias, 
however unintentional, might not be insinuated into his audience but honestly 
appraised. Such honesty deserves imitation, and I shall try to follow his 
good example by declaring that I am a Christian writing of a non-Christian. I 
do not alway. agree with the direction or stress of Melville's arguments, but 
I have endeavored to present his arg_ents, not my own. It is not necessary 
iv 
to be in full agreement with Melville, however, to feel a deep empathy with 
the struggle that was his. 
v 
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PART I 
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 
CHAPTER I 
BACKGROUNDS or SCEPTICISM: A SKELETAL HISTORY 
"The skeleton of the whale furnishes but little 
clue to the shape of his fully invested body" 
Moby-Dick. 
Reasons for a skeletal history 
In his discussion of the whale' a ake1eton in Moby-Dick, Herman 
Melville dec1area: 
I could not but be struck anew with the circumstance, so variously 
repeated in this book, that the skeleton of the whale is by no means 
the mould of his invested form. • • • 
How vain and foolish, then, thought 1, for t11lid untrave11ed man to 
try to comprehend aright this wondrous whale, by merely poring over his 
dead attenuated skeleton. 
. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The skeleton of the whale furnishes but little clue to the shape of his 
fully invested body.1 
Although the preceding extracts might well stand as epigraphs for the present 
study in its entirety, they are offered--with an admittedly bounding synaptic 
1 The Works of Herman Melville (16 vo1s.; London: Constable & Co., 
Ltd., 1922-1924), II, chap. ciii, 217, 218; chap. civ, 221. The project 
leading toward a definitive edition of Melville's works under the general 
editorship of Professor Harrison Hayford of Northwestern University began 
official operation July 1, 1965; therefore, no volumes were yet available 
for tha present study. Tbe Hendricks House edition, which was to have 
superseded the Constable edition, remains, as yet, incomplete. The Stand-
ard Edition, at this time, is the Constable edition, and, unless otherwise 
stated, in all references to and citations from Melville's writings the 
Constable edition will be used. Notes will include the commonly used short 
titles, the volume number of the novel (not the novel's number in the set) 
only if the work occupies two volumes of the Constable edition, the chapter 
number (to facilitate the location of citationa in other editions), and page; 
in addition, Pierre will also be cited by book. 
1 
2 
application--as a point of reference for the more immediate concerns of this, 
the beginning, chapter, because it may likewise be maintained, perhaps com-
plained, that neither, of course, can the "monstrous whale" of scepticism be 
comprehended in an attenuated skeletal history; yet, even as Melville found 
it eminently useful for his purpose to devote two chapters to a particular 
discussion of his whale's skeleton, so an initial chapter will be ventured 
here on a "skeleton of scepticis." on the grounds that it. too, is useful to 
the present purpose--that of placing Melville in his epistemological context 
and providing a background and basis for understanding the significance of 
the reading, much of it early, which .ixed with mind to form the matrix of 
his philosophical writings. But this history, highly selective as it is and 
emphasizing names found in Melville's reading or works, does incorporate a 
surprising number of outstanding names in the annals of sceptical thought and 
demonstrates a develapaent of iaplication and intensity which had reached a 
certain degree of culmination by the time of Melville in the nineteenth 
century. 
The kinds of scepticism 
Scepticism has become something of a generic term comprehending many 
kinds of sceptieisms. In its broadest context scepticism denotes doubt as op-
posed to dogmatism. However, with its revival during the renaissance, partiCU-
larly during the refol'DlDticn, scepticiSDl was employed to bolster bith: the 
efficacy of the senses and of the reason was depreciated in an effort to estab-
lish faith as the sole trustworthy repository of confidence. In this sense, 
scepticism was not opposed to but subservient to the interests of be1ief--but 
it was belief, not knowledge: this is, generally, the fideist position. 
3 
In the kaleidoscopic confusion that accompanied the reforaation, man 
was no longer faced with .!. faith but !h!. faiths. Reactions differed: some 
chose one of nthe faiths"; SODle chose not to choose and turned the batteries 
of scepticism on faith itself and became unbelievers, so that another scepti-
cism arose synonomous with unbelief. Finally, since man as ethical and moral 
agent acts according to his criterions of belief or knowledge, and since these 
props of morality had buckled for many sceptics, scepticism, for some, de-
volved to libertinisa and depravity. Scepticism, then, affects the spheres 
of religion and philosophy--epistemology and ethics--man's believing, knowing, 
and doing: a man can profess to have faith and morality without (demonstrable) 
knowledge; or a man can be sans faith and knowledge but maintain a blind drive 
for morality--often based on feeling; or he can be void of any definitively 
professed stand on faith, knowledge, and morality, which is, unfortunately, 
the malaise of modern man and a prime symptom of the decline of western 
civilization--man's comaitBent to nothingness. 
Origins in Greek thought 
Scepticism as a philosophical position, or, paradoxically, the pro-
fession of a lack of one, orginated in ancient Greek thought. In the 
"Apology for Raimond Sebond" in Hazlitt's edition of Montaigne's works, which 
Melville owned, a footnote offers the following comment on a particular 
passage: "There are three general methods of philosoph1s[i)ng, the one dog-
matic, the other academic, and the other sceptic. The first affirm they have 
found the truth, the next declare it to be above our comprehension, and the 
1 
others are still in quest of it." The academic position, although one of 
lThe Complete Works of Michael De Montaigne; Comprising; The Essays 
4 
the two types of classical scepticism, is also a type of negative dogmatism, 
since it knows that it does not know: l negative dogmatism or academic scepti-
cism, "formulated in the Platonic Academy in the third century, b.c., 
developed from the Socratic observation, 'All I know is that I know nothing.' 
Its theoretical formulation is attributed to Arcesilas, c. 315-241 b.c., and 
Carneades, c. 213-129 b.c.,,2 The arguments of academic scepticism have come 
down to us through Cicero's Academica and ~ Natura Deorua, through their 
refutation in St. Augustine's Contra Academicos, and in the summary given by 
Diogenes Laertius, who also summarizes Pyrrhonistic scepticism. 
Sceptical thought moved from the Academy to the school of the 
Pyrrhonian sceptics, so-called because, as a movement, it supposedly began 
with the legendary figure of Pyrrho of Elis, c. 360-275 B.e~ The Pyrrhonist 
questions the reliability of sense knowledge and hence of the reason and disci-
plines Which depend upon that knowledge; because of the deceptive and limited 
nature of his knowledge, he consequently holds suspect the common. everyday 
belief in the phenomenal world. Again. because of his cognitive It-itations, 
the Pyrrhonist does not feel justified in proclaiming impregnable conclusions; 
(Translated by Cotton); The Letters; The Journey into Germany and Italy; 
Now First Translated; A Life. by the Edttor; Notes from All the Comaentators; 
The Critical Qpinions of Eminent Authors on Montaisne; The Elog.s of MM. Jay 
and Villemainj A Bibliographical Notice of All the Editions. and CopiOUS 
Indexes, ed. William Hazlitt (London: John Templeman, 1842), Bk. II, chap. 
xii, p. 231, n. 1. Hereafter cited as Montaigne. The three methods of 
philosophizing, as Hazlitt rightly states in the footnote, Montaigne borrows 
from the opening remarks of Sextus Empiricus and may be seen in hil Outlines 
of Pyrrhonism, trans. Rev. R. G. Bury (New York: G. P. Putnaml.s Sons, 1933). 
I, 3. 
1 Sextus Empiricus. I, xxxviii. 
2 Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Eras.us to 
Descartes (Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum & Co., N. V., 1960), p. ix. 
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rather, he considers, weighs, evaluates, questions, and doubts. Of necessity, 
the Pyrrhonist must make some proximate, if still doubtful, judgments, but he 
suspends ultimate judgment: he is sensitive to antinomies, to the pros and 
cons of a question, and what sometimes appears to be a categorical conclusion 
or judgment, when traced far enough, reveals itself as one of an opposing pair 
of "conclusions," for Pyrrhonistic scepticism is dialectical, the argUJllent 
often being a aelf-argument rather than that between two opponents. FrequentlYl 
it is this self-argument of an active, probing mind that accounts for apparent 
contradictions, though neither contra-diction of the argument is completely 
and finally sanctioned: hence, the sceptical element in Emeraon--by no 
means negligible--caused him to aay, in his easay on self-reliance, that a 
fooliah consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, and Melville's 
1 Babbalanja finds his consistency in the sum of his inconsistencies. The 
final abnegation of both extreme pOSitions results in a neutral or "neuter" 
position--relative to the suspension of judgment and conducive to an aura of 
ambiguity--with the eye of the intellect still open to regard both; further, 
the sceptical problem may be compounded by the presence of out-and-out 
diversity rather than two nicely juxtaposed polarities. 
Pyrrhonistic scepticism is an open mental attitude rather than a 
closed philosophical system: although a purpose of this study will be to 
show that a certain philosophical pattern, a logical and sequential drive 
toward nihilism, can be traced in Melville, it nevertheless remains more the 
reasoning toward a possibility, perhaps the catharsis of a fear, rather than 
an irrefragable conclusion, for, without in any way obliterating the far 
~ardi, II, chap. xxxix, 160. 
6 
heavier element of negation, the affiraative side has a way of bobbing up 
like a persistent though wave-swamped buoy in a heavy stora--it's simply 
there, and, though sometimes, like the buoy, it's not more prominent than a 
dot on an oceanic vastness, it can't be ignored without ignoring the total 
Melville. The procedure and final emphasis of this study will be more clearly 
perceived if it is remembered that, while the main current of the argument 
seems to be following an unimpeded path toward nihilism, the injection of 
contradictions and questions is intentional, because they are Melville's and 
show that in the end, despite a sharp veering into darker waters, final ques-
tions are left open, and Melville's position more closely approximates that 
of the Pyrrhonistic sceptic. One senses Melville's courageous effort to 
comprehend, to accept, if need be, the direst possible view of reality if this 
is what is, but the it remains as well as an always pendent question mark. 
As the previously cited footnote in the Hazlitt edition of Montaigne claims, 
borrowing from Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhonistic scepticism is a quest: truth, 
like a beautiful woman, often aloof and elusive, surrenders itself little by 
little only on the condition of being continuously courted, may then become 
incomprehensively withdrawn, 1s often desirable in proportion to the very 
degree of its mysteriousness and, alas, is never completely possessed in 
this mundane sphere. This unending while earthbound process that is scapti-
cism 1s called, in Margaret Wiley's study, the "spirit of inquiry" and the 
1 
sceptic the "philosophical inquirer. 1t 
~argaret L. Wiley, The Subtle Knot: Creative Scepticism in Seven-
teenth-Century England (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1952), pp. 19, 17. 
Wiley is quoting, respectively, from William Mitchell, "The Meaning of 
Scepticism, tI The Arena, XL (1908), 395, and John Owen's preface to The Reli-
gious Aspects of Scepticism (London, 1891), no pagination in preface. All 
7 
Because Pyrrhonism searches, doubts, and questions everything, it neither 
claims something can be known (positive dogmatism) or cannot he known (riega-
tive dogmatism or academic scepticism) but suspends judgment on this issue as 
well and is not even sure if something can be known. Pyrrhonism is therefore 
the more severe type of scepticism: it doubts even its own doubt. 
The Pyrrhonian movement continued to the time of Sextus Empirieus (c. 
A.D. 160-210), whose writings, the Hypotyposes (Outlines of Pyrrhonism) and 
Adversus Mathematicos, are the only extant works of a Greek Pyrrhonian and, 
therefore, provide the principal source of information. Pyrrhonism gradually 
receded into the shadows of antiquity; occasional outcroppings in certain 
anti-rational theologians kept it from suffering a complete demise, but it was 
not well known in the west until its reappearance in the sixteenth century. 
Renaissance rediscovery 
The rediscovery of Pyrrhonism, as professor Popkin demonstrates in 
his thesis, could not have occurred at a more propitious moment in history for 
effecting the greatest impact, since it reappeared during the intellectual 
crisis of the reformation. The central quarrel of the reformation was over 
Uthe rule of faith 1t or the proper standard of religious knowledge, which, 
consequently, raised one of the classical problems of the Greek Pyrrhonists, 
"the problem of the criterion of truth": 
With the rediscovery in the sixteenth century of writings of the Greek 
Pyrrhonist, Sextus Empiricus, the arguments and views of the Greek 
sceptics became part of the philosophical core of the religious struggles 
then taking place. The problem of finding a criterion of truth, first 
philosophy has and is a "spirit of inquiry," but scepticism is such in a more 
limited sense, because it never rests in stable truths, conclusions, or dogmas. 
8 
raised in theological disputes, was then later raised with regard to 
natural knowledge, leading to the crise pyrrhonienne of the early 
seventeenth century.l 
popkin goes on to explain that against the standard of truth authorized.by 
Church tradition, Pope and Councils, Luther asserted another criterion--the 
individual conscience. The sceptical argument asserts that in order to deter-
mine which alternative criterion is now correct, a third criterion against 
which each must be measured is required. But what about the correctness of 
the third criterion?--against what is its correctness to be measured?--and so 
the problem goes ad infinitum. As Popkin observes, Luther opened a Pandora's 
box in the intellectual realm. 2 
Rabelais 
The most famous presentation of Pyrrhonism in the early sixteenth 
century occurs in the characterization of the Pyrrhonian philosopher Trouillo-
gan in Rabelais's Cargantua and Pantagruel, Book III, chapter xxxvi: itA Con-
tinuation of the Answer of the Ephectic and Pyrrhonian Philosopher Trouillogan. I 
Rabelais's source, however, is apparently Diogenes Laertius rather than Sextus 
Empiricus. 3 Rabelais's comic satire of this sceptic Pyrrhonian philosopher, 
a satire which he directs at the whole human situation, might cause some 
~opkin, p. 1-
2 
.!.!!!.!!., p. 15 • 
3Popkin writes: "The terminology, however, seems to come from 
Diogenes I.aertius's discussion of Pyrrho," and he comments in a footnote: 
"Pyrrhonian scepticism is briefly described by the humanist, Guillaume Bude, 
(with whom Rabelais corresponded), in his De Asse, (Paris 1541), p. cxxii, 
a.pparently based on Diogenes Laertius" (ibid., p. 22). Popkin might have 
added the textual evidence of the occurr~ of Diogenes Laertius's name in 
Rabelais's work: see, e.g., Bk. III, chap. x and Bk. V, chap. xix. 
9 
readers, because of the apparent ridicule, to miss the pervading and final 
scepticism of his own work, a scepticism which seems to have had a notable 
influence on Melville's writing in conjunction with other sources, like Mon-
taigne, who were more indebted to Sextus Empiricus than to Diogenes Laertius. 
Calvin 
There appears, however, between Rabelais (14941-1553) and the 1562 
publication of Sextus Empiricus's works a major figure whose doctrines had an 
abrasive and lifetime influence on Melville because of his childhood indoc-
trination in the tenets of the Dutch Reform Church; this figure is the French 
Protestant John Calvin (1509-1564). Scepticism is inherent in the Augustinian 
bias of his teaching, which stresses the fallen nature of man and the conse-
quent darkness of the intellect: in his Dictionary, Pierre Bayle sees such 
implications in a quotation from Calvin concerning the liturgy of baptism, in 
which Calvin asserts that regeneration consists in "DENYING ~ follow OUR OWN 
REASON."l Calvin would not have admitted to scepticism, however, and he 
attempts to establish a criterion of truth on inner persuasion--a certain com-
pe1ling illumination through the Holy Spirit. Unfortunately, he is caught in 
a vicious circle which merely further substantiates the sceptical position: 
"The guarantee of the authenticity of inner persuasion is that it is caused 
2 by God, and this we are assured of by our inner persuasion." 
1 A General Dictionary. Historical and Critical (10 vols.; London: 
Vol. I Printed and Sold by J. Roberts; Vols. II-X Printed by James Bettenhaa, 
1734-1741), VIII, 598. 
2 Popkin, p. 9. 
10 
Montaigne 
When Calvin died in 1564, Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) was approach-
ing the height of his powers. Two years earlier, in 1562, Henri Eetienne 
translated into Latin and first published Sextus's Hypotyposes or Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism; Gentian Hervet later translated the Adversus Mathematicos and the 
complete works were published in 1569. Diogenes Laertius had summarized the 
Pyrrhonian position, but Sextus offered an extended and formulated presenta-
tion whose percussive effects upon Montaigne are still broadening and rever-
berating in our own day. After studying the writings of Sextus, Montaigne 
composed his most philosophical essay, the "Apology for Raimond Sebond," an 
essay which gives evidence of his own meditations on Pyrrhonism. 
In the "Critical Opinions" section of the Hazl1tt-Cotton edition of 
Montaigne, the Scottish philosopher Dugald Stewart complains: "To Montaigne's 
merits, indeed, as a lively and amusing essayist, ample justice has been done; 
but his influence on the subsequent habits of thinking, among his countrymen, 
remains still to be illustrated."l In the same edition, in Hazlitt's short 
"Life of Montaigne lt he writes of the essays that "edition after edition was 
called for, and the Essays of Montaigne were to be found on the table of every 
gentleman in France that could read aught beyond his other breviary, and, ere 
long, became known, by the medium of translations, in Italy, England, and 
other countries. tt2 Montaigne, then, whose Essais were widely read and fre-
quently reprinted, was the great popularizer of scepticism, and Popkin argues 
~ontaigne, p. xxxviii. 
2 
.!lli., p. xv. 
11 
that it was through Montaigne that "Renaissance scepticism became crucial in 
the formation of modern philosophy, contrary to the view that it was only a 
transitional moment in the history of thought."l The importance of Montaigne 
in the dissemination of Pyrrhonistic scepticism can hardly be exaggerated. 
Scepticism became a leading philosophical movement only after the publication 
of Sextus's works and their adaptation by Montaigne, his disciples, and the 
thinkers he influenced. 
Descartes 
A leading figure in modern philosophy's quest for certainty who was 
influenced by Montaigne and by Montaigne's disciple Pierre Charron is Rene 
Descartes (1596-1650). Montaigne presented the problem, Descartes proposed an 
answer. Descartes did not doubt in order to suspend judgment; he doubted in 
order to achieve certainty. Ironically, the very propositions Descartes set 
forth to refute scepticism have been interpreted by some as offering the most 
irrefutable substantiation of it, and the greatest opponent of scepticism has 
been called sceptigue malgre 191. 
Descartes proposed a method of universal doubt--doubt of everything 
until everything was stripped away but that which could not be doubted, his 
cosito ergo~. Many of his doubts were but a reiteration of former ones, 
doubt of the reliability of the senses, difficulty of distinguishing real 
experience from dream experience (previously suggested by Montaigne), but his 
2 
original and, as some view it, his most disastrous hypothesis was the demon 
1 Popkin, p. 43. 
2 Ibid., see p. 190 f. 
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hypothesis found in the first Meditation: 
I will suppose, then, not that Deity, who is sovereignly good and the 
fountain of truth, but that some malignant demon, who 1s at once exceeding-
ly potent and deceitful, has employed all his artifice to deceive me; I 
will suppose that the sky, the air, the earth, colours, figures, sounds, 
and all external things, are nothing better than the illusions of dreams, 
by means of which this being has laid snares for my credulity.l 
Descartes' method, if not Descartes, does, however, question the 
notion of a benevolent or "sovereignly good" God, a question that Melville was 
to turn into a tenacious inquisition. Descartes writes: 
If • • • it were repugnant to the goodness of Deity to have created me 
subject to constant deception, it would seem likewise to be contrary to 
his goodness to allow me to be occasionally deceived; and yet it is 
clear that this is permitted. 2 
And in Meditation IV Descartes discusses the possibility of God being the 
deceiver. The created knowing subject and the created knowable object had 
been questioned previously, but in challenging the Creator Himself by asking, 
in effect, "Is God the Devi!?" the ultimate sceptical query had been put. 
Descartes seems to have answered these difficulties to his own satisfaction, 
but whatever his intentions were, he bequeathed to a great part of posterity 
only a legacy of irrevocable doubt in everything but his cosito ergo~, tbe 
basis for modern traumas of alienation and isolation, the lonely, solipsistic 
realization of only one's own existence--and tbis existence without apparent 
meaning. Hume, bowever, was to cast serious doubts even on the cosito ergo 
~. Actually, Descartes doubted less than his theoretical universal doubt 
would imply: be trusted and used reason. If his own theory is used against 
1 , Rane Descartes, The Method. Meditations, and Selections from the 
Principles of Descartes, trans. John Veitch (9th ed.; Edinburgh and London: 
William Blackwood and Sons, 1887), pp. 102-103. 
2 ~., p. 101. 
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him, however, it may be &sserted that this universal doubt should embrace 
reason, and, therefore, be can no longer reason to anything, for to do so 
would be to beg the question by assuming the validity of reason before proving 
it and being unable to prove it without reasoning. Further, Descartes' theory 
of clear and distinct ideas cannot help him to truth: because meaning lies 
in relationship, Descartes' ideas remain meaningless, since he cannot relate 
them to actually existing external objects. Although resolved personally, 
Descartes' most devastating question, reiterated by Pierre Bayle and seriously 
considered by Melville, was that concerning a deceptive Deity. The acceptance 
of the idea of a deceiving Deity leaves the epistemological case of the uni-
verse in a complete cosmic bind. 
Sir Thomas Browne 
Before considering two additional French sceptics, chronology demands 
a departure from the first four--Rabe1ai8, Calvin, Montaigne, and Descartes--
for a trip across the channel to England and the English Anglican doctor Sir 
Thomas Browne (1605-1682), whose fideistic and sceptic writings emit a 
strange mixture of certitude and doubt. Although anti-rationalistic scepti-
ciam led many Frenchmen into a position of fideism, the English Anglican 
Church, as Louis I.Bredvold observes, was not easily given to this position, 
since it was, in fact, becoming more and more rationalistic at this time: to 
find Browne writing on the subject of Christian scepticism is therefore an 
occasion for surprise. ttl 
1 Louis I. Bredvold, "Chapter II: The Traditions of Skepticism," The 
Intellectual Milieu of John Dryden: Studies in Seae Aapects of Seventeenth-
Century Thought (3rd printing of Ann Arbor Paperback; Ann Arbor: The Oniverste, 
of Michigan Press, 1962), p. 40. 
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For some time, there was thought to be a direct indebtedness to Mon-
taigne in Browne's writings; Simon Wilkin, Browne's editor, quotes Mr. Keck's 
comment on a passage from "Religio Medici": "I cannot think but, in this ex-
pression, the author had respect to that of that excellent French writer, 
Monsieur Montai8ne, in whom I often trace him. ,,1 Wilkin, however, offers 
evidence to the contrary in a statement written by Browne himself. 
In a piece of mine, published long ago, the learned annotator hath 
parallelled many passages with others in Montai8ne's Essays; whereas, 
to deal clearly, when I penned that piece I had never read these 
leaves in that author, and scarce any more ever since. 2 
If we waive the possibility of mendacity on the part of the good doctor, the 
parallels may be explained by a common source: Browne, like Montaigne, knew 
3 his Sextus Empiricus, whose works he owned in the 1621 folio. As scattered 
entries in the catalogue show, Browne owned several other books connected 
with sceptical thought, works by Diogene. Laertius, Cicero, Descartes 
(several volumes), Hobbes, Herbert of Cherbury, and Pascal. There is also the 
possibility of indirect indebtedness to Montaigne through his disciple Pierre 
Charron (1541-1603), since one of the Brownes, father or son. owned the 
English translation by Samson Lennard of Charron's Of Wisdom; unfortunately, 
no date is 8iven for this entry in the catalogus, so it is not possible to tell 
if it might have been an early influence on Browne's writing. The works of 
lSir Thomas Browne's Works: Includins His Life and Correspondence, 
ed. Simon Wilkin (4 vols.; London: William Pickering, 1835-1836), II, 8-9. 
2 ill!t., II. 10. 
3CataloBue of the Libraries of the Learned Sir Thomas Brown and Dr. 
Edward Brown. His Son (ri1m copy, nesative. from the original in the British 
Museum, of the sales catalogue for the auction of the Brownes' libraries; 
London: Thomas Ballard, 1710), p. 7, No. 62. 
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Browne give evidence of the growing cosmopolitan dimensions of scepticism. 
Pascal 
In France, at this time, a new element in sceptical thought may be 
traced: in place of the suave scepticism of Montaigne and the undaunted quest 
for certainty in Descartes, there appears the chafed and agitated scepticism 
of Pascal. Montaigne worked upon Pascal as a powerful provocative; in fact, 
Montaigne must be credited for inspiring--perhaps "incitingft--many of the 
Pensees: besides some fifteen direct mentions of Montaigne in the Pensees, 
close to seventy borrowings or close parallels have been traced. l E. w. 
Patchett has remarked that "the sceptical arguments taken over from Montaigne 
• • • [are) so numerous that a running commentary on the Pensees reads almost 
like a re-edition of the Essais in many parts.,,2 Pascal reacted strongly 
against what he called Montaigne's "rather free and licentious opinions on 
some relations of life" and his suggested "indifference about sa1vation,,,3 
but he shared the realization of the quandary of doubt. In an anguished con-
sideration of man's uncertain state, Pascal wrote of the misery of man without 
God and, accordingly, found his own greatest consolation in his faith. 
Bayle 
'The scepticism that had been a "soft pillow of doubt" for Montaigne 
1 I See, e.g., notes to the Pensees, trans. W. F. Trotter (New York: 
E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc •• 1931). This edition is the reference for those 
Pensees noted by number throughout this study. 
2 E. W. Patchett, "Pascal and Scepticism," in Speculum Re1isdon1s: 
Being Essays and Studies in Religion and Literature from Plato to Von HUgel 
(Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1929), p. 153. 
3 / Pensees, 63. 
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became a bed of briars for Pascal and finally agitated the almost militant 
reaction of Pierre Bayle '(1647-1106) and the Scottish philosopher whom he 
profoundly influenced--David Hurne (1711-1776). Bayle's scepticism owes much 
to Hontaigne: in the "Preface to the first French Edition" of his DictionarY, 
Bayle felt obUged to prepare his more "Grave and Severe" readers for his 
1 
citations from Montaigne. In Bayle and Hume, scepticism began to be drawn 
out to its full implications; although both Bayle and Hume were reacting 
against Calvinism, their scepticism was not so much aimed, as it was in the 
earlier reformation dispute, at one or the other sect of Christianity, but, 
at least through implication, at Christianity itself with its claims of 
rational proof for the existence of God, its concepts of revelation, provi-
dence, and a benevolent God. Many of the earlier sceptics, in their doubt, 
were willing to give God the benefit of the doubt, but Bayle and Hume in their 
sceptical arguments, admittedly probable though they were, because of the 
presence of the power of evil in the world, came to have a less exalted image 
of God and moved from the negatively insinuative arguments of Bayle to the 
philosophically structured indifference of Hume. 
Pierre Bayle remains a slippery writer: even philosophers like James 
2 Collins, who predominantly tend to regard Bayle as a sceptical fideist, make 
note that Bayle 1s sometimes otherwise interpreted. Collins explains that: 
To a Voltaire and a Diderot, fideism could not be a seriously held 
position; it was only a convenient dodge in the game with the censor 
~ierre Bayle t An Historical and C.ri tical Dictionary (4 vols.; 
London: Printed for C. Harper, [etc.], 1710), no page number. 
2 God in Modern PhilosophI (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1959). p. 
133. 
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and the consistory.1 Hence they took a purely ironical view of Bayle's 
frequent juxtaposition of the critical findings of reason and the non-
rational certitudes of faith. 2 
Collins goes on to explain, however, that "to a man nour:1.shed on Hontaigne, 
alarron, and the Calvinistic divines, supernatural faith could well remain 
3 intact amidst the destructions wrought by a critical reason"; if Bayle was 
a f1deist, and, because of his final sceptical position of not knowing, he 
could sustain his fideism against a conflicting--but limited--reason, the 
point still to be made is that the "destructions wrought by a critical 
reason" became more virulent. Bayle's faith was, indeed, Bayle's faith: a 
subjective faith, it stood, if such it did, without his acceptance of any 
objectively organized philosophical or theological structure; rather, Bayle 
encouraged the antagonistic combat between faith and reason. Bayle, in fact, 
seemed to nourish the prospective undertakers of his own faith; by placing 
faith in an anti-rationalistic position and divorcing ethics, as he does, 
from religion, there is precious little left for faith: man's manner of know-
ing and acting are peculiarly his own, springing from his human nature, a 
nature that strives toward ultimate unity through the perception of relation-
ships and therefore meaning, but by making faith not only unrelated to but 
unreconcilable with, disparate, and antagonistic to reason, Bayle, in a certain 
sense, renders faith not only above our nature, super-natural, but 
1 Howard Robinson in Bayle the Sceptic (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1931), p. 200, shows that Rayle was arraigned before the Walloon 
Consistory at Rotterdam where it was insisted that he not weaken the value 
"of believing in a God, in Providence, and in the future life." 
2 Colltns, p. 128. 
3Ibid • 
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contranatural. 
Disturbed by the problems of predestination. Bayle, reacting against 
Calvinism like Hume--and like Melville--does not argue in a Christian context 
that man has sinned and needs a redeemer--Chr1st, but that man is sinned 
against by God (whether Bayle's Manichean God of Evil or a unique supreme God 
is not altogether clear), a God who has placed man in his impossible human 
predicament. Bayle asks: "Why then does he [St. Basil] say so coldly, That 
we must not search for Evil but in the Soul of Man? But who put it there?"l 
A few pages later Bayle recalls the statement that '~en are wicked, and that 
God is Good; which gave Occasion to this other Question, How comes it that 
God being Good, Men are wicked'l,,2 
Bayle was not satisfied with the solution offered of the "giftt! of 
free will: 
For if a Goodness so bounded as that of Earthly Fathers does necessarily 
require, that they should prevent 88 much as is possible, the bad use 
their Children might make of the good Things they give them; much more 
will an Infinite and AbRighty Goodness prevent the ill Effects of his 
Gifts.) 
In his article on the "Paulicians," Bayle again argues: 
Those who say that God peraitted Sin. because he could not hinder it 
without destroying Free-w1ll. which he had given to Man, and which was 
the best Present he had made ht.. expose themselves very much. • • • 
There is no good Mother who having given leave [freedom] to her Daughters 
to go to a Ball, but would revoke that leave. if she were sure thft they 
would yield to Enticement, and leave their Virginity behind them. 
1 Bayle, 1710 ed., IV, 2487. 
2 Ibid. , p. 2498. 
) !l!!!. , III, 1152. 
4 1!'!!!. , IV, 2488. 
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To the argument that Adam's fall and the subsequent sins of man were permitted 
and give occasion for God's justice and mercy to become manifest, Bayle 
counters that "this is to compare the Deity to a Father who should·suffer his 
Children to break their Legs on purpose to show to all the City his great Art 
1 in setting their Broken Bones. tt 
At the nub of Bayle's problem is the question of evil, physical as 
well as moral: as the Dictionary gives ample evidence, Bayle is at times 
obsessed with "the Difficulties about the Origin of Evi1.,,2 Because evil 
seems incompatible with the notion of a benevolent God, Bayle argues, at 
least ostensibly, for the Manichean position of two necessary principles, one 
good and one evi1--he asks: "If that only Principle be Good, whence comes 
Evil? If it be Bad, whence comes Good?,,3 Bayle se .. iugly endorses the idea 
of this duality of principles in his argument against orthodox belief in one 
God; he challenges the orthodox: 
You must therefore say that God is the Author of the Devi1's Malice, that 
he himself produced it such as it is, or sowed the Seeds of it in the 
Soil that he created; which is a thousand times more dishonourab1e t~ God, 
than to say that he is not the only necessary and independent Being. 
On the question of evil, the likelihood that Bayle is an ironist and is 
obliquely posing the possibility of a non-benevolent (one) God is, of course, 
a probability and will be developed further in the next chapter on Melville's 
knowledge of sceptic sources. Further, writing on the mixture of 11fe's 
lIbido 
2 ~., III, 1167. 
3 ~., IV, 2794. 
4 !lU:.t. I p. 2493. 
20 
adversity and prosperity, Bayle says of the Hanichean hypothesis of a good 
and evil principle: "These are things which lead us to suppose, that the two 
Principles made an Agreeaent which reciprocally limits their Operation. ,,1 In 
these two last citations may be 8een the grounds for what Collins calls 
"Bayle's famous dilemma that, in the face of evil, we must conclude either 
that God is omnipotent and hence malevolent or e18e that He is benevolent 
and hence limited in power.,,2 Either concept of God i8 far removed from the 
traditional Christian view, and a subsequent question arises concerning the 
sincerity of Bayle's positive claims for reve1ation--for what is the degree 
of dependability, or how much credence should be placed in the revelation of 
either a malevolent or a limited God? In Bayle the Sceptic, Howard Robinson 
shows in his eighth chapter, "The Dictionary--Mirac1es and the Bible," how 
Bayle takes delight in covert gibes at discrepancies in the Biblical text, and 
he claims that with Bayle only "lip service was paid to an inspired Bible. tt3 
When Bayle claims in "Explanation III, tf which follows the Dictionary. that 
"the most precious faith is that which, on the divine testimony, embraces 
the truths most opposed to reason," Collins comments: 
Whether this declaration be taken ironically or fideistica11y, the 
upshot is that on the prob1ea of evil and all other natural issues 
involving God, the probabilities of rational argumentation will always 
lean in the favor of unbe1ievers. 4 
1Ibid., p. 2487. Underlining mine. 
2Co11ius. pp. 292-293. 
3Robinson, p. 156. 
4Co11ins, p. 131. The passage commented on by Collins he takes 
from Bayle's Dictionnaire historique et critique (4 vo1s.; 3rd ed.; Rotterdam: 
Bobm, 1720), IV, 3005. 
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The point might be made that Bayle's rational dil ... as do not matter 
in the long run anyway, given Bayle's fideistic position; they aerely show to 
what impossible ends the inextricable entanalements of reason lead and apot-
light the fact that man should place his final confidence in faith alone. 
Such an answer would se .. fairly simple if Bayle hi.elf did not confuse the 
issue by the tone, stress, and example of his writings-he writes: 
You must necessarily make an Option betwixt Philosophy and the Gospel: If 
you will belie"e nothing but what is e"ident and agreeable to COllllOD 
Notions, choose Philosophy: If you'll be1ie"e the incoaprebensible Mys-
teries of Religion, taka Christianity and 1ea"e Phi10sopby; for to poss.ss 
E"idence and Incomprebensibility together is a tbing impossib1e. 1 
For one who advocates cboosing eitber evidence (phi1osopby and reason) or in-
coaprehensibi1ity (the gospel and faitb), the professedly fideistic Bayle's 
ex .. ple offers a strong case for the side of e"idence as against Christianity: 
bis Dictionary piles authority upon autbority for different questions; he 
laaents the fact that certain great philosopher. did not argue on a certain 
side of a question, but without hesitation, be, Bayle, hastens to supply the 
deficiency and argues at length "as they would have argued. "-But, then .. ain, 
evidence, for Bayle, was a relati"e quality. In the conundrum that is Bayle, 
perhaps the safest conclusion, if not the most accurate, is that of Ludwig 
'euerbach who states that Bayle is "in contradiction with himself" for accept-
ing both subjecti"e faith and an antagonistic critical reason. 2 This critical 
reasOD and specu1ati". sceptici .. challenged established noras and "iews of 
Christianity and was apparently more widely adopted by Bayle's discipl.s than 
1 Bayle, 1710 ed., in ''Explanation III" following Dictionary, IV, 
!xxi. 
2Co11ins is quoting. on p. 425, from Feuerbach's Pierre Bayle 
(Slmatliche Werte [10 "018.; Leipzig: Wigand, 1844-1866], VI, 158-159). 
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his questionably-intentioned claims for revelation. 
For those who see Bayle as a fideist--though still inimical to any 
rationally supported faith--his manner of arguing in the same style as the 
Calvinist divines, though to far different conclusions, merely exemplifies 
his efforts to shaw the futility of such argumentation in establishing any 
philosophical and theological defense of religious faith and the necessity of 
accepting faith as faith. For those who see Bayle as an ironist saying one 
thing and showing another and giving only feigned deference to faith (perhaps 
because of pressures from the consistory), while, at the same time, placing 
faith in a ridiculous and untenable position, his arguments become particu-
larly barbed and inimical to Christianity. The present purpose is not to 
solve the problem of Bayle's intentions, but to exemplify the fact that his 
intentions are hard to solve; because they are, there is the possibility of 
more than one reading; Collins and Robinson have been cited since they di-
vergently stress the two--fideistic and ironistic--views of Bayle respec-
tively. More important to our purpose is the fact that, whether right or 
wrong in his reading, MelVille, from the evidence of his works, and probably 
frOlll a literary man!.s sensitiveness to nuances of rhetoric, most likely in-
terpreted Bayle in the ironist view. 
Though Bayle revelled in philosophizing, he was not a systematic 
philosopher; many of hi. suggestive questionings, however, found their way 
into a system when they were incorporated by David Hume. Logically, Hume 
was an ultra sceptic: however, though Hume thought Pyrrhonism irrefutable, 
he reasoned that man was psychologically unable to sustain such a complete 
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scepticism--neither was it practical. He therefore advocated a mitigated 
scepticism in which men could believe, reason, and act, even though they could 
never discover foundations for these actions. He questioned the certitude 
of the cognitive faculties and, failing to find a bridge from mental to extra-
mental reality, he questioned the existence of the latter, and, by this doubt-
ing of the existence of the external world, cancelled (according to his own 
limited system) the possibility of reasoning a posteriori to God's existence 
or attributes. Hume not only questioned the possibility of making any exis-
tential demonstration (demonstrative reasoning, for Hume, is nonexistentia1), 
but he further questioned causal relationships, upon which proofs for the 
existence of God are based: Hume claims that because events are contiguous 
a habit of association is set up, so that the mind has a compulsion when it 
sees one thing to expect the other; nevertheless, necessitation is not in 
things or events but in the habituated mind. God becomes an unimportant 
vague possibility; in his reaction to Calvinism and religious practices and 
controls over reason and ethics, Hume not only removes God from the field of 
demonstrable knowledge but, consequently, from the field of practical ethics 
as well, since moral decisions can scarcely be influenced by a remote and 
incomprehensible deity that might or might not exist. 
Further, Hume--raising serious problems of personal identity--c1aims 
that the mind is not a substance or organ that has ideas: ideas, memories, 
etc., are actually separate or occur in a series--they ~ the mind in SO 
much as there is one, but there is no entity of "mind" or soul sub-standing 
thea. The existence of an immaterial mind and, henee, of free will (matter 
is determined--on1y the immaterial or spiritual can be "free") and an immortal 
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soul are held in doubt. Hume goes beyond questioning God's ways to man--the 
very concepts of "God" and "man" come under scrutiny. 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), like Descartes, rejected scepticism. Be 
endeavored to describe the bounds of valid knowledge. Kant's failure to 
provide the grounds for valid knowledge, however, inspired some readers to 
see his philosophy as containing an implicit if wholly unintentional scepti-
"" ciam. Emile Saisset, a contemporary of Melville's, has written of Kant: 
Ce serait se former de Kant une idee fausse que de le confondre avec les 
interpretes cons acres du scepticisme, les Pyrrhon, les Montaigne, les 
Bayle. Si sa philosophie, prise a la riguer, recele le scepticisme, sa 
grande ime en fut toujours exempte. Comme le dix-huitieme siecle, Kant 
a una foi. l 
Kant had faith; for some, unfortunately, he could not reconcile it with fact 
nor could he prove a powerful enough antidote for the objections of a Bayle 
and Hume. It may be argued that Kant simply assumed in the second Critique 
what he had shown to be undemonstrable in the first, i.e., any valid knowledge 
on the three great problems of metaphysics: God, freedom, and immortality. 
Such a brief consideration of Kant as this, of course, does not give an 
adequate idea of his intention nor of the complexity of his philosophy. It 
is all that seems justified in the present study, however, since Melville is 
numbered among those who did not find a solution to their sceptical quandaries 
in the system proposed by Kant. In fact, contrary to Kant '. intention, his 
answers, susceptible to rejection as they are, were capable, through their 
1" " , Emile Edmond Saisset, La scepticisme: AEnesideme--Pasca1--Kant: 
etudes pour servir a l'histoire critique du scepticisme ancien et mode me 
(Paris: Didier et cie, 1865), p. 352. 
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failure, of nurturing rather than alleviating the very problems they attempted 
to solve--such seems to be Melville's case. 
Melville's general affiliation with sceptic figures 
cism. 
Melville shared in all the accumulated intensity of the tide of scepti-
1 Though he rejected the carefree scepticis. of Rabelais and admired, 
but never quite attained, the serene scepticism of Montaigne, he shared their 
doubt. With Pascal, he felt the excoriating impact of scepticism and the 
misery of man without God: "Without a God, 'tis woet"2 But Pascal, through 
faith, was not "without God": Melville could place faith in no orthodox creed. 
Melville was torn between the beauty of part of the Christian message and what 
he felt to be Christianity's impracticability and even deception and came to 
argue against Christianity and Christianity's God with the same inimical 
scepticism as that of Bayle and Hume. Finally, he numbered with those who 
glimpsed the possibilities of a deeper despair following a ruptured hope in 
the period's las t formidable contender against scepticism, Immanuel Kant. 
Melville's despair, however, was not unremitting; he willed--as he wrote of 
Hunilla in "The Encantadas"--a "hope against hope.,,3 
~elville's admiration for the self-poised sceptic emanates from his 
portrait of Rolfe in Clarel and from his praise for the attitude of such 
minor but unforgettable figures as "the easy, indifferent Hautboy" in "The 
Fiddler": "It was plain that while Hautboy saw the world pretty much as it 
was, yet he did not theoretically espouse its bright side nor its dark side. 
Rejecting all solutions, he but acknowledged facts"--quoted from Billy Budd 
and Other Prose Pieces, pp. 222-223, of the Standard Edition. 
2 Herman Melville, Clarel: A Poem and Pilgrimage in the Holy Land, 
ed. Walter E. Bezanson (New York: Hendricks House. Inc., 1960), Pt. IV, 
canto xx, 1. 136. Bezanson's edition, used in this study, will hereafter 
be cited as Clarel. 
3The Piazza Tales, p. 226; from Rom. 4:18. 
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Without in any way claiming to exhaust the question of sources and 
influences, it is, nevertheless, significant to this brief history of scepti-
cism to point out that Montaigne knew the works of Rabelais;l Descartes had 
read Montaigne and his disciple Charron; Browne shared a common source with 
Montaigne in Sextus Empiricus and may have been indirectly influenced by 
Montaigne through Charron; Pascal knew Descartes and was profoundly influenced 
by Montaigne; Bayle is familiar with Charron, Descartes, and Pascal and has 
2 been called "the mouthpiece of Montaigne"; Hume, in turn, was deeply influ-
enced by Bayle and Montaigne: in most matters "Hume was congenially minded 
with Bayle, as with their common master, Montaigne,,;3 Kant's debt to Hume can 
hardly be exaggerated--though he discovered the critical problem of epistem-
ology, the problem of the conformity of thought and things, independently, 
his later reading in Hume confirmed and strengthened the development of his 
own thesis. These relations are significant because they show the great 
amount of philosophical inbreeding with a fairly consistent and common strain 
being, in many casu,,: Montaigne. Melville, too, was greatly influenced by 
Montaigne, particularly Montaigne's Pyrrhonistic nApology for Raimood Sebond" 
where most of the major critical problems that became those of subsequent 
modern philosophers, and Melville's, are present, particularly the ontologi-
cal problem--the problem of the nature of reality, and questions on God, 
freedom, and immortality--all of which depend upon the fulcrum, for whatever 
~ontaigne, Bk. I, chap. xxiv, p. 53 and Bk. II, chap. x, p. 187. 
2 Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (New York: St. 
Martins Press, 1960), p. 325. 
3 !lli.., p. 285. 
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it proves to be, of the epistemological, critical problem of the conformity 
between thought and things, man's ability, therefore, to know with certainty 
things as they are, since man must reason from the known to the unknown. 
This skeletal survey, cursory as it is, nevertbeless provides a 
coherent backdrop against which to investigate Melville's knowledge of sceptic 
sources. 
CHAPTER 11 
MRLVILLE'S KNOWLEDGE OF SCEPTIC SOURCES 
"The truth is that we are all sons, grandsons, 
or nephews or great-nephews of those who go 
before us. No one is his own sire.--" 
Letter to Duyckinck, 
3 March 1849. 
"Shakespeare had his fathers too" 
Pierre. 
Statement of problem 
Certain strands of information about Melville's sceptic sources are 
clearly defined; other facts, e.g., particular editions of books, remain 
elusive, and in some cases it is not known whether Melville made the acquain-
tance of certain authors through primary or secondary sources, though textual 
evidence establishes the acquaintance. 
Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus 
At some time during the year 1846 Melville's uncle Herman gave his 
namesake a copy of Ephraim Chambers' two-volume Cyclopaedia: Or, an Universal 
Dictionary of Arts and Sciences. l If Melville cared to investigate, he 
could have found articles on ttAcademicks," "Pyrrhonians," "Scepticism," and 
"Scepticka"--articles in which the names of Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus are 
in evidence. Melville met both Pyrrhonists and their philosophical tendencies 
1 (London: Printed for James and John Knapton, [etc.), 1728). 
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again with his 1848 acquisition of the works of Montaigne and in Bayle's 
Dictionary, which he purchased in 1849. After mid-February 1848,1 Melville 
borrowed the volume of Fran~ois Rabelais's works which contained the sceptic 
meanderings of the "Ephectic and Pyrrhonian Philosopher Trouillogan,,,2 and 
he later found a sympathetic treatment of Pyrrho in the 1853 edition of 
3 Diogenes Laertius' The Lives and 0Rinions of Eminent PhilosoRhers. 
Pyrrho's name appears in proximity to Montaigne's in Mardi, where 
Melville mentions "the sneer of Pyrrho" and names Plato as being of his 
counsel. 4 As the over-all and final evidence of Mardi attests, Melville's 
rejection of the "sneer" of Pyrrho, did not necessarily include a rejection 
of Pyrrhonic doubt: in Clarel, he also rejects those who, vaunting their 
doubt, sneer, "mock," and "scorn" the Holy Sepulcher. but he adds: 
But how of some which still deplore 
Yet share the doubt?5 
Further, Plato may not have been introduced to cancel the element of sceptic 
doubt, since Chambers' CycloRaedia, though leaning toward the dogmatic inter-
pretation of Plato, explains that u a great Controversy" raged among the 
6 
ancients themselves whether Plato was a sceptic or a dogmatist; and Montaigne, 
~erton M. Sealts, Jr., personal letter of 8 November 1965. 
2 The Works of Francis Rabelais: Translated from the French: With 
EKRlanatory Notes by Duchat. Ozell. and Others (4 vols.; London: John Russell 
Smith and John Miller, 1844), III, Bk. III, chap. xxxvi, SO. 
3 Trans. C. D. Yonge (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853). 
4 Mardi. II. chap. xv, 54. 
SClarel, Pt. I, canto iii, 11. 153-166. The writings of Melville's 
middle, darker period are not without their gibes, however. 
6 Chambers, II, 31. 
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in his "Apology," says: "Some have looked upon Plato aa a dogmatist, others 
88 a doubter, other. in some things the one, and in other things the other • 
• • • 'Tis said that ten several sects sprung from Plato."l Helville owned 
both Chambers' Cyclopaedia and the works of Montaigne at the time he was 
writing Mardi. 
A few paragraphs beyond the reference to "the sneer of Pyrrho," and 
probably with the thought still in mind, Melville has Media warn against the 
2 
"brutality of indiscriminate scepticism": The term "scepticism," as briefly 
explained in the opening chapter of this study, included several kinds of 
scepticisms, and it had acquired pejorative overtones because of its 89S0-
ciation not only with disbelief but with depravity. Because of his intense 
moral preoccupation, Melville would have objected to the sug~estion of de-
pravity, but he would not have objected so much to the connotations of dis-
belief, since he himself felt he could not accept the Christian credenda--in 
a large measure, in fact, he rejected organized Christianity because he 
personally failed to see that it offered a realistic and practicable moral 
code, more, that it could actually be a responsible cause leading toward de-
pravity. Like some sceptics before him, including Bayle, Melville questioned 
Christianity on the compatibility of its moral creed with a moral life. 
Literature of the period, while often predominantly defending reli-
gion, pointed up the "corrupting" influences of scepticism. The American 
Magazine of Useful and Entertaining Knowledge in the glowing article on 
"Locke and Newton" felt obliged in its peroration to admonish "the young to 
~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. '213. 
~ardi, 11, chap. xvi, 57. 
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avoid the corrupting speculations of illiterate skeptics ••• If who "would 
deserve some credit, if they would inquire, with candid minds ••• into the 
nature, character, and doctrines of our holy religion [which one is not 
stated]; instead of perverting its obvious meaning."l As a tangential obser-
vat ion , it may be wondered if such superficially hortative and unsubstantiated 
writing of the period did not repel the masculinely robust and probing mind of 
Melville and perhaps inadvertently increase his sceptical and argumentative 
attitude. 
There had also occurred between 1828-1831 a heated debate between the 
editors (particularly Robert Dale Owen) of a New York weekly bearing the 
sceptic title The Free Enquirer and their opponent William Gibbons. In the 
first number of The Free Enguirer, in an article called "Our Title," the 
editors claim: "It speaks of doubts and changes; it savors of infidelity and 
independence. It prognosticates hard questions and unwelcome discoveries; and 
the orthodox and the loyal like it not."2 The weekly ran favorable articles 
on such topics as "Atheism" and "The Advantages of Scepticism" and wrote an 
eloquent defense of the Devil; the article "On the Existence and Character of 
Jesus of Nazareth" ends by questioning both, and the weekly includes such 
1 (Boston: John L. Sibley and Benjamin H. Greene, 1837), 1, 366. For 
other passages indicating period concepts of scepticism as anti-religious see 
in this same source "lnfidel Philosophers," I, 464 and "Skepticism," 11, 127. 
Although Hawthorne was editor of and contributed articles to the American 
Magazine for six numbers beginning with the March, 1836 issue, none of the 
articles opposed to scepticism are his. 
2 R. L. Jennings, William OWen, Robert Dale Owen, and Frances Wright 
(eds.), The Free Enquirer (weekly; 2nd series; 3 vols.; New York: Vol. I 
Printed at the Office of the Free Enquirer, 1829; Vol. 11 Published by Wright 
& OWen, 1830; Vol. 111 Printed at the Office of the Free Enquirer, 1831), 1, 
6. Orestes A. Brownson was Corresponding Editor for several issues of the 
second volume. 
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deceptively entitled articles as "Of the Coldness and Heartlessness of Scepti-
dsm.," which is actually a defense of scepticism. and an accusation of Chris-
tianityas cold and heartless. In "Bible Selections," Robert Dale Owen points 
to the "cruel, obscene and im.m.oral stories in the Bible," and in an article 
on "Byron's Cain" that would have interested Melville, if it ever came to his 
attention, Owen sanctions the assertion that "the arguments against orthodoxy 
are frankly acknowledged to be unanswerable," and ridicules "implicit faith." 
The weekly dips into "moral heresy," as the editors call it, with their 
attacks on religion and articles advocating divorce and free love--an article 
on "Bonaparte and Josephine" appeared that was enough to set any Victorian's 
teeth on edge, since alliances of mere affection (also changes of alliance 
based on something of the psychology behind a Russian treaty) were condoned. 
William Gibbons wrote a rebuttal, An Exposition of Modern Scepticism. in a 
Letter, Addressed to the Editors of t~e Free Enquirer, in which he connects 
sceptics with those who curse and deny God, and he shows the sceptic as a 
"subverter of morals" and one who exalts "profligacy • • • and vice. ,,1 
Gibbons further accuses the weekly of saying that God is full of m.alice, envy, 
2 
and hatred. The issue of The Free Enguirer for 16 January 1830 contains a 
rebuttal to the rebuttal and the argument continues for several issues. 
Questions that arose during the weekly's publication and debate include the 
problems of doubt, reliability of sense perceptions, possibility of an "unjust 
Deity," supposed failures of revelation and orthodoxy, the nature of Providence, 
1(3rd ed. corrected and enlarged; Wilmington, Del.: Printed and Sold 
by R. Porter and Son, 1829), pp. 4-5. 7, 25. 
2 Ibid., p. 27. 
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questions of chance or design, freedom or necessity, 
or annihilation, problems of morality--all issues wh 
in Melville's works. 
By the end of its first volume, .;:.Th.:;.;.e;:;...;F;;.;r:;.;e:;.;e::;...;;=-==.:::. 
teen states and six agents in New York itself, and Gibbon's Exposition of 
Modern Scepticism had gone into a third "corrected and enlarged" edition in 
1829, all of which seems to indicate that the problems of scepticism, as well 
as contemporary associations of scepticism with depravity, were not strictly 
esoteric or relegated to the philosophy text of a verging Victorian and 
vestigially Puritanic America, but found their way to a certain segment of the 
popular, contemporary audience--especially in New York in the case of The Free 
Enguirer. On the question of scepticism leading to corruption, Melville con-
versely showed the possibility of Christianity becoming a vehicle for corrup-
tion, particularly in the cases of the often self-aggrandizing and hypocriti-
cal missionaries and ministers. 
Melville, like Eaterson, rejected that type of scepticism found "where 
there is depravityl1 and "a slaughter-house style of thinking. ,,1 but 11ke 
Emerson in his appraisal of Montaigne, only tending to a darker view of exis-
tence than Emerson (the two compressed into one, in fact, might have made 
the ideal sceptic), Melville was also deeply impressed by the cogency of the 
sceptic's pendulous position in a consciously cultivated state of equipollence. 
By the time of Moby-Dick, Pyrrho is even forgiven his sneer, or 
1 
"On Immorta11 ty. II The Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson, with 
a biographical introduction and notes by Edward Waldo Emerson, and a general 
index (Centenary Edition; 12 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Printed at the River-
side Press, 1903-1904), VIII, 332. 
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perhaps it recedes to the background in favor of his ponderous and "deep 
thoughts": 
And I am convinced that from the heads of all ponderous profound beings, 
such as Plato, Pyrrho, the Devil, Jupiter, Dante, and 80 on, there al-
ways goes up a certain semi-visible steam, while in the act of thinking 
deep thoughts.1 
Finally, in Clare1, for what weight of significance it may have, Rolfe, whom 
Bezanson calls the "best-rounded temper_ent of the group" and in whom he 
sees a general parallel to Melville, even a "self-projection, ,,2 is called a 
"Pyrrhonist.,,3 
But Melville, in all probability, did not resort to the stark, bare 
bones of the Greek Bypotyposes or Outlines of Scepticism, but obtained his 
classic scepticism fleshed out in the "roast-beef done rare" adaptation of 
the French sceptics, labelais, Montaigne, and Bayle, and Swigged it down in 
the subtle English ale of the sonorous Sir Thomas Browne, Knight. 
labe1ais 
Melville may well have approached Rabe1ais in a spirit of social self-
defense, in an effort to be as knowledgeable as the literary "in-groups," the 
Knickerbocker set and their ilk: Perry Miller takes as much delight in ex-
plaining New York's mid-nineteenth-century contemporary notions of 
"labelaisian"--"an adjective which they [New Yorkers] took particular pride 
~ObY-Dick, II, chap. lxxxv, 116. 
2Clarel, pp. 545, lxxxvii, !xxxiv respectively. 
3 Ibid., Pt. II, canto xxi, 1. 32. 
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in applying to themselves, in order to prove (most of all when they had come 
originally from New England) that they were not Bostonian prudes"l--as New 
Yorkers did in appraising themselves such. Whatever hi. reasons, Melville 
borrowed from Evert Duyckinck in January or February of 1848 t volume II of 
Rabelais's Works, and sometime after mid-February 1848 he returned for volumes 
III and IV. The exact edition is not known, although Sealts gives as a 
queried entry the London edition of 1844 which is being used in this study.2 
If Whitney Hastings Wells is correct in his assumption that Melville knew 
Book I, chapter x of the Works, "Of That Which is Signified by the Colours 
White and Blue, ,,3 then Melville was fai1iar with the first volume as well. 
Rabelais seems to have functioned in complicity with other sources of 
the late 1840's to help Melville toward some kind of "artistic liberation," 
and Merrell R. Davis haa shown how Melville turned to Rabe1ais for the frame-
work of his travelogue-satire in Mardi as well as for devices of burlesque of 
legal documents and gatherings of odd curios, books, and manuscripts of a 
misplaced antiquarianism. Mr. Davis also suggests that the numerous refer-
ences to devils in Rabelais may have inspired the invisible spirits described 
lThe Raven and the Whale: The War of Words and Wits in the Era of 
Poe and Melville (A Harvest Book Paperback; New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
World, Inc., 1956), p. 17. 
~erton M. Sea1ts, Jr., '~e1vi11e's Reading: A Check-List of Books 
Owned and Borrowed," Harvard Library Bulletin, II (Spring, 1948), 141-163; 
II (Autumn, 1948), 378-392; III (Winter, 1949), 119-130; III (Spring, 1949), 
268-277; III (Autumn, 1949), 407-421; IV (Winter, 1950), 98-109; '~e1vi11e's 
Reading: A Supplementary List of Books Owned and Borrowed," !!!&, VI (Spring, 
1952), 239-247. No. 417. 
3 
''Moby Dick and Rabelais," !:!y!, XXXVIII (February, 1923), 123. 
1 in Mardi. 
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Most often, it is the jovial, wine-advocating, "Drink-with-unbuttoned-
bellies" Rabelai. that comes to Melville' s mind: in heaven, Dante will 
2 
"shake sides with fat Rabelais"; in his full-moon madne.s Babbalanja declares: 
"All sages have laughed,-let us; Bardiaua laughed,--let us; Daorkriti 
laughed,--let us; Amoree laughed,--let us; Rabeelee roared,--let us,,;3 in 
addition to borrowing one of the extracts in MobY-Dick from Rabelais's Book 
IV, chapter xxxiii, Melville mentions hta again when he later rejects the 
passing wisdOll of "jolly" Rabelais for that of .olean and "unchristian Solo-
4 
.on's wisdom"; again from Rabelais, the inscription "In wine, truth" OIl 
the portal of the temple of the holy bottle appears in the confidence-aan's 
If In vino veritas,,,5_-the Latin version being given in the notes to the 1844 
6 
edition --and the bachelor later affirms that "Rabelais '. pro-vine Koran [is] 
no more trustworthy than MahOllet's anti-wine one.,,7 Finally trustworthy or 
not, however, wine becomes symbolically c01l1lected with truth throughout l!!!. 
Confidence-Man: when the aerchant gives his dicttD on the "cold cave of 
~rrell R. Davis, Melville's Mardi: A Chartless Voyage (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1952), pp. 76-77, 153-154, 167 n. 4. 
~rdi, I, chap. iii, 14. 
3 ~ •• II, chap. lxxix, 350. 
~obY-DiCk, II, chap. xcvi, 182. 
5The Confidence-Msn, chap. xi:l1, p. 87. 
6I.abelai •• III, 166. The "Explanatory Remarks" in IV, 122 likewise 
aaintain that "the Greek text of the New Test_ent • • • gives the n_e of 
wine to truth." 
7Tbe Confidence-Man. chap. xxiv, p. 181. 
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truth," it is only after several gluses of "wine seemed to shoot to his heart, 
and begin sooth-saying there,,;l and u long as the two confidence-men, the 
boon companions "Prank" and "Charlie," abstain from drinking their wine, they 
2 are able to maintain their reciprocated prevarication. 
Even more significant than examples of form and literary device was 
Rabelais's presentation, through the pilgrimage to the oracle, of an ineffec-
tual search for final and absolute truth. Despite sOlIe slighting allusions, 
Melville never completely rejected the lusty humor of Rabelais, and the 
Prencluaan's racy bawdiness is present in his own covert "Rabelaisiani_s, "--
and his not so covert ones over a glus of good port vith a friend3--but 
such humor was outweighed When he caae to consider seriously man's existen-
tial dilemma, and Melville's predOlllinant, if not sole, attitude toward life was 
traaic: "Man,' poor player,' succeeds better in life' s tragedy than comedy. ,,4 
Montaiee 
DefeBae of the importance of Montai8ne's sceptical influenca.--
Melville' s readina vaa of a "varied scope • • • randOlllly acquired"; 5 as this 
study attempts to show by the inclusion of several names connected with his 
1 ~., chap. xiii, p. 87. 
2 lk!!t., chap. xxix, p. 214ft. 
3In The Raven and the Whale, p. 18, e.g., Miller quotes a New 
Orleans reporter who describes an evenina at the hOllle of Dr. Prancis in 
l8S0: after paying proper attention to the Doctor, Tuckerman, Grisvold, 
and n,ayckinck, in that order, he remarks: ''Melville (when in town) is 
taciturn, but genial, and when wamed-up, capitally racy and pungent." 
4 Israel Potter, chap. xxv, p. 212. 
SAa Melville says of his hero in Pierre, Ik. XXI, chap. i, p. 394. 
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penchant for sceptical thought, it would be a narrow and falsifying perspec-
tive to isolate a sole source; nevertheless, if it is a question of stress, 
Michel de Montaigne, whose works Melville valued enough to purchase for him-
self, aay well be one of the aost significant sources of influence both 
directly and indirectly (certainly through Bayle) on Melville's sceptical 
thought. This influence began early and is evident in the scepticism of 
Mardi, where Montaigne is first aentioned. In the index to Mr. Lawrance 
Thompson's Melville's Quarrel with God there appears an entry referring to 
"1:JM's Changing Responses To" Montaigne, which reads: Itln Mardi, St. Paul 
1 
represented as overcoming doubts raised in BM's aind by Montaigne. 1t This 
interpretation is, however. an apparent misreading of the brief statement in 
2 Mardi: "I list to St. Paul who argues the doubts of Montaigne." Thompson 
evidently interprets the aeaning as "argues againstU ; a reading of the 
"Apology," however, reveals the aeaning as "argues for" or "along with." Of 
the some fourteen references from St. Paul throughout the Essays, ten are in 
the "Apology"; of the remaining four, only one pertains to doubt and it sub-
stantiates a sceptical position: "The Lord knoweth the thoughts of the wise, 
that they are vain ... 3 In the "Apology," which Melville seems certainly to have 
been reading during the writing of Mardi, there appears the Pauline text which, 
4 
as Popkin observes, was to be the favorite Scriptural text of the nouveaux 
l(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 468. 
~rdi, II, chap. xv, 54. 
31 Cor. 3:20 as quoted in Montaigne, Bk. III, chap. ix, p. 458. 
4 Popkin, p. 48. 
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E.xrrhoniens: 
I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the 
understanding of the prudent. Where is the wise? Where is the scribe? 
Where is the disputer of this world? Hath not God made foolish the 
wisdom of this world? For after tha~, in the wisdom of God, the world 
knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save 
them that believe. l 
Mr. Thompson recognizes Montaigne's presiding eletaent of doubt but seemingly 
misinterprets the use of Pauline texts to confirm that scepticism and, there-
fore, downplays ita probable tmpact on Melville, who vas exquisitely sensitive 
to darkly ambiguous passages from Scripture. 
Another work, however, seems to have completely missed the prevalence 
of Montaigne t S Pyrrhonistic sceptici .. , much of which was tran81llitted to 
Melville: the Mansfield-Vincent edition of Moby-Dlck offers selected quota-
tiona to show that Montaigne ''made numerous disparaging comments on him 
[Pyrrho] and his followers, particularly in Book 2, chap. 12, 'An Apologie of 
2 RaY!lond Sebond. II. In the Mansfield-Vincent note preceding the above cita-
tion Pyrrho is described as a "Greek philosopher • • • who maintained the 
impossibility of knowing things in their own nature"--this is, however, the 
11 Cor. 1:19 as quoted in Montaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 230. Other 
anti-rational texts in the "Apology" borrowed by Montaigne from Paul are 
Col. 2:8: 
'That our wisdom is but folly in the sight of God: that the vainest of 
all vanities is man: that the man who presumes upon his wisdom does not 
yet know what wisdom is; and that man, vho is nothing, if he thinks 
himself to be anything, does seduce and deceive htmselt' (Bk. II, chap. 
xii, p. 205). 
Rom. 1:22 "Men • • • professing themselves to be vise, they become fools" 
(Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 245). Col. 2:8 and I Cor. 1:19 are again quoted in 
the essay (Bk. II, chap. xii, pp. 224 and 257-258). 
2"Explanatory Notes" to Melville's Moby-Dick or, the Whale, ed. 
Luther S. Mansfield and Howard P. Vincent (New York: Hendricks House, 1952), 
pp. 783-784. Hereafter cited as Hendricks House Moby-Dick. 
40 
crux of the argument in the II Apology, tt the limi tation of man t s reason, man's 
inability to "know what things truly are in themselves,,,l his inability to 
2 
communicate with being, his incertitude about the congruity of "resemblances" 
conveyed to the soul by the senses and the thing "resembled.,,3 This argument, 
in turn, becomes the spinal column upon which all the "business" of the great 
leviathan Moby-Dick converges--that the nature of the universe is problematic. 
One of the so-called "disparaging comments" quoted in the Hendricks 
House edition is the following: 
The Philosopher Pyrrho being at Sea, and by reason of a violent storme 
in great danger of being cast away, presented nothing to those that were 
with him in the ship, to imitate but the securitie of an Hog which was 
aboard, who nothing at all dismaied, seemed to behold and outs tare the 
tempest. 4 
The word "nothing" may be the misleading word in the above quotation; however, 
sceptics advocated suspension of judgment, which was supposed to result in 
serenity, imperturbability, or indifference and repose called by the scep-
tics ~taraxia: when Pyrrho points out the calmness of the pig during a 
raging storm, he is, in effect, giving the pig credit for having more wisdom 
and dignity than man exhibits in his uncontrolled perturbation--an example of 
animal sagacity which would have pleased Montaigne mightily, especially since 
his lengthy comparison of man and animals, much to the detriment of mankind, 
occurs in the same essay. 
It is true, as Mansfield and Vincent quote, that Montaigne writes of 
~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 281. 
2l.!?.!S. 
3Ibid • 
4Hendricks House Moby-Dick, pp. 783-784. 
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the Pyrrhonians: "The profession of the Phyrronians [s1c] is ever to waver, 
to doubt and to enquire, never to be assured of any thing, not to take any 
warrant of himse1f,,;1 taken out of context, this description lIlay be read as 
a disparaging one; read in context, however, it implies something far different 
for it is sanctioned by Montaigne and is a preparation for his condemnation of 
an unwarranted dogmatic position. Montaigne goes on to explain this wavering 
and doubting as leading to a suspension of judgment and writes: 
Is it not mueh better to suspend one's persuasion than to intermeddle 
with these wrangling and seditious divisions: "What shall I choose?" 
"What you please, provided you will choose. 1f A very foolish answer; but 
such a one, nevertheless, as all dogmatism seems to point at, and by which 
we are not permitted to be ignorant of what we are ignorant of.2 
3 With that wonderful candor for which Melville praises Montaigne in B1lly Budd, 
the Gascon argues against the arbitrary assumption of an "assured" position 
when we are, in fact, ignorant. 
Montaigne's Pyrrhonism is widely recognized and it may seem to be 
laboring the obvious to argue further; yet, because this misunderstanding 
4 
occurs in a very significant piece of Melville scholarship, it may not be out 
1 ~., p. 784. 
~ontaigne. Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 232. 
3Herman Melville, Billy Budd. Sailor (An Inside Narrative), reading 
text and genetic text, edited from the manuscript with introduction and notes 
by Harrison Hayford and Merton Sealts, Jr., (2nd impression; Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1963), leaf 83, [po 62]. Hereafter cited as 
Billy Budd, ed. Hayford-Sealts. 
4The one difference treated here is not meant to detract from the 
over-all value of the Mansfield-Vincent edition--neither, of course, is it 
meant to depreciate in toto Mr. Lawrence Thompson's study. Mr. Thompson's 
rhetoric has sparke~O;;-Combative reactions because of its note of con-
descension to the reader of Melville; nevertheless, with a daring thesis, 
he had the courage to lay his brains on the line. 
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of place to offer these more obvious affirmative passages on Pyrrho and 
Pyrrhonism from the "Apology." Montaigne writes of Pyrrho: 
He would never make hiluself a stock or a stone, he would show himself 
a living man, discoursing, reasoning, enjoying all reasonable conven-
iences and pleasures, employing and making use of all his corporal and 
spiritual faculties in rule and reason. The fantastic, imaginary, and 
false privileges that man had usurped of lording it, ordaining, and 
establishing, he has utterly quitted and renounced. l 
Montaigne says of Pyrrhonism: "There is nothing in human invention that 
carries so great a show of likelihood and utility as this, .. 2 and in a canpari-
son of the Academics and Pyrrhonians, he writes that Itthe Pyrrhonian opinion 
is more bold, and also somewhat more likely"3_-he then continues his descrip-
tion of the human situation in Pyrrhonian terms. Earlier in the essay, Mon-
taigne asserts that the idea of the Pyrrhonians is '~ore certainly understood 
by interrogation: 'What do I know?' as 1 bear it, with the emblem of a 
balance,,4-by declaring that the question "What do I know," Montaigne's 
famous Que s~ay-je?, is the motto that he bears inscribed over a pair of 
scales, Montaigne reveals his own Pyrrhonistic position. Numerous other 
Pyrrhonian expressions were inscribed on the ceiling of his library. Although 
recent scholarship seeks psychological and moral convictions in the last book 
of Montaigne's essays, centuries of readers found the epitome of Montaigne'. 
thought in the question which forms the heart of the "Apology," his Que 
~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 232. 
2 
.lli.!!., p. 233. 
3 ~., p. 262. 
4 
.lli.!!. t p. 244. 
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s!jay-je.f.-"What do I know?" Melville asks: "What may man know?"l Montaigne 
claims that the idea of the Pyrrhonian position is best understood by inter-
rogation. and the question becomes a pervasive form for Melville's considera-
tion of terminal realities. 
Possible factors contributing to ltelville's interest in Montaigne.--
It is probably not possible to pinpoint the exact circumstances that insti-
gated Melville's interest in acquiring and studying the works of Montaigne, 
although several possibilities present themselves. In Boston, 1 January 1846, 
Ralph Waldo Emerson gave the first reading of his lecture "Montaigne; Or, 
The Skeptic." Montaigne was an early and persistent favorite with Emerson 
and received mention in his sceptically influenced essay "Experience," pub-
lished in Essays, Second Series on October 19, 1844. There is only a doubtful 
but provocative possibility that Emerson might have led Melville to Montaigne, 
for just how early and, if early, how deeply Melville was influenced by Emer-
son remains a moot question. In the often quoted letter to Evert Duyckinck, 
3 March 1849, Melville remarks: "I had only glanced at a book of his 
[Emerson's] onee in Putnam's store--that was all I knew of him, till I heard 
him lecture.,,2 The ingenuousness of Melville's choice of "glanced" may enjoy 
the latitude of his South Sea adventure claims, or, as he wrote to Hawthorne 
of Solomon, he may have "a little managed the truth,") or, again, the remark 
1 Clarel, Pt. IV, canto iii, 1. 109. 
2 The Letters of Herman Melville, ed. :r-ferrell R. Davis and William H. 
Gilman (3rd printing; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 79. Here-
after cited as Letters. Melville attended Freeman Place Chapel on Beacon 
Street on 5 February 1849 to hear one of Emerson's five lectures on '~ind 
and Manners in the Nineteenth Century." 
) ~., p. 130. 
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may be one of .t.ple truth.Sealt.' check-li.t of Melville'. reading .how. 
the acqui.ition of Emerson'. The Conduct of Life in 1870, the E •• ays, first 
and second series, in 1862, and the Poem. in 1859.1 Internal evidence in ~ 
Confidence-Man (1857) and in Pierre (1852) and in some of the short stories 
places the acquaintance even earlier. and Eleanor Melville Metcalf estab-
lishes, through a letter of Hrs. Nathaniel Hawthorne, that Melville read 
Emerson's essays in 1850;2 finally, Perry Miller pushes the relationship even 
further back by seeiug evidences of transcendentalism in Mardi (1849)--
Miller .ay.: "Clearly Melville must have read much of Emerson, if only in 
Putn .. •• store, during these crucial years.,,3 The tendencies of transcenden-
talism were not unknown to New York literary circle., however, and Melville 
could have easily gleaned second hand accounts of Emerson's lectures and 
essay.. Further, .imilarities between Emer.on and Melville might well hinge 
on the fact that both had many .ources in common. 
In hi. lecture on Montaiane, Emer.on said: "I heard with pleasure 
that one of the newly-discovered autographs of William Shakespeare was in a 
4 
copy of Florio's translation of Montaigne." While vi.iting the library of 
1 Sealts, No •• 203, 204, 205, 206. 
2 Eleanor Melville Metcalf, Herman Melville: Cycle and Epicycle. 
(Cambridge, M .... : Harvard University Pres., 1953). p. 91. 
3 Perry Hiller, '~elville and Tran.cendentalism," in Moby-Dick 
Centenaial Essals. edited for the Melville Society with an introduction by 
Tyrua Billway and Luther S. Mansfield (Dallas: Southern Methodi.t Univer.ity 
Pre8s, 1953). p. 146. 
4 Works, IV, 163. 
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the British Museum in London in 1849. Melville saw this autograph and records 
the fact in his Journal. l Whether Melville knew Emerson's lecture or not, the 
statement is important in establishing contemporary awareness of the connec-
tion between Montaigne and Shakespeare and a question arises concerning the 
importance of Helville's own association of the two--is it, for example, mere 
coincidence that Melville bought his Shakespeare and Hontaigne at the same 
time?2 Melville's cognizance of the connection became particularized when he 
marked, in Hamlet II: ii, the prince's speech, "Why, then 'tis none to you; 
for there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it 80; to me it is 
a prison," and comments: "Here is forcibly shown the great Montaignism of 
Hamlet.") Sceptical implications, the subjective relativeness and variability 
of human opinion, are evident in the passage. The scepticism of Hamlet, with 
its darkly doubting, questioning, Renaissance prince, had a profound effect 
on Melville, and it usually heads his list of tragic characters and plays that 
show Shakespeare in his "grandest conceits" and as tithe profoundest of think-
ers.,,4 It is Hamlet, Timon. Lear, and Iago who say what is "so terrifically 
true"i 5 it is the "deeper significances of its pervading indefiniteness" that 
1 Journal of a Visit to London and the Continent by Herman Melville, 
1849-1850, ed. Eleanor Melville Metcalf (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1948), p. 51. Hereafter cited as Journal--London and the Continent. 
2 Sealts, No. 366. 
3Jay Leyda, The Melville Log: A Documentary Life of Herman Melville, 
1819-1891 (2 vols.; New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1951), I, 288-291. 
Hereafter cited as I.og. 
4The quotations are from p. 126 of the first installment of Melville's 
"Hawthorne and His Mosses,tt The Literary World, VII (August 17, 1850), 125-
127; (August 24, 1850), 145-147. 
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I 
makes the narrator apply Hamlet to Pierre's situation; and when Melville 
writes in "The Coming Storm," 
No utter surprise can come to him 
Who reaches Shakespeare's core; 
That which we seek and shun is there--
Man's final lore--
the one who is not surprised is described as the one who has "Hamlet in his 
heart. tt2 
A selection from the Westminster Review in the tlCritical Opinions" 
section of the edition of Montaigne's works which Melville purchased discusses 
the Shakespeare-Montaigne relationship; though the review calls attention to 
the chronological problem in the question of the possible influence of Mon-
taigne on Hamlet, analogies are drawn: 
On the whole, the celebrated soliloquy in "Hamlei'presents a more charac-
teristic and expressive resemblance to much of Montaigne's writings than 
any other portion of the plays of the great dramatist which we at present 
remember; though it would doubtless be easy to trace many apparent trans-
ferences from the Frenchman into the Englishman's works, as both were 
keen and many-sided observers in the same age, and neighbouring countries. 
But ftHamlet" was in these days no popular type of character; nor were 
Montaigne's views and tone familiar to men till he had himself made them 
so. Now the Prince of Denmark is very nearly a Montaigne, lifted to a 
higher eminence, and agitated by more striking circumstances and a severer 
destiny, and altogether a somewhat more passionate structure of man. 3 
In Pierre, the narrator relates the tragic story of the Egyptian Memnon (who 
serves as an analogue for Pierre himself) and the story is called the 
''R_Ietism of the antique world"; in a following observation, Melville shows 
1 Pierre, Bk. IX, chap. iii, p. 236. 
2Collected Poems of Herman Melville, ad. Howsrd P. Vincent (Hendricks 
House edition; Chicago: Packard & Co., 1947), p. 94. Hereafter cited as 
Collected Poems. 
1Montaigne, p. xli. 
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how important he felt the connection to be between Shakespeare and Montaigne: 
"The English tragedy [Hamlet] is but Egyptian Memnon, Montaignised and 
modernised; for being but a mortal man Shakespeare had his fathers too."l 
Melville was probably led to a more serious study of Montaigne because of his 
affinities to and probable influence on the works of Shakespeare, which Mel-
ville so much admired, particularly Hamlet, and the element of scepticism. in 
this, the greatest of Shakespeare's tragedies, was to find its way into all 
of Melville's tragedies as something more than a literary device to be ob-
jectively manipulated with undisturbed detachment--rather, because of Mel-
ville's own probing, there is a growing and perceptible integrity between 
the artist and his artifact in the realization of the tragedy that William 
Ellery Sedgwick came so aptly to title TIle Tragedy of Mind. 
In addition to the possibility, direct or indirect, of Emerson lead-
ing Melville to Montaigne, there is the conjectural possibility of a latent 
interest sown by the presence of "long rows of old books, . . . [some] printed 
in Paris. ,,2 which formed part of Allan Melville's library during Herman' 8 
childhood. Though Melville's father "spoke French like a native, ,,3 his son 
did not know foreign languages, but the presence of these books may have 
engendered a curiosity that would later burgeon into an active investigation 
of a number of French writers, Montaigne among them. 
1 Pierre, Bk. VII, chap. Vi, p. 191. 
2 Redburn, chap. i, p. 6. 
3 
"Herman Melville,1I Cyclopaedia of American Literature, ed. Evert 
A. Duyckinck and George L. Duyckinck (2 vols.; New York: Charles Scribner, 
1856), II, 672. Hereafter cited as Duyckincks' Cyclopaedia. 
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In New York, Melville also had contact with a number of leading 
Francophiles, artists who probably could have spoken of the works of Montaigne 
with familiarity. Anne C. Lynch, the later Mrs. Botta, conducted one of New 
1 York's leading salons--perhaps ~ leading salon --frequented by a motley 
group of literati; in Charles Frederick Briggs' roman ~ clef, The Trippings of 
Tom Pepper, which began serialization in the ~irr~ 14 November 1846, Mel-
ville's friend Evert Duyckinck as Tibbings shares with Anne Lynch, euphoniously 
named "Lizzy Gil," and certain other of the elect, including Poe, the honor 
of special and, particularly in nuyckinck's case, satirical characterization: 
at one point in the narrative Duyckinck is shown in shadow-like attendance 
on Cornelius Mathews at one of "Lizzy Gil's" l'Iotrees. 2 Another obvious con-
nection between Duyckinck and Miss Lynch is her inclusion in the Duyckincks' 
3 4 Cyclopaedia of American Literature. Melville owned a copy of Tom Pepper 
and, while Mardi was in the making, recorded evidence shows him in attendance 
at least once at "Lizzy Gil's," the occasion being a Valentine party 14 
February 1848 at which Bayard Taylor--another Francophile--read a verse honor-
S ing Melville. Without belaboring the fact of numerous social interconnec-
tiona of Francophiles relating to Melville during hf.B residence in New York, 
1 See the contributory chapter tlHer Salon" by A. J. Bloor in Memoirs 
of Anne C. L. Botta, ed. Vincenzo Botta (New.York: J. Selwin Tait & Sons, 
1894), pp. 181-191. 
2 See Miller's chapter on "Tom Pepper" in The Raven and the Whal.e, 
pp. 168-185. 
3"Anne Charlotte Rotta" in Duyckincks' ~'y'c.l..9..P!l~, II, 627-628. 
4 Sealts. No. 86A. 
S Log, I, 272. 
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1845-1850, suffice it to say that the suddenly sceptical current of Melville '. 
thought, which mace its debut in Mardi, may owe a great deal to an unwritten 
but social source which could ':lell have directed both the choice and inter-
pretation of his reading~ including ~1ontaigne, at this time. 
As a corroborative clue to the type of coterie mentality which may 
have influenced Helville's interpretation of a predominantly French core of 
sceptic writers, perhaps not enough attention has been given to Anne C. Lynch 
Botta's Hand-Book of Universal Literature, which first appeared in 1860 and 
which, by 1867, was in its seventh edition. Helville and Duyckinck both 
1 
receive at least a passing nod in the Hand-Book. In her "Preface." Mrs. 
Botta declares: 2 "This work was begun many years 8~O,1I that is. during those 
years when, in addition to the compilation and summation of numerous earlier 
literary sources, she was acquiring through a peculiarly keen feminine im-
pressionability the various idealities, including those of a number of leading 
Francophiles, which came to a confluence within the precincts of her own 
parlor, and it is revealing to discover as a note of coherence aJl10ng the 
various entries in her section devoted to French literature in the Hand-Book 
a marked preoccupation with scepticism. Certain passa~es of the ~and-Book 
are relevant not only to the present consideration of Melville's reading of 
Montaigne but point back to Rabelais and forward to Bayle. After a cursory 
treatment of Rabelais, Mrs. Botta continues: 
Intellect continued to struggle with its fetters. Many, like Rabelais, 
mistrusted the whole system of ecclesiastical polity established by law, 
------------------------~-----------------------------------------------------
1 Anne C. Lynch Botta, Hand-Book £If Universal },iterature (7th ed.; 
Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1867), pp. 538, 543. 
2 
..ill,g.., p. ii1. 
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and yet did not pin their faith on the dictates of the austere Calvin. 
The almost inevitable consequence was a wide and universal skepticism, 
replacin~ the former implicit subjection to ROlllanism. 
The most eminent type of this school was Montsigne [whom Botta declares 
is considered the earliest philosophi.cal writer in French prone 1 (153.3--
1592). who. in his ESBays. shook the foundations of all the creeds of his 
day, ~.lithout offer:tnr: R.nyt.hi.nl! t" -:-epl::!cc thl?ln. 1 
Mrs. BottA i.ncludes Rabelais anc1 l'-10,..!taigne, as l,rell as Descart0R A.nd Pascal, 
under "PERI on SECmm," or the renaissauc.(> and p;olden age of 1"rench literature 
(1500-1700), and :f.n "PERIOD THIRD," the literature of the ilh€' of the revolu-
tion and of the nineteenth century (1700-1859),9.fter having already desig-
nated the bed_nnin~s of scertid.sm in the second period, she labels the first 
part of the third period tfTIlE DAWN OF SKEPTICISl-f" and begins l·d th a discus-
sion of Pierre Bayle. Her explanatory remarks indicate a distinction made 
earlier between scepticism as a philo~ophical or epistemolor,ical stance still 
not incongruous with but suhstantiatinp, fideism--i.e., distrust of reason 
strengthening reliance on faith--and the later scepticism which Mrs. Botta, 
follOtJing the more contemporary concept, identifies with di.sbelief: 
On the other h;lnd, the dominant influences of the 18th century were a 
skeptical philosophy [etc.] •••• The transition, however, was not 
sudden nor immediate, and we corne now to the consideration of those works 
which occupy the midway position between the submissive age of Louis XIV" 
and the darinr, infidelity and republicanism of the 18th century.2 
A description follows of the "ne~y ~eneration," which includes Bayle: 
A certain indifference to principle began to prevail; men ventured to 
doubt opinions once unquestioned; the habit of jesting with everything, 
and unblushing cynicism appeared almost under the eyes of aged Louis • 
• • • The Protestants, [were] exiled by the Revocation of the Edict of 
Nantes. • • • 
Among these refugees was Bayle (1647-1706), the coolest and boldest 
of doubters. He wrote boldly agains t the intolerance of Louis XIV., 
1 Ibid., pp. 267-268. 
2 Ibid., p. 285. 
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and he affords the first announcement of the characteristics of the 
century. His "Historical and Critical Dictionary," a vast magazine of 
knowledge and incredulity, was calculated to supersede the necessity of 
study to a lively and thoughtless age. His skepticism is learned and 
philosophical, and he ridicules those who reject without exaaination 
still more than those who believe with docile credu1ity.1 
Mrs. Botta then proceeds to "THE PROGRESS OF SKEPTICISM," which includes a 
discussion of Voltaire. 
Melville's view of French sources may also have received direction 
from Wiley and Putnam. Melville's American publishers for Typee, of which 
Evert Duyckinck oversaw the American edition, and joint financers with Apple-
ton for the journal The Literary World, with Evert Duyckinck as first editor, 
Wiley and Putnam, imported for those with Gallic reading interests a large 
selection of French authors both in the original and in translation. Among 
the names appearing on the advertising pages of Tbe Literary World, some 
frequently, are Rabelais, Montaigne, Descartes, Pascal, Bayle, Voltaire and 
Volney (a sceptic of the Enlightenment mentioned in C1are1, Part II, canto 
xvi, 11. 38-39). Among influences leading Melville to the sources which 
profoundly changed his course of thought and, consequently, of his writing, 
Evert A. Duyckinck, editor for Wiley and Putnaa's "Library of Choice B.eading," 
is probably one of the strongest but also one of the most difficult to define, 
since his influence was, to a great degree, social and oral. Even before his 
only recorded attendance at Anne Lynch's, Melville was foraging in Duyckinck's 
basement library and borrowing volumes of Rabe1ais in which he found not only 
the coarse, vigorous humor that Duyckinck with other New Yorkers so vastly 
enjoyed, but, of more significance, the artistic presentation of an abortive 
1 ill!. I p. 286. 
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search for truth. During this time Melville purchased hia copy of Montaigne 
and, a little over a year later, wrote to Duyckinck about his purchase of 
Bayle's Dictionary in a tone which seems to denote a common familiarity with 
the work--Duyckinck owned a set of Bayle's Dictionary which Melville probably 
used before his own purchase. 
Though Thomas Browne, whose works Melville also borrowed from Duyckinck 
in 1848 before he bought his own folio in 1849, is an English sceptic, it is 
significant that he joins the triumvirate of Frenchmen at thia important 
period of Melville's reading, a relatively short period from 1848 through 
1849: the inherent scepticism of these works, probably pointed out though 
1 
not necessarily sanctioned by Duyckinck, may have been reinforced the fo11ow-
ing year, 1850-1851. in the quickening conversations between Melville and 
Hawthorne--as Marion L. Kesselring observes: 
Throughout 1829, 1830 and 1831, Hawthorne apparently planned a course in 
French literature for himself. The names of Montaigne [etc.] ••• recur 
in the Charge-Books, volumes from sets of their worka usually being taken 
in numerical order even though several days intervened between entries. 2 
Among the entries in Hawthorne's reading list are Montaigne's Essais (4 
volumes; Paris, 1802). of which all four volumes were checked out one at a 
time; Pascal's Oeuvres (5 volumes; La Haye, 1779)--volumes I and II checked 
out; Bayle's Dictionary (5 volumes; London, 1734)--all five volumes of this 
work, in translation, were checked out over a period of time; and the scepti-
cal Voltaire's Oeuvres completea (92 volumes; Kehl, 1785-1789), of which 
1 As Miller points out in The Raven and the Whale, Richard H. Dana 
senior Itfelt he was talking to a kindred spirit [in Duyckinck] as he de-
nounced ••• '[those] who were apreading God1eas skepticism'" (po 73). 
~rion L. Kesselring, Hawthorne's Reading: 1828-1850 (New York: The 
New York Public Library, 1949), p. 9. 
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1 forty-nine volumes were checked out. When Montaigne asked during his ex-
planation of Pyrrhonism: "Can any thing be proposed to us to grant, or deny, 
2 
which it shall not be permitted to consider as ambiguous?" -he could not yet 
know that Nathaniel Hawthorne would be one of his most apt pupils: question-
ing and ambiguity are the hallmarks of Hawthorne's prose. Melville and Haw-
thorne had much reading background in common to discuss, and their mutual 
concern with the CtBmerian side of reality probably owes more to Montaigne's 
sceptical descendant Pierre Bayle than has yet been properly assessed. 
Melville's edition of Montaigne.--An extant statement of Melville'. 
account with John Wiley shows that Melville purchased through Wiley, his 
publisher, "1 Montagne (sic]" on 18 January 1848. 3 Melville's personal copy 
of the works of Montaigne has not been located, and a measure of uncertainty 
has remained concerning the particular edition he purchased. The present 
study endeavors to offer a few more degrees of practical certainty. 
Merton M. Sealts, Jr. recorded Melville's purchase of Montaigne in his 
extremely useful contribution to Melville scholarship, '~elville's Reading: A 
Check-List of Books Owned and Borrowed" (previously cited in this chapter); 
the section of the check-list which contains the Montaigne entry was published 
in the Autumn 1949 issue of the Harvard Lihrary Bulletin, and it was noted 
at that time: 4 "Title and edition unidentified." The 1952 Hendricks House 
edition of Moby-Dick, edited by Luther S. Mansfield and Howard P. Vincent, 
1 ~., pp. 57, 58, 44, 63. 
~ontaigne. Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 231. 
3Sealts, No. 366. 
4Ibid• 
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1 
although using the Florio translation, identified the extract from Kontaigne 
2 
as "probably in William Hazlitt translation. If Hazlitt, however, translated 
only the "Journal" and "Letters"; he edited the Cotton translation of the 
3 
essays, and, since the extract for Koby-Dick is borrowed from the essays, 
theoretically, the question reaained whether Hazlitt's Cotton or another 
editor's Cotton is the source. 
The last English edition to precede Hazlitt's is, from all present 
eVidence, the London 1811 edition of the Essays "with very considerable 
amendaents and improvements from the most accurate French edition of Peter 
Coste." This is the last edition mentioned by Hazlitt (he refers to it as a 
"reprint") in his own edition of 1842. 4 The 1811 English text of the Essays 
is also the last listed before Hazlitt's in Samuel A. Tannenbaum's biblio-
graphy of Montaigne.5 No intermediate editions appear in the usual places 
of reference, e.g., the British Museum Catalogue and National Union Catalog. 
Further, Charles Dedeyan, in his Montaisne chez ses amis Anglo-Saxons speaks 
of "un arr~t dans les editions anglaises de Montaigne de 1811 a 1840," as 
something that "nous avons dUo constater." nedeyan's designation of the year 
1840 is probably an approximation, since he goes on from this statement to 
iuendricks House Moby-Dick, pp. 593, 599, 784. 
2 n!!., p. 582. 
3The title page of the first impression (see Appendix) reads: "The 
Complete Works of Michael de MontaiRne; Comprising; The Essays (Translated 
by Cotton). • • ." 
4 Montaigne, 3rd page of "Preface." 
5Hichel Eyguem De Montaiane (A Concise Bibliography) (Menasha, Wis-
consin: The George Banta Publishing Co., 1942), p. 6. 
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discuss the 1842 Hazlitt-Cotton text. l The 1811 Essays was possibly still 
available to Melville through Wiley, since it was advertised by Wiley and 
Putnam in volume I of the Literary World for 18 September 1847 (see Appendix). 
An examination of both the 1811 and 1842 editions, however, reveals, 
through textual evidence, that the extract follows the later Hazlitt edition 
(the editor, Hazlitt, is William Hazlitt the Younger [1811-1893], son of the 
famous romantic essayist of the same name [1778-1830]). It is fortunate for 
those interested in Melville's sources that Razlitt did not feel bound to a 
slavish presentation of Cotton's translation. Hazlltt speaKs of an unnamed 
later editor of Cotton's translation and remarks that "he has altered Mr. 
Cotton's prose in above three thousand places. ,,2 Hazlitt apparently offers 
this editor as a precedent, because he goes on to declare: "The departures 
which I have made fr01l his [Cotton's] translation •••• are frequent.,,3 
Emendations and other changes made by Hazlitt in the sectlon chosen by Mel-
ville as an extract for Moby-Dlck are adequate to establish Hazlitt as his 
source. If allowance is made for Melville's insertion ("whale's") and his 
replacement of a general term by a more specific antecedent designation 
(lithe sea-gudgeonn ), which he used to clarify the extract and render it more 
pertinent to hls book, the closeness with which he followed the Hazlitt text 
is evident (see the Appendix for the passages corresponding to the MobY-Dick 
extract as they appear in the 1811 Essays and in Hazlitt's edition; finally, 
lCharles Dedeyan, MontaiBne chez ses amis Anglo-Saxons (2 vols.; 
Paris: Boivin & Cie, [1943]). I, 257. I am grateful to Professor Donald 
M. Frame of Columbla University for bringing this reference to my attention. 
~ontaigne, 3rd page of "Preface." 
3 ~., 4th page of "Preface." 
, . 
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the extract itself is given as it appears in the first American edition of 
Moby-Dick [1851]). In addition to correspondence of word and punctuation, 
Melville follows the orthography of Hazlitt's "Raimond Sebond" rather than the 
frequently variant earlier spellings of the name. 
There is corroborative, if circuitous, evidence that John Wiley stocked 
and sold the Hazlitt edition. When Melville bought Montaigne's works in 
January 1848, Wiley and Putnam were in the process of a dissolution of part-
nershipj George Haven Putnam in his memoir of his father recalls: "The 
capital that my father was to secure from the firm of Wiley & Putnam came to 
him almost entirely in the form of books. ,,1 A few weeks after Melville's 
purchase, the newly independent Putnam advertised in the Literary World for 
March 11, 1848, a list of books entitled "Selections from recent Importations 
of Books," which included the following item: 
Montaigne's Works, edited by Hazlitt. R. 
Svo. half morocco, $5 50. [See Appendix.] 
The price of the Hazlitt edition also makes it the eligible source, since Kel-
Ville purchased "I Shakespear" together with his copy of Kontaigne at the 
2 price of $9.25 for both, whereas the 1811 edition of the Essays alone i. 
priced $9.50-an,amount which. even with Melville's possible discount, 
leaves it an unlikely candidate. 
Recently, Robert Shulman, evidently working independently and re-
maining unaware of the earlier suggestion of Razlitt's "translation" of the 
1 Georse Palmer Putnam: A Memoir (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 
1912). p. 108. 
2 Sealts, No. 366. 
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essays, concludes ftthere is every reason to think that this [Haz1itt's edi-
tionJ is the one. ,,1 Shulman reasons that Melville bought the text which 
first appeared in 1842. 2 There is, however, a second possibility, since the 
second impression of the Hazlitt-Cotton edition was brought out in 1845 
(later printings appeared only after Melville's purchasing date), and the 
proximity of this date to the purchasing date may make it more likely the one 
Melville owned. Judging from the account of Melville's purchase of "1 Mon-
taigne," Shulman states that "Melville's copy of Montaigne was apparently a 
one-volume edition" and continues to describe correctly the Hazlitt-Cotton 
3 text as just such a one-volume edition, whereas the 1811 Essays 1s B three-
volume set. For his study, however, Shulman uses what he tems a t'reprint,,4 
of the Hazlitt-Cotton text (New York, 1889), a text which, if the transcrib-
ing and printing of the direct quotations from Montaigne in Mr. Shulman's 
article are correct, contains a number of discrepancies in spelling and 
punctuation. 
Although possibilities may be narrowed to two, unless Melville's copy 
of Montaigne's works is located, it may not be possible to determine defini-
tively which of the two impressions he owned; however, for purposes of source 
study, with serious reservations concerning some forty-eight leaves, there i8 
1 
"Montaigne and the Techniques and Tragedy of Melville's Billy Budd," 
eL, XVI (fall, 1964), 322, n. 1; in the same note, Shulman observes that "the 
Florio translation had been out of print for over two hundred years and did 
not receive renewed attention until late in the nineteenth century." 
2Ibid • 
3Ibid • 
4Ibid• 
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no pressing need to do so for the remainder and greater portion of the two 
impressions. The two most noticeable differences between impressions are the 
border design (see note 1 below) and the title page, which has been reset for 
the second impression: in addition to the change of date, the title is modi-
fied and the name of the publisher changes from John Templeman to C. Temple-
man (see Appendix). Other than these two divergent points, a collation made 
by the "Hinman Collator" machine of the 1842 and 1845 impressions of Hazlitt's 
edition1 reveals, with the exception of forty-eight questionable leaves, that 
1 This collation, though made between all the pages of the first im-
pression and second impression (the so-called ItSecond Edit1on"-see title 
page for second impression in Appendix), cannot, as yet, claim to be a com-
plete collation. Of the so-called "Second Editions" of Haz1itt's Montaigne 
!isted in the National Un~~ Cats1og--and there are six such listings, for 
the American Antiquarian Society (Worcester, Mass.), The Free Library of 
Philadelphia, Harvard, The New York Public Library, The Ohio Wesleyan Uni-
versity Library, and Yale--and the one listed in the British Museum Catalogue, 
Ohio Wesleyan claim. not to have the "Second Edition" in its holdings, and 
the other six copies are all composed of what appear to be mixed sheets. Aside 
from the title page, the most noticeable difference between the first and 
second impressions occurs in the simple border design of double rules broken 
at each corner by an equally simple circular design: the design of the 
first impression is a circle within a circle © and that of the second is 
a circle with a dot at center 0. Plates were evidently made of the type 
but not of the rules and corner designs. Of the three 1842 (first) impres-
sions examined--the two listed in the !Y£ for Harvard and Johns Hopkins and 
a personal copy--al1 pages (except four without borders) have the first 
impression border throughout. Of the second impressions, all but the American 
Antiquarian Society copy have pages 1-192 (beginning with the Essays) with 
the first impression border and the remaining bordered pages with that of the 
second impression. These 192 pages of the octavo comprise a dozen sheets, 
signatures B-N. In the Harvard and Yale 1845 (second impression) copies that 
were examined, pages 1-192 also seem slightly more yellowed, which may indi-
cate that these sheets were left over from the first printing. The AAS 
second impreSSion has only pages 97-192 or six sheets, signatures H-N, with 
the first impression border: although 664 pages have been collated between 
impressions with diverse borders, until it is known whether or not all the 
"Second Editions" were composed of mixed sheets, it is not possible to claim 
a complete collation of the two impressions, and these ninety-six pages (pp. 
97-192) remain questionable. If the policy for the printing of these so 
far undiscovered ninety-six pages with second impression border remained the 
same, it would be safe to say there were no intentional changes; however, 
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not only do no significant textual variants occur, but the plates, stereo-
types, uncorrected despite errors, remain the same for text and notes in the 
first and second impression (loosely called a "Second Edition" on the title 
page of the 1845 printing). In addition to differing title pages and border 
design, existing differences, apparently due to battered type, do not sub-
stantially affect the text: on page 490 the first ~ in invention is present 
in the first impression and missing in the second; page 519 of the first 
impression has END OF THE ESSAYS.--this is missing in the second; page lxxxix 
is numbered in the first impression and left unnumbered in the second. In 
addition to the not unusual amount of broken type, all of the compositorial 
errors that were noted have been left standing from the first to the second 
1 impression. 
In summary; textual and corroborative evidence point to the Hazlitt 
these pages have not been seen, and nineteenth-century printing holds many 
surprises. 'Fortunately, the "Apology for Raimond Sebond," an essay that 
seems to have profoundly influenced Melville's thinking, is not composed of 
what appear to be mixed sheets and reveals no changes from the first to the 
second printing. 
lcompositorial errors corresponding in both impressions include 
transposed letters (p. 235, cubred for curbed); reversed letters (e.g., p. 
378, withont; p. 470, frand for frlud; p. 586, sociaty); faulty spacing (e.g., 
p. xiv, wasvety; p. 41, toimpose; p. 284, be ingtaken); repetition (p. 470, 
do do not follow the common run); incorrect type (e.g., p. 486, nust1e for 
nestle; p. 574, faees for faces; p. 588, considered). Other errors, such 
as missing punctuation marks (e.g., missing periods on pp. 68, 199, n. 12, 
and 328) and missing letters (e.g., p. 84, n. 1, h[a]d; p. 304, n. 1, 
abso[1]ute1y; p. 490, relatio[n], may be due, in some cases, to battered 
type; however, some instances seem certainly to be compositorial faults: 
e.g., on p. 328, the period is missing at a point that is simultaneously the 
end of a quotation, sentence, and paragraph; the quotation marks follow 
immediately in the printing and no space was ever allowed for a period, and 
no plate damage seems evident. In both impressions, p. 341 has been mis-
numbered as 141. 
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edition of Montaigne's works as the one Melville most likely owned. Between 
the two impressions of this edition printed before Melville's purchasing 
date there are no resettings (title page excepted), substantives, or minor, 
intentional changes which affect the text. The later 1845 impression may be 
the more likely source because of the proximity of its publishing date to 
Melville's purchasing date, but for practical purposes, with forty-eight 
leaves in question (though not in copies examined and collated), either im-
pression is safely eligible for source study. Both impressions are being used 
in this paper, and quotations with their locations correspond in both. 
"Critical Qpinions" section of Melville's Montaigne.-Aside from the 
three Books of "Essays," and with the exception of opinions written in French, 
the section that exerted the greatest influence on Melville in his reading of 
Haz1itt's Montaigne was probably the section entitled "Critical Opinions upon 
Montaigne and His Works. fI George, Marquis of Halifax, suggested that Mon-
taigne's freedom of style was intentiona1,l an encouraging precedent for the 
contemporary American search for freer forms of literature from Emerson 
through Melville and Whitmsn and on. The Westminster Review connects Mon-
2 taigne with Shakespeare, particularly with Hamlet. Throughout the opinions, 
various conflicting comments raise the question of whether Montaigne was 
detrimental to or a supporter of religion; according to Dugald Stewart, 
Montaigne indulged in wily rhetorical devices; Stewart writes of the 
"Apology" : 
The principal aim of Sebond's book, according to Montaigne, is to 
~ontaigne, p. xxxiv. 
2Ibid •• p. xli. 
61 
show that "Christians are in the wrong to make human reasoning the basis 
of their belief, since the object of it is only conceived by faith, and 
by a special inspiration of the divine grace." To this doctrine Montaigne 
professes to yield an implicit assent; and, under the shelter of it, con-
trives to give free vent to all the extrav.gancies of scepticism. l 
Stewart further calls attention to Montaigne's puncturing of human pride in 
intellectual prerogatives by his elimination of the essential distinction 
2 between the reason of man and the cognitive abilities of lower animals. 
Stewart also says: "The only study which seems ever to have engaged his 
3 
attention was that of !Il!!."; a number of other references are made to Mon-
taigne's observations on human nature--Hazlitt (the romantic essayist) stresses 
the "richness, truth, and force of his [Montaigne's] ••• observations on 
• • 
• men.,,4 In Billy Budd, Melville's praise of Montaigne's honesty and 
freedom from cant may have been prompted by Haz1itt's remarks on Montaigne's 
"inexpressible frankness and sincerity" and "honesty of mind. ,,5 
An encomium appearing in the Retrospective Review would have endeared 
the "old confabulator" Montaigne to Hawthorne and Melville: 
It is the author who gives utterance to the promptings of the heart, who 
mingles human feelings with all his knowledge, that lays fast hold of our 
affection, and whom, above all, we love and venerate. And such a one 
is the lively old Gascon, Montaigne.6 
It is Stewart, again, who pOints out at a time that Ue1vi11e was 
1 
.!ill., p. xxxvii. 
2Ibid • 
3 
.ll!.U., p. xxxvi. 
4 ~., p. xxxviii. 
5 
.!ill., pp. xxxviii-xxxix. 
6 ~., p. lCCtix. 
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newly aware of the "wonder" of "the world of mind,tll that it is Montaigne who 
is flat the head of the French writers who contributed • • • to turn the 
thoughts of their countrymen to subjects connected with the Philosophy of 
Mind" and who holds distinguished rank "in the history of modern philosophy.tt2 
Montaigne, it is declared, has done more than any other author to introduce 
~~ Philosophy, 3 and it is a philosophy of Pyrrhonian scepticism. The 
Westminster Review points to Montaigne's "Apology" as the "chief document on 
the subject of his philosophical opinions, or rather of his opinions about 
4 philosophy," and Stewart finds that "an universal Pyrrhonisll is recommended" 
5 in the "Apology," the most "serious" of the essays. Stewart speaks of Mon-
6 taigne's "unlimited scepticism," the Westminster Review of his "fundamental 
7 8 
scepticism," and Hallam of his "bias towards Pyrrhonism" and sees the 
"Apology" as a "long defence of moral Pyrrhonism." 9 
Particular aspectB of scepticism are latched upon by various commenta-
tors. Dugald Stewart notices the tendency toward self-argumentation and the 
element of contradiction; speaking of "the scepticism of Montaigne," Stewart 
~ardi, II, chap. lxv, 277. 
~ntaigne, p. xxxvi. 
3 
xxxviii. l!!.!£. , p. 
4 
xlv. ~., p. 
5 
xxxvii. ~., p. 
6Ibid• 
7 
xlv. 1l!!!!. , p. 
8 
xlix. .!!:!!!!. , p. 
9 
xlviii. .!!:!!!!. , p. 
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says that Montaigne. depending on "the current of his reflections and feelings, 
argues. at different times, according to the varying state of his impressions 
and temper. on opposite sides of the same question," and he remarks that 
1 Montaigne does not resolve his doubts. The Retroseective Review also finds 
2 Montaigne "at once, ••• philosophical and inconclusive" --the observation 
parallels that of the New York Daily Tribune's reviewer (Stedman?) who was 
bothered by the lack of "distinct conclusions" in Clare!. 3 Melville's aware-
ness of the variableness and moodiness of man--"it is all in all what mood 
you are in; if in the Dantean, the devils will occur to you; if in that of 
4 Isaiah, the archangels" --was probably strengthened by such comments as that 
of Stewart. above, and of the Retrospective Review in their paraphrase of 
Montaigne: 
Human nature is a wayward and variable thins, and • • • we must expect to 
find that his [man's] mind has undergone changes stailar to those of his 
body, and that what he thinks today he will not think to-morrow. The 
opinions of a mutable nature cannot be immutable. Doubts will arise, 
contradictions will occur, and one opinion displace another, in its turn 
to be deposed. 5 
The ontological problem, the problem of cracking the veneer of appearances 
to get at the hardwood of reality, is posed by Stewart: 
In the mind of Montaigne the same paradoxes may be easily traced to those 
deceitful appearance~ which, in order to stimulate our faculties to their 
best exertions. nature seems purposely to have thrown in our way, 
1 
.ill!., p. xxvii. 
2 ~., p. xli. 
3Quoted in Bezanson' 8 "Introduction" to Clare I , xl. 
4 Moby-Di~~, II, chap. lxxxvi, 122. 
SMontaigne, p. xli. 
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as stumbling blocks in the pursuit of truth. l 
Hallam concerns himself with the moral implications of Pyrrhonism and finds 
that Montaigne "was at a 10s8 to discover a general rule of moral law, as an 
implanted instinct, a necessary deduction of common reason, in the varying 
2 
usages and opinions of mankind." Finally, Melville's musings on the question 
of immortality may have been moved by the rhetorically appealing article from 
the Westminster Review, where it is asked: "For what else are we but a 
breath, and our lives but sparks of fire in a vault of darkness?,,3 
Descartes 
All that may be known with certainty about Melville's knowledge of 
Descartes is that he knew ~ him. The two references to Descartes, one in 
4 Moby-Dick and one in Pierre, are to the Descartian vortices; unfortunately, 
as Howard P. Vincent has observed: "It is not easy to be certain of precisely 
5 
what Melville meant by the 'Descartian vortices. '" I t may even be wondered 
if these vortices somehow relate to tile vortex imagery of Mardi and the pre-
sence of the great vortex at the end of Moby-Dick. 
It is not known if Helvil1e was aware of Descartes' method of ante-
cedent scepticism, 'his universal doubt, or of his questioning of the 
inerrancy of sense-knowledge, the "dream" meditation and the demon hypothesis 
1 ~., p. xxxvi. 
2 Ibid., p. xlix. 
3 
.!!?M., p. xlii. 
4 Moby-Dick, I chap. xxxv, 198; Pierre, Bk. XIX, chap. it p. 372. 
5 The Trying-out of Moby-Dick (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co •• 1949), 
p. 157. 
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directly from Descarte.. It would be strange. considering Melville's con-
tinued interest in philosophy, if he did not know this, one of philosophy's: 
aost controversial and pivotal figures. Regardless. however, the sceptic 
quandaries found in Descartes (quandarie. aany scholars consider to be answered 
inadequately) are found prior to Descartes in Montaigne and after Descartes in 
Bayle (where the demon hypothesis is subsumed in his own questioninl of the 
cause of evil) and in Hae. Melville met Ulany .eferences to and from Des-
cartes in the Dictionary of Pierre Bayle, who became acquainted with Carte-
sianin in Geneva. Also, by the time of Melville. Cartesiani .. had been ab-
sorbed into the main stream of sceptical thought, and the general contours of 
the philosophy were evident and available in many forms--through conversation, 
periodical literature. histories of philosophy, encyclopedias, to nam. only 
the more obvious. 
Sir Thomas Browne 
Melville borrowed at least three of the four volaes of Sir Thomas' 
Browne's Works l from Duyckinck after mid-February 1848, and he purchased on 
19 December 1849. while in London, the 1686 folio of Browne's Works2 in one 
volume at Stibbs' the bookseller for sixteen shillings. 3 The 1686 folio is 
divided into four sections: the first contains "Vulgar Errors," the second 
1 Sir Thomas Browne's Works: Including his Life and Correspondence, 
ed. Simon Wilkin (4 vols.; London: William Pickering. 1835-1836). Sealts, 
No. 89. Citations are from this edition unless otherwise stated. 
2The Works of the teamed Sir Thomas Brown. ICt. (London: Thomas 
Basset [etc.]. 1686). Sealts. No. 90. 
3 . 
Joumal--London and the Continent, pp. 76, 85. 
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"Religio Medici," the third ·'Hydriotaphia; or, Urn-Burial: Together with The 
Garden of CYRUS," and the fourth section is composed of "Certain MISCELLANY 
TRACTS." 
Besides the example of Browne'. exquisite prose, the mine of rich 
1 
allusions Melville discovered in him, and the sheer pleasure Browne's unin-
hibited and daring play with words gave the etymologically-minded Melville--
Browne contrived such wonders as digladiation, "fighting with swords," and 
writes of man's "deceptible condition" and of how the devil does "empuzzle" 
our conceptions (he probably inspired Melville's own concoctions in Mardi, 
2 
e.g., unconsubsistent and Quadammodotatives )--there were passages to be 
found which give evidence of Brownefs philosophical scepticism: the whole 
compendium of popular or "Vulgar Errors," in fact, points out the facility 
with which man's mind stumbles into mistaken judgments; the first chapter is 
devoted to a discussion of a fundamental cause of man's errors, his weak or 
deceivable nature. Adam and Eve are shown as deceived by Satan, by one 
another, from themselves, and through the conduct of their senses--Browne 
adds in the second chapter: ttBeing thus deluded before the fall, it is no 
wonder if their conceptions were deceitful, and could scarce speak without 
an error after. ttl 
The most forthright statement on scepticism occurs in Browne's 
Relisio Medici: 
I See, e.g., the entry on Sir Thomas Browne in index to Hendricks 
House Moby-Diek, p. 842. 
~rdi. II, chap. lxxii, 308. 
3 Browne, II, 188. 
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I cannot think that Home~ pined away upon the ~idd1e of the fishermen, o~ 
tbat A~istot1e, wbo unde~stood tbe unce~tainty of knowledge, and confessed 
so often tbe ~eason of man too weak fo~ the works of natu~e, did eve~ 
d~own bimse1f upon tbe flux and ~eflux of Eu~pus. We do but 1ea~, to-
day, wbat ou~ bett.~ advanced judgements will unteach, to-mo~~ow; and 
A~istotle dotb but inst~ct us, as Plato did bim, tbat is, to confute bim-
self. I bave ~n tb~ougb all sorts, yet find no rest in any: thougb ou~ 
fi~st studies and junior endeavours may style us Pe~ipateticks, Stoicks, 
or Academicks, yet I perceive tbe wisest heads prove, at last, almost all 
Scepticks, and stand like Janus in the field of knowledge. l 
In a letter to Eve~t A. Duyckinck, 3 Ma~cb 1849, Melville connects 
Browne witb Emerson: "Lay it down tbat had not Si~ Thomas B~owne lived, 
Emerson would not bave mystified ... 2 B~owne's name first appears in connection 
with his "Vulga~ Eno~s" in Ma~dit wbere Melville's statement may well indicate 
tbat be recognized him as a sceptic fideist. Melville writes (with i~ony?3): 
1 
.!!!.M., p. 104. 
2 Letters, p. 78. 
3Leon Howard has written in his biography Herman Melville (Berkeley: 
University of Cal1fo~ia P~ess, 1951), p. 113, that "some of the ea~ly 
cbapters we~e later ~evised" in Ma~di "or even w~itten and inserted in their 
entirety." A new element in some of these cbapters certainly seems to be 
tbat of irony, the saying of one thing and sbowing of another; e.g., in Mardi, 
I, chap. iii, 14, the na~rator says witb a rather sanctimonious t~anscenden­
talism: "All things form but one whole; tbe universe a Judea, and God 
Jehovah its head. Then no mo~e let us start with affrigbt. In a tbeocracy, 
wbat 18 to fear?" Melville soon shows "wbat is to feartl--Taji desc~ibes his 
"sense of perir' in tbe open boat, the "terro~f1 st~uck at tbe sigbt of tbe 
Bone Sbark. The barmonioua wo~ld forming but "one wbolen becomes, instead, 
a discordant world in wbicb creatures prey, war, and feed upon each otber. 
The invitation to see Jehovab as a benevolent and providential God ("In a 
tbeocracy, wbat is to fear?") is countermanded by tbe statement: "As well 
bate a serapb as a sbark. Both were made by tbe same band" (Mardi, I, chap. 
xii, 43; cbap. xiii, 46-47). The growing influence of sceptical writings on 
Melville during tbe writing of Mardi not only be1ps account for tbe cbange 
from romance to pbi10sopbica1 quest, but for the wide divergence of outlook 
that, like oil and water, kept the work from ever coming togetber as a wbo1e. 
The irony of the first cbapters--probably tbe last to be written or rewritten 
--prepares fo~ tbe somber finale, but it is questionable if Melville reworked 
passages so assiduously for a coberent tone and direction of material in tbe 
central cbapters. 
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"Be Sir Thomas Brown our ensamp1e; who, while exploding 'Vulgar Errors,' 
heartily hugged all the mysteries in the Pentateuch."l Duyckinck seems to 
have recognized the influence of Browne's scepticism, if not his ftdeism; in 
his Cyclopaedia, Duyckinck mentions Melville's reading in Sir Thomas Browne 
for Mardi and in his continued observations remarks: "In the latter portions, 
embarrassed by his spiritual allegories, he wanders without chart or compass 
in the wildest regions of doubt and 8cepticism,,2-Duyckinck's observation on 
Mardi gathers weight When it is recalled that he possessed firsthand knowledge 
of MelVille's reading and possible reactions during the composition of the 
novel and, in fact, lent Melville many of the books from his own library, in-
cluding Browne. Shortly after the publication of Mardi (in London, 17 March 
1849), Melville wrote Duyckinck of his purchase of Bayle's Dictionary and an-
nounced that he intended to "lay the great old folios side by side & go to 
sleep on them thro' the summer, with the Phaedon in one hand & Tom Brown in 
the other.,,3 
Melville drew on Browne's "Vulgar Errors" for an extract in Moby-Dick: 
'What spermacetti is, men might justly doubt, since the learned 
Hosmannus [sicl in his work of thirty years, saith plainly, Nescio 
quid ill. '4 
5 The phrasing of the extract most closely follows the 1686 folio, which Me1-
ville owned at the time of the writing of Moby-Dick; also, Melville mistook 
~ardit I, chap. xiii, 45. 
2 Duyckincks' Cyclopaedia, II, 673. 
3Letter of 5 April 1849, Letters, pp. 83-84. 
4 Moby-Dick, I, xv. 
5 Bk. III, chap. xxvi, p. 139. 
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the f in "Hofmannus" for the old elongated!.. More to the purpose, the ex-
tract offered Melville an example of how philosophical scepticism could be 
concretized into an artistic device integral to the philosophical framework 
of the novel and contributive to the primary theme of a problematic universe. 
The flNescio quid sit"--"I don't know what it is"--in reference to spenaaceti, 
becomes the commentary, in different forms, on each member as Melville cata-
logs the anatomy of the whale, his surrogate, in different though sometimes 
interdependent instances, for nature and God: the skin--"The question is, 
what and where is the skin of the whale?" and even if it is conceded that the 
blubber should properly be considered the skin the mystery still remains, 
since the body is crossed and recrossed with markings "hieroglyphical,,;l the 
spout--ftAnd as for this whale-spout, you might almost stand iJn it, and yet be 
undecided as to what it is precisely"; 2 the tail and head--
The more I consider this mighty tail, the .ore do I deplore my ina-
bility to express it. At tiMes there are gestures in it, which • • • 
remain wholly inexplicable. • • • Nor are there wanting other motions of 
the whale in his general body, full of strangeness, and unaccountable to 
his most experienced assailant. Dissect him how I may, then, I but go 
skin deep; I know him not, and never will. But if I know not even the 
tail of this whale, how understand his head? much more, how comprehend 
his face, when face he has none?3 
the brain--"If the sperm whale be physiognomically a sphinx, to the ph reno 10-
4 gist his brain seems that geometrical circle which it is impossible to square"; 
~obY-Dick, II, chap. lxviii, 30, 31. 
2 ~., chap. lxxxv, 115. 
3 ~., chap. lxxxvi, 123. 
4 ~., chap. lxxx, 84. 
70 
1 the forehead is a forehead "plaited with riddles"; ambergris--nBy some, 
ambergris is supposed to be the cause, and by others the effect, of the dys-
pepsia in the wha1et1 ;2 "the digestive organs of the whale are. _ • inscru-
tably constructed,,;3 the ske1eton--after relating the story of a whale's 
skeleton being mistaken for that of a reptile, the narrator comments: itA 
significant illustration of the fact, again and again repeated in this book, 
that the skeleton of the whale furnishes but little clue to the shape of hiB 
4 fully invested body." Melville's examples are, in fact, "again and again 
repeated in this book." Pina11y, again borrOWing from Browne's chapter "Of 
Many Things Questionable as They are Commonly Described in Pictures" from 
''Vulgar Errors,"S Melville, in his chapter "Of the Monstrous Pictures of 
Whales," concludes that the whale's appearance cannot even be known with 
exactitude: 
Any way you may look at it, you must needs conclude that the great 
Leviathan is that one creature in the world which must remain unpainted 
to the last. True, one portrait may hit the mark much nearer than 
another, but none can hit it with any very considerable degree of 
exactness. So there is no earthly way of finding out preCisely what 
the whale really looks 1ike.6 
Pascal 
Our awareness of Melville's knowledge of Pasea1 rests on textual 
1 !R1.4.- , chap. lxxix, 83. 
2 !2!!!.. , chap. xcii, 161-
3 ~., chap. c, 203. 
4 Ibid. , chap_ civ, 221. 
5 See note 261.7 in Hendricks House Moby-Dick, p. 746. 
6 Moby-Dick. I. chap. lv, 336. 
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evidence, particularly a well-known passage in MobY-Dick. English trans1a-
,; 1 tions of the Pensees were numerous and Pascal's works were sold by Melville's 
publishers Wiley and Putnam; because of Melville's interest in and personal 
purchase of the works of two other great French sceptics, Montaigne and Bayle, 
it would be strange, though not impossible, if Melville ignored this great 
intermediary figure. 
Melville had access to the article on Pascal in Bayle's DictionaII. 
where Pascal is called "one of the sublimest Wits in the World"; 2 however, 
none of the DictionaI! accounts in the editions of 1710, 1734-1738, or 1734-
1741 include the aspect of Pascal's biography that attracted Me1v111e--in 
Moby-Dick, Pascal receives an accolade as a man of woe: 
The truest of all men was the Man of Sorrows, and the truest of all books 
is Solomon's, and Ecclesiastes is the fine hammered steel of woe. 'All 
is vanity.' ALL. This wilful world hath not got hold of unchristian 
Soloaon's wisdom yet. But he who dodges hospitals and jails, and walks 
fast crossing graveyards, and would rather talk of operas than hell; call. 
Cowper, Young, Pascal, Rousseau, poor devil. all of sick men; and through-
out a care-free lifetime swears by Rabe1ais as passing wise, and therefore 
jo1ly;--not that man is fitted to sit down on tombstones, and break the 
green damp mould with unfathemably wondrous Solomon. 3 
Almost forty years later, on Melville's seventieth birthday, 1 August 1889, 
,; Elizabeth presented to Herman the two volumes of The Correspondence of Honore 
de Balzac translated by C. Lamb Kenny (London, 1878).4 In the second volume, 
in a letter of Balzac to Madame Hanska, October, 1836, Melville scored: 
1 The British Museum Catalogue. e.g., shows a holding of twelve edi-
tions of "Thoughts • • ." published between 1688-1851. I have used an 
American edition of 1835 not mentioned in the Catalogue. 
2 Bayle, 1710 ed., IV, 2464. 
1Moby-Dick, II, chap. xcvi, 181-182. 
4 Sea1ts, No. 23. 
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I can understand how the absolute asceticism of Pascal, and his 
immense labours, brought him to the pass that he saw constantly an 
abyss on both sides of him, and was obliged to have two chairs on 
each side of the one in which he sat. l 
The inclusion in Moby-Dick of Pascal's name with other so-called "sick men," 
and the scoring of the passage referring to Pascal's visions of the abyss 
point to a particular incident in Pascal's life: because of a seriously de-
clining state of health, Pascal's physicians recommended that he take excur-
sions in the open air. Accordingly, he went for an outing one day in a coach 
and four; the two lead horses became frightened in an area where there was no 
parapet, and they fell into the Seine--the traces gave way, however, and the 
carriage remained on the brink of a precipice. Because of the exhausted 
condition of an already highly sensitive constitution, the shock of the 
accident threw Pascal into a fit and he afterwards suffered from recurring 
trauaatic visions of an abyss--v1sions which sometimes eamed for him the 
reputation of being deranged. Melville would have sympathized with Pascal's 
deep realization of physical evil. The concept of the abyss had other conno-
tat ions in relation to Pascal, too, since he so deeply realized the abyss of 
man's misery without God; also, thoughts of annihilation were not entirely 
foreign to Pascal's mind. 
Henry A. Murray is willing to be rather decisive about Melville's 
knowledge of Pascal; in the explanatory notes to his edition of Pierre he 
writes: "Having recently read Pascal. including no doubt the Provincial 
Letters, Melville was especially alert to instances of theological 
1 Log, II, 815. 
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juggling."l From internal evidence, Murray points to five of the Pensees as 
2 possible sources of parallel thoughts occurring in Pierre. 
From Bayle's presentation of Pascal Melville would have recognized the 
element of scepticism, although it is muted and almost lost in the biographi-
cal details. A more overt statement occurs in Bayle's article on Pyrrho, 
where he writes that "Pascal • • • declared . . . reason ought to be degraded 
as much 88 possible, and represented as a faculty that ought not to be much 
relied on. ,,3 Melville, knowingly or unknowingly, shared with Pascal an 
appreciation of Solomon; his continued interest in Solomon and Job at least 
partially stemmed from their sceptical affinities--Ephraim Chambers' article 
on "Scepticism" states that "some have even charged Job and Solomon with 
luerman Melville, Pierre: or. the Ambiguities, ed. Henry A. Murray 
(Hendricks House edition; reprint; New York: Hendricks House, Inc., 1957), p. 
459. Hereafter cited as Hendricks House Pierre. 
2See notes in Hendricks Rouse Pierre for 232.23, 250.1, 407.33: in 
Melville's statement, "Death ••• the last act of man's play, ••• begin how 
it may, in farce or comedy, ever hath its tragic end," Murray sees a rendering 
of Pensees, 210: "The last act is tragic, however happy all the rest of the 
play is; at the last a little earth is thrown upon our head, and that is the 
end for ever." Murray also quotes Pensees, 397, 398 as probable influences 
in Melville's conception of Ahab and Pierre--the Pensees read: "The greatness 
of man is great in that he knows himself to be miserable • • • All these same 
miseries prove man's greatness. They are the miseries of a great lord, of a 
deposed king." In this conjunction of misery and greatness, Mr. Murray might 
have quoted Pierre, Bk. IX, chap. iii, p. 237: "Wherefore is it, that not to 
know Gloom and Grief is not to know aught that an heroic man should learn?"--
or, Ahab's "I feel my topmost greatness lies in my topmost grief" (Moby-Dick, 
II, chap. cxxxv, 366). Although not mentioned by Murray, another possible 
borrowing from Pascal's biography may have found its way into Pierre. Pascal 
professed to have had a unique, personal, and spiritual revelation, an account 
of which he wrote and kept between the cloth and the lining of his coat for 
the remainder of his life. This action may have suggested to Melville the 
business of P1in1immon's pamphlet becoming obscured in the lining of Pierre's 
coat to be found only after his death. 
3Bayle, 1734-1741 ed., VIII, 598. 
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Scepticism; from their proposing a great Number of Questions, without deciding 
1 
any of them"; Pascal, too, may have been one of the sources influencing Mel-
ville in his appreciation of Ecclesiastes, which Helville, following tradi-
tional belief, thought to be the work of Solomon, and which he praised as the 
"truest of all books" and the "fine hammered steel of woe, If for Pascal de-
clared that "Solomon and Job knew best, and exhibited most accurately the 
2 
misery of man,tI and Pascal shows that much of man's misery is his inability 
, 
to "know"--he writes in Pensees, 389: 
Ecclesiastes shows that man without God is in total ignorance and inevi-
table misery. For it is wretched to have the wish, but not the power. 
Now he would be happy and assured of some trut}1. and yet he can neither 
know, nor desire not to know. 
Pierre Bayle 
Melville wrote to Evert Duyckinck 5 April 1849: "I bought a set of 
Bayle's Dictionary the other day, & on my return to New York intend to lay the 
great old folios side by side & go to sleep on them thro' the summer.") The 
4 
edition of the Dictionary purchased is unknown. Melville was probably ac-
quainted with the Dictionary before his own purchase, since Duyckinck, whose 
library Melville periodically invaded, owned the set in five volumes. Mel-
ville must have done a great deal more than sleep on his folios of Bayle during 
the ensuing two years, however, for, as Millicent Bell has shown, Bayle 
1 Chambers, II, 31. 
2 Blaise Pascal, "Thoughts on Religion and Other Subjects," trans. 
Rev. Edward Craig, The Christian Library (New York: Thomas George, Jr., 1835), 
IV, 559. Hereafter cited as Pascal, 1835 ed. 
3 Letters, p. 83. 
4 Sealts, No. 51. Sealts lists three possibilities. 
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1 
exerted a notable influence on Melville's masterpiece, Mobr-Dick. 
Melville met another Pyrrhonist with his reading of Pierre Bayle. In 
sceptic fashion, Bayle questioned the trustworthiness of sense knowledge and 
also questioned accepted truths including rationalistically established 
truths of Christianity--God's unity, benevolence, providence, and justice. 
These attributes of God came under question as Bayle established a view of 
reality involving a greater sceptical equipoise between the two polarities of 
good and evil. 
Melville, like Bayle, and, perhaps, largely because of Bayle, pro-
foundly questioned the presence of evil in the world; he seems to have re-
garded evil, again like Bayle, not simply as the negation or absence of good-
ness, but as something excruciatingly positive in its own realm. Be apparently 
considered, at least for literary purposes, the Manichean pseudo-solution, dis-
cussed at length by Bayle, that, in order not to have to conclude to a malevo-
lent God (it is argued that if God is only one and omnipotent and could pre-
vent all evils if Be so chooses--but doesn't--then Be must be malevolent), it 
would be preferrable to posit two necessary Principles, one responsible for 
good, the other for evil. Pushed further, however, Melville again fuses the 
two elements in dne Principle, and does, therefore, question the possibility 
of a malevolent one God--this is the Cartesian question rephrased by Bayle 
and adopted by Melville: "18 God the Devil?", is God responsible for evil? 
In Chapter 1 of this study, the point was made that Bayle apparently sanctions 
the idea of two conflicting coeternal Principles of good and evil. Mr. 
~illicent Bell, "Pierre Bayle and Mob! Dick," ~, CXVI (September, 
1951), 626-648. 
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Lawrence Thompson opines that Melville's predominant presentation of good and 
evil as coalesced into one principle may be due to a misinterpretation of 
1 Bayle. This may be so. It may be contended, however, that Melville found 
sufficient grounds for such a reading of Bayle: it may be argued, though not 
concluded, that Bayle's arguments for two Principles may have been a ruse, for 
it seems Bayle was surely astute enough to realize that, in his questioning 
of evil, his rational arguments for Manichean dualism would be rejected, but 
that the very rejection would leave his contenders confronted with the problem 
of a malevolent God. Evidence of his subsequent influence seems to point to 
the preponderance of this view. The Enlightenment tried to circumvent the 
problem by rejecting a personal providenee and removing God further and 
further away, so that He had very little to do with the affairs of men and 
could not, therefore, be malevolent since He wasn't even involved; He was left 
was a sort of nebulous beginning and end of the affair as Creator and Judge--
not all, of course, were even this remotely reverent. Bayle offers some 
provocative examples that are insinuative of an ambivalent first principle--
as ambivalent as the father figure in one of Melville's novels, the father 
of Melville's dewy boy Pierre; Bayle writes of the Roman gods: 
And though there was one Vejovis much more inclin'd to do Evil than to do 
Good; nevertbeless it was beli(e]ved that Dijovis or Diespiter, i.e. the 
good Jupiter darted the Thunderbolt. 2 
The "good Jupiter" is, therefore, not all good, but wields a vast threatening 
power toward man. Melville's God, a primal power common to all creeds, races, 
~ompson, pp. 30, 187. 
2 Bayle, 1710 ed., III, 1150 [pagination erratic in this volume, but 
see the article ''Manicheans'']. 
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and times, whether the Christian "God," the pagan "Jupiter," or a "Pictish 
stora-king," is often a God connected with storms and prodigal of thunderbolts; 
there is. e.g., the God of "The Candles" in Moby-Dick: "Sky and sea roared 
and split with the thunder, and blazed with the lightning," for "God's burning 
finger ••• [was] laid on the ship,,;l the "Jupiter Tonans" of "The Light-
ning-Rod Man" whose eyes "played with an innocuous sort of lightning" tries 
to intimidate and drive "a brave trade with the fears of man," while "scatter-
ed bolts" of "irregular thunder" boom overhead: 2 the "storm-admiral*' of 
Pierre is an antagonist to man,3 and the grim "Pictish storm-king" of Clarel 
is heard "scoffing" about the gables as Arculf and Adamnan tell their simple 
tales of faith. 4 Bayle notes that--
Plutarch is also mistaken, when he thinks that the Philosophers and Poets 
are agreed in the Doctrine of two Principles. Did not he remember that 
Bomer the Prince of Poets, their Pattern, their common Original, that 
Bomer, I say. set only one God over the two Tuns of Good and Evil?5 
The 8ugge8tion of a common dispenser behind the source8 of good and evil 
would have been evident to Melville. Bayle continues: "The Apology of Costar 
being 8carce in foreign Countries. I shall make no scruple to cite a long 
Pusage out of it," and he offers the following passage on nthe two Tuns of 
Good and Evil": 
"Jupiter at all time8 
"Bas at the Threshold of his Bouse, 
~obY-DiCk, II, chap. cxix, 276, 279. 
2 The Piazza Tales, pp. 171-173, 180. 
3 Pierre, Bk. XXV, chap. iii, p. 474. 
4 Clare1, Pt. I, canto xxxv, 11. 107-110. 
5 Bayle, 1710 ed., III, 1150. 
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"As HOIIler says, two full Tuns; 
uAnd there is neither old Man, nor young, 
"Reither WOIIlan nor Maid, 
"Whether ahe be old or young, handsOllle or 
"ugly, 
'~o receives Life in this World, 
"But drinks of these two Tuns. 
n'Tis a full Tavern, 
"Whereof Fortune is the Vintner, 
It And mingles Pota an"dCups, 
"To make all the World Soups; 
ttShe 8ives all Drink with her own Hands, 
"But to some more, to others lesa: 
"There is none but every Day drinlta 
"Out of these Tuna, either a Quart or a Pint, 
"Or a Tierce, or a Gallon, or a Chopin, 
"As it pleases Fortune, 
"To give either with a full Hand or a few 
"Drops, 
''Which she puts into their Mouth: 
"And pours out Good or Evil upon every one, 1 
ftAccording as she ia in a good or bad HUtlour." 
God ("Jupiter") ia aeen dispensing evil as well u good and thia in a 
fortuitous or indifferent aanner. The preceding poem probably influenced 
Helvi11e'a chaptera on "The Great Heidelburgh Tun," that "f.oua great 
tierce, ,,2 and "Cistern and Bucketa" in Moby-Dick. The Speraa Whale's head 
becomes the analogue for the mind of God in the novel as Melville quea-
tions that mind and its poasib1e malign intentiona toward man. Hia aore 
subtle connections se. to align it with the evil Tun: Taahtego is atand-
ing lion the a~it of the head" and "the place where he atood was • • • 
treacherous and oozy"; he fal1a into the Tun and the narrator wonders 
"whether the Evil One himaelf would have it to fall out ao, without atat-
ing hia particular reuons"; finally, the narrator remar1r.a that the 
~ObY-DiCk. II, chap. lxxvii, 72~ 
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incident will seem less incredible to "landsmenlt (often Melville's figure for 
security seeking individuals who do not ask more ultimate contemplative ques-
tions, who do not "push off to sea") if they recall having heard of some one's 
falling into a cistern ashore, an accident that happens "with much less 
reason" than Tashtego's, "considering the exceeding slipperiness of the curb 
of the sperm whale's well,,1_-Me1vi11e's statement recalls Montaigne's in the 
2 
"Apo10gylt: "In a slippery and sliding place let us suspend our belief." 
Millicent Bell suggests that Ahab'a words, "be the white whale agent, 
or be the white whale prinCipal" may be an echo of Bayle in that Ahab does not 
know if the whale's malicious strength "is the [direct] expression of the ,,-
Christian God or some delegated source of evil. ,,3 A passage from Bayle's 
article on Zoroaster substantiates the tendency to push past a duality of 
Principles to a common source; Bayle quotes Dr. Hyde at length and concludes: 
"These words clearly express that in Zoroaster's Hypothesis, the two Princi-
p1es, one Good and the other Evil, • • • or Light and Darkness were, properly 
speaking, no more than Second Causes, and did not strictly deserve the Name 
of Principles: they were the Effects of another Cause, and the productions 
of God. tt4 Bayle argues against this view, but not nearly so well as he 
argues for it: the weakness of his rebuttal renders his intentions highly 
questionable. Without, however, entering into an argument M hominem, it does 
1Ibid., chap. lxxviii, 75-76, 79. 
~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 235. 
3 Bell, p. 646. 
4 Bayle, 1710 ed., IV, 3102. 
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seem relevant to state that Melville would not be completely unjustified in 
an ironical reading of Bayle. The line of reasoning which sees secondary 
causes as productions of another Cause, "God," may apply in "The Candles" 
chapter of Moby-Dick, where there is the suggestion of a power behind the 
power that Ahab defies: 
There is some unsuffusing thing beyond thee, thou clear spirit, to whom 
all thy eternity is but time, all thy creativeness mechanical. Through 
thee, thy flaming self, my scorched eyes do dimly see it. l 
Whatever the final responsible power is, the attributes of both Good 
and Evil, God and the devil, become integrated in it as it is symbolized 
through Moby-Dick: the White Whale is not only described as "ubiquitous," 
"immortal," a "grand god," one who moves "divinely" and is compared to "Jupi-
ter" and nJove, ,,2 but he is also full of "cunning ••• and malice," marked 
by nintelligent malignity"; "all evil ••• [is] made practically assailable 
in Moby Dick"; he evinces a tfdemoniac indifference," is "devilish," suspected 
of a "latent deceitfulness" and exhibits "eternal malice.,,3 
The presence of evil in the world led Melville, like Bayle, to ques-
tion God's benevolence. In his article "Diogenes the Cynick" Bayle writes 
that "the number of those who perish notwithstanding their Vows, does far 
exceed the Number of those whose Prayers are heard.,,4 Melville, in effect. 
says the same: in Moby-Dick Pip prays, "Oh, thou big white God aloft there 
~oby-Dick, II, chap. cxix, 282-283. 
2 ~., I, chap. xli, 226, 227; II, chap. cxxxiii, 334, 335. 
3 ~., I, chap. xli, 223, 228, 229-230; II, chap. <:xxx, 318; chap. 
cxxxiii, 336; chap. <:xxxv, 362. 365. 
4 Bayle, 1710 ed., II, 1104. 
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somewhere in yon darkness, have merey on this small blaek boy down here, ,,1 
but his prayer goes unheeded; as Moby Diek bears down upon the fated Pequod, 
Starbuek asks: 2 trls this the end of all my bursting prayers?" Even Ahab's 
prayer, for Pip, "Cod forever bless thee; and if it eome to that,--God for-
ever save thee, let what will befall, ,,3 goes unanswered in this world and, 
aeeording to Melville's terms, remains dubious in the next. The darkest 
example oeeurs in "Benito Cereno," where, on the dead body of Don Joaquin, 
Marques de Aramboalaza 
was found seereted a jewel, whieh, by papers that were diseovered, 
proved to have been meant for the shrine of our Lady of Merey in Lima; 
a votive offering, beforehand prepared and guarded, to attest his grati-
tude, when he should have landed in Peru, his last destination, for the 
safe eonelusion of his entire voyage from Spain.4 
Don Joaquin is killed through a mistake of the Amerieans: the Negroes foree 
him onto the bulwarks and tie a hatehet "edge out and upright to his hand"; 
seen in this "questionable attitude," the Amerieans shoot him, be1:l.eving him 
to be a renegade seaman.S Melville's probing of the divine nature, not only 
its benevolenee, but elaims for its providenee and justiee, have a direet 
bearing on the subsequent problems of this study. 
David Hume 
Melville's referenees, ~passant, to David Hume, though few, exhibit 
~ob!-Diek, I, ehap. xl, 221. 
2 ~., II, ehap. exxxv, 364. 
~ 
~!2!!., ehap. exxix, 317. 
4 The Piazza Tales, p. 16S. 
5Ibid• 
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a marked esteem: it is possible that a more than normal national pride in 
his Scotch ancestry contributed toward this respect. l Melville probably had 
Hume in mind, among others, when, in Mardi, he describes Kaleedoni, that is, 
Caledonia, an ancient name for Scotland and remarks that the people of Kalee-
doni are known for "their penetration in philosophy," their "metaphysicians.,,2 
A short time later in Redburn (1849), published the same year as Mardi, 
Melville describes Hume's death in terms that, in some respects, seem appli-
cable to Melville as well: 
Though the Christian era had not then begun, Socrates died the death of 
the Christian; and though Hume was not a Christian in theory, yet he, 
lwilliam H. Gilman in Melville's Early Life and Redburn (New York: 
New York University Press, 1951), p. 12, prints a letter of Melville's father, 
Allan, to his father, which shows his pride in "discovering links that bound 
him to [Scotch] aristocracy": 
"Your greatgrandfather was a grandson of Sir John Melvill of Carnbee, 
who was knighted by James the 6th & made baron of Granton 28th July 1580, 
on which you may depend as a well-authenticated historical fact, ~­
firmed El living testimony--I have also traced you back in direct lineal 
descent to Sir Richard de Melville, Knight in the reign of Alexander the 
3d in the year 1268, & have discovered that ~ branch At Boston, & my 
great Uncle John then at Grenada, are expressly recognised in Douglas 
Baronage of Scotland, of which I shall purchase if possible a cheap 
edition. as belonging to the Melvilles of Carnbee & termed an ancient & 
illustrious House of the founders of which Crawford & Douglas Peerage of 
Scotland both say, were related to Queen Margaret consort of Malcolm 
Canmere & came with her from Hungary. • • • ft 
Melville seems to have come by his own pride naturally, and he had the added 
impetus of his romantic literary trends, trends which had depended, to a large 
measure, on the presence of aristocracy and class distinctions. In his arti-
cle on Melville in the £yclopaedia, II, 672, Duyckinck states immediately 
following the date and place of birth: "On his father's side he is of Scotch 
extraction, If and Melville lIlust have impressed Hrs. Hawthorne with the same 
information, since she wrote in early autumn of 1850 to her lIlother of Mel-
ville: "He is of Scotch descent--of noble lineage--of the Lords of Melville & 
Leven, & Malcolm is a family n81lle" (quoted in Metcalf, Herman Melville: 
£Icle and Epicycle, p. 92). 
2 Mardi, II, chap. xlviii, 198. 
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too, died the death of the Christian--humble, composed, without bravado; 
and though the most sceptical of philosophical sceptics, yet full of 
that firm, creedless faith that embraces the spheres. l 
The passage calls attention to Hume's scepticism and may also be a reflection 
of Melville's reading at this time in Montaigne, who devotes essays to the 
subject of death and the manner of dying. 
The source of Melville's knowledge of Hume remains unknown;2 he knew 
Hume's essay on suicide and makes explicit reference to it in The Confidence-
3 ~. Since the essay "Of Suicide" was printed with "On the Immortality of 
the Soul," the subject of which was of deep concern to Melville, it may be 
conjectured that Melville was acquainted with it also, and, given Melville's 
4 interest in theological works, a further strong surmise may be made for his 
direct knowledge of the "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion." Whether he 
knew the remainder of Hume's works through primary or secondary sources is 
anybody's guess. Near the end of his life, as noted by William Braswell, 
Melville marked heavily a passage in Schopenhauer saying that "from. every 
page of David Hume there is more to be learned than from. the collected 
1 Redburn, chap. lViii, 377. 
~elville knew Hume's essay on suicide: a 1777 octavo printed the two 
essays, "Of Suicide" and liOn the immortality of the Soul"; an 1824 octodecimo 
(The Philosophical Works of David Hume [London: G. Fenton]) printed the same 
two essays and the "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion," finally, in 1826, 
the complete essays were brought out in a four volume octavo set with the 
same title as the preceding (Edinburgh: Printed for Adam Black [etc.) ••• 
London)--citations are from. this 1826 four volume edition. 
3 The Confidence-Man, chap. xxiv. pp. 180-181. 
4 Sealts notes in the first article on "Melville's Reading," p. 143, 
that New York book dealers declined purchasing the lot of books which Mrs. 
Melville offered for sale after her husband's death. because of the "pre-
ponderance of these theological books." 
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philoaophical works of Helel.: Herbart. and Schleiel'llacher together. ,,1 
In hia "The Deailn of the ArgUlllent in Moby-Dick," Howard C. Horaford 
ainlles out in particular the "duperate implications of Hume's skeptical 
epistemOlOlYu2 and speaks of "the consequences of the new epistemology"; 3 it 
.ust be sub.itted, however, that the epist_oloBY, as this study endeavors to 
show, is not entirely "new," and, though Hume undoubtedly influenced Melville. 
4 probably early 88 Thorp suggests, he is by no .eana a unique source. In 
addition to his awareneas of Hume's scepticism and unchristian Christianity, 
Melville offers .ore evidence of a knowledge of the general outlines of Hume's 
philosophy than of particulars, though he may have known them; a search for 
5 
"direct" allusions may be misleading. Although a number of parallels .ay be 
drawn between Melville and Hume, for the purposes of this study four are of 
primary concern: the epistemological, ontological, ethical, and retributive; 
these will be amplified in the following chapters. Suffice it to say here 
~elville" Religious Thought (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University 
Press, 1943), p. 14. 
~S, VIII (Autumn, 1962), 234. 
3 !1?!!., p. 235. 
~illard Thorp, Herman Melville: Representative Selections (New York: 
American Book Co., 1938), p. xxvi, n. 18. 
5'or example, Starbuck'a arB_ent, "VenBeance on a dUllb brutel ••• 
that s1mply smote thee from blindest instinct! Madness! To be enraged with a 
dab thing, Captain Ahab, seems bluphemoua" (Moby-Dick, I. chap. xxxvi, 204), 
aeema to point to Hume's "The only proper object of hatred or vengeance, ia 
a person or creature endowed with thought and consciousnesa" (Huae, IV, 117). 
But the core of this concept is alao present in Monta1gne, a mentor to both 
Melville and Hume--Montaigne saysi' "This is the reason why we do not fall 
upon a beaat or a stone when it hurts us, because they are not capable of 
being sensible of our revenle" (Bk. II, chap. :xxvii, p. 321). 
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that Melville, like Hume (though not exclusively), questioned the certitude 
of knowledge and the actual existence and nature of reality; he would have 
balked at the utilitarian and pragmatic bent of Hume's ethics and been much 
less sanguine about a man-made ethical code, but he would have understood the 
difficulty that underlay this expedient in lieu of stabler forms; with Hume, 
he questioned the immortality of the soul and pending annihilation. 
IIIIanue1 Kant 
Recognition of Melville's knowledge of Kant rests not only on textual 
evidence in the novels, but on the testimony of Melville's Journal of 1849-
1850. Kant's name, as well as Rabelais's, Montaigne's, and Browne's, first 
1 
appears in the great intellectual ragout of Mardi, where Melville also makes 
reference to "Abstract Noumenons,,2 -whether Melville has Kant's concept of 
noumenon in mind in this particular reference is not clear, however, since it 
appears without comment. That Melville understood the essence of the problem 
that was to become, in Kantian terms, the phenomenal-noumenal problem, i.e., 
man's limited ability to perceive mere sensible impressions, the superficial 
appearances of things--phenomena, but his inability to penetrate this un-
yielding wall of appearances to seize the essence of the thing-in-itself--
noum.enon, the terms of the novel give ample evidence, particularly through the 
dialogue of Babbalanja who seeks the "pearl" beneath the shell, "the mystery 
that lieth beyond" mere appearance, "things infinite in the finite. 1t The 
problem, however, is common to the phalanx of scept1c writers. 
~ardi, I, chap. 11i, 14. 
2 ~., II, chap. lxvi, 282. 
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Kant's name again appears in Redburn in a passage that gives evidence 
of Melville's recent reading in Montaigne's ttApology,tt especially the section 
on the rationality of animals: 
There are unknown worlds of knowledge in brutes; and whenever you 
mark a horse, or a dog, with a peculiarly mild, calm; deep-seated eye, be 
sure he is an Aristotle or a Kant, tranquilly speculating upon the mys-
teries in man. No philosophers 80 thoroufhly comprehend us as dogs and 
horses. They see through us at a glance. 
Melville's most serious apprenticeship to Kant probably occurred on 
his journey to London and the continent in 1849-1850. He enjoyed lengthy 
discussions with Franklin Taylor, who was well versed in German philosophy, 
and his travelling companion for a good part of the trip and visit was George 
J. Adler, professor of German at New York Uni.versity; Melville's journal 
entry for October 12th reads: "There are some very pleasant passengers on 
board with whom to converse. Chief among these is a Mr. Adler, a German 
scholar, to whom Duyckinck introduced me. . . . He is full of the German 
2 
metaphysics, & discourses of Kant, Swedenborg, &c." Ten days later, October 
22nd, Melville records: 
1/2 I forgot to mention, that 1!!! night about 9 P.M. Adler & Taylor came 
into my room, & it was proposed to have whisky punches, which we ill have, 
accordingly. Adler drank about three tablespoons full--Taylor 4 or five 
tumblers 'c. We had an extraordinary time & did not break up till after 
two in the morning. We talked metaphysics continually, & Hegel, Schlegel, 
Kant &c were discussed under the influence of the whiskey.3 
--Faced with the melancholy reflection that facts are in absentia to prove 
that Melville mentally masticated the ponderous prose of the Critiques at 
I Redburn, chap. xl, p. 254. 
2 Journal--London and the Continent, p. 4. 
3 1!!£., p. 12. 
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first hand, regret may be alleviated by recalling these conducively "trans-
cendental" and elucidating circwnstances in which he imbibed his knowledge of 
the philosopher of K8nigsberg. As several successive journal entries show, 
the subject of metaphysics, particularly German metaphysics, was never left 
1 
very far astern. 
In Moby-Dick, Melville uses Kant opposite Locke to set up a situation 
of sceptical polarity. A Right Whale's head is hoisted up on the side of the 
ship Pequod opposite a Sperm Whale's head, and the narrator comments: 
So, when on one side you. hoist in Locke's head, you go over that way; 
but now, on the other side, hoist in Kant's and you come back again; but 
in very poor plight. Thus, some minds forever keep trimming boat. Oh, 
ye foolish! throw all these th.under-heads overboard, and then you will 
float light and right. 2 
Though his juxtaposition of the two philosophers is not further clarified in 
the passage, Me1v1.lle prohably had in mind the epistemological view of Locke, 
where the mind is fundamentally passive and affected, a "tabula rasa" in-
scribed by sense impressions of external nature, as opposed to the idealistic 
epistemological view of Kant, where the mind, not purely passive and receptive, 
is also active and effecti~g knowledge by providing, through the categories 
constituent to internal human nature, forms for the matter received through 
sense impressions. Melville finally rejects both extremes of systematized 
1 Friday, November 1: "In the evening played chess, & talked meta-
physics [with) my learned friend till midnight"; !hursday, November 15: 
ftWent with Adler to the 'Edinburgh Castle', a noted place for its fine Scotch 
ale, the best I ever drank. Had a glorious chop & a pancake, a pint & a half 
of ale, a cigar & a pipe, & talked high German metaphysics meanwhileN ; 
Tuesday, December!: "Thenee to his [Adler's1 room and talked high German 
metaphysics till ten o'clock"; Friday, December I: "Sat up conversing with 
Adler till pretty late,--(Topic--as usual--metaphysics)" (Ibid., pp. 16-17, 
32. 57, 59). 
2 Moby-Dick, II, chap. lxxiii, 59. 
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philosophy; though, despite his own advice, he did a great deal of "trimming 
boat" himself on the underlying problem of matter and mind. 
Describing the transcendental Apostles in Pierre, Melville employs 
Kant's name for the sake of a pun, but also, perhaps, for the idealistic 
affinities appropriate to transcendentalism, where truth is made to conform 
to the mind rather than vice versa: 
Often groping in vain in their pockets, they cannot but give in to the 
Descartian vortices; while the abundance of leisure in their attics 
(physical and figurative), unite with the leisure in their stomachs, to 
fit them in an eminent degree for that undivided attention indispensable 
to the proper digesting of the sublimated Categories of Kant; especially 
as Kant (can't) is the one great palpable fact in their pervadingly 
impalpable lives. l 
Henry A. Pochmann sees Melville's Moby-Dick and Pierre as parallels of 
Kant's first and second Critiques respectively: according to Pochmann, Mel-
ville, like Kant, examines the problem of knowledge on identical levels, the 
2 
metaphysical and the moral. It may be, however, that Melville is primarily 
questioning the three large areas of enquiry: God, nature, and man--man 
being particularly the self, the man best known if known at all. In a 
passage of a letter to Hawthorne on the "last stages of metaphysics," Melville 
speaks of the ''Me, a QQ£., a Nature. ,,3 Although the "self" is an important 
4 
element in Moby-Dic~, the accent is often on God and nature as seen through 
1 Pierre, Bk. XIX, chap. i, p. 372. 
2 Henry A. Pochmann, German Culture in America (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1957), p. 439. 
3 Letters, p. 125. 
4 Emerson's Over-Soul, the Divine Reality that stands behind phenomenon 
and emanates through it and infuses itt 1s at some furthest recess of man's 
soul identified with it. Emerson pushes Renaissance Protestant humanism to 
ultimate proportions by deifying mankind. "The Divinity School Address" is a 
89 
the proteanly symbolic whale. In Pierre, Melville stresses self: phrases 
such as "in his soul," "into his soul," "through thy soul," "within ourselves," 
Itinterior," "the heart,1t the spells "evoked in me" become more prevalent. 
God and nature are not forgotten, but, almost, as it were, assuming the darkly 
inconclusive conclusions of Koby-Dick, they are summarily reviewed near the 
beginning of Pierre in order to concentrate on the self; God, through the 
father figure, has failed: "Thy sacred father is no more a saint"; nature 
has failed: "The before undiBtrusted moral beauty of the world is forever 
fled"; but--at this early juncture--self remaine: 
The final tragedy comes with the failure of self. 
1 
''Myself am left, at least. It 
In The Confidence~an, too, 
as Miss Foster perceptively shows, Melville divides his allegory into the 
logical consequent of the premise of the Over-Soul: if every man at the 
marrow of his being is identified with the divine principle, then, ~ facto, 
every man is divine. The hypostatic union is no longer unique. The notion 
of Self-Reliance is an outcropping of romantic individuali ... , but Emerson 
baptized it. As the divinity-of-all-men premise is a logical consequent of 
the postulate of the Over-Soul, so is Self-Reliance the logical consequent 
of both of these: if the!!Ai!!!t is divine because of its identification 
with the Over-Soul, then self-reliance becomes synonymous with reliance on 
God: "Self-reliance, the height and perfection of man, is reliance on God" 
(Emerson, Works, XI, 236). Melville was as enamoured with the idea of self-
reliance and the dignity of the individual as Emerson--he would "cross the 
frontiers into Eternity with nothin8 but a earpet-bag,--that is to say, the 
E80" (Letters, p. l2S)-but he repudiates transcendental optimism in the 
outcome of this reliance. In "The American Scholar," EmersOll, that 8reat 
spiritual entrepreneur, asserts, in the cause of self-reliance: "That if the 
sin8le man plant himself indomitably on his instincts, and there abide, the 
huge world will come round to him" (EmersOll, Works, I, 115). Melville's Abab 
"indomitably" takes his stand, there abides, and the whole world, represented 
by the Pequod, comes round to him--and 80es down. As Melville writes in 
Pierre (Bk. XVIII, chap. ii, p. 364); "Our God is a jealous God; he wills not 
that any man should permanently possess the leas t shadow of his own self-
sufficient attributes." 
1 Pierre, Bk. III, chap. vi, pp. 89-90. 
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consideration of God, Nature, and Man, as he methodically punctures trust in 
1 
each of them. This three-fold division, in fact, seems to offer the larger 
dimensions of form for each of his more philosophical novels. Though not 
specifically Kantian, the division of Kant's Critiques, of course, may have 
been an inspiration for Melville's own considerations. 
The consideration allotted to each sceptic writer included in this 
chapter on Melville's sources will be augmented in following chapters. 
Melville had met, some more, some less, in his reading or conversation, all 
of the sceptics here included--Pyrrho, Sextus Empiricus, Rabelais, Montaigne, 
Descartes, Browne, Pascal, Bayle, Hume, and Kant--by the time of his most 
perfect work of art as well as record of sceptical enquiry, Moby-Dick. 
Attention turns now to a closer study of Melville's works; selected passages 
from the works of these authors, beginning with Rabelais, will accompany 
the following investigation of the philosophical problems inherent to scepti-
cism as they are found in the texts of Melville's writings. The fundamental 
thesis of this study is that Melville's basic problem (logically) is epis-
temological, a lack of noetic certitude which gave rise to an ontological 
difficulty concerning the nature of a consequently uncertain reality, which, 
in turn, engendered an ethical question, aince ethics depends on one's view 
of being or reality, and, finally, the ethical inconsequence which Melville 
envisioned rendered the retributive rationale--immortality and Banctions--
meaningles., until nothing was left but nothing. This course of reasoning is 
Melville's predominant one. While the element of nihilism is evident, in the 
1The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade, ed. Elizabeth S. Foster 
(Hendricks House edition; New York: Hendricks Bouse, Inc., 1954), pp. lvi-
lvii. 
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end, Melville no more trusted the powers of a fallible and limited reason to 
reach negative dogmatic conclusions than to reach more positively sanguine 
ones, and, for Melville the sceptic, the case of the universe ends with a 
question mark. 
CHAPTER III 
SCEPTICISM IN MELVILLE'S WRITINGS: EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 
"But deign, sOlDe little sign be given-n 
"Timo1eon." 
The fact of inguiry 
All literature is comprised of the ~ and the verba, the sense and 
the style, the matter and the manner--in short, !!h!! is said and how it is 
said. Every writer writes from a premise: the more universal, profound, and 
ultimate the premise, if the writer is also imbued with a unique gift of 
rhetoric to articulate it, the greater is his chance of reaching the highest 
echelon of artistic achievement. Herman Melville, in his greatest works, 
wrote from such a universal premise and probed it to profound and ultimate 
proportions. Because his premise is universal, it appears in different guises 
in works of contemporaneity as well as those of antiquity; a modern philosopher 
writes: 
Deep within us all, emergent when the noise of other appetites is stilled, 
there is a drive to know, to understand, to see why, to discover the 
reason, to find the cause, to explain. Just what is wanted has many names. 
In what precisely it consists, is a matter of dispute. But the fact of 
inquiry is beyond all doubt. It can absorb a man. It can keep him for 
hours, day after day, year after year, in the narrow prison of hill study 
or his laboratory.l 
The "fact of inquiry"--Melvil1e' s titanic struggle might be summarized in 
1 Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1957), p. 4. 
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these brief words. Like all aen, only more than most aen, he wanted to ~. 
Perhaps this assertion aay be questioned in view of the fact that Melville 
wrote to Hawthorne: "I stand for the heart. To the dogs with the headl"l 
But he also wrote that 
in those aen who have fine brains and work them well, the heart extends 
down to hams. And though you saoke them with the fire of tribulation, 
yet, like veritable hams, the head only gives the richer and the better 
flavor. 2 
Man needs aore love than knowledge: 
My fellow-creature, do you know 
That what aost satisfies the head 
Leaat solaces the heart? Less light 
Than warmth needs earthly wight. 3 
Though love is first in the priority of tmportance, however, knowledge is first 
in the order of precedence: we cannot love what we do not know. In the end, 
in any true humani .. that encompa.ses the whole aan, the head and heart stand 
united. In the final part of C1are1, Melville calls the heart the "Spouse 
of the brain, ,,4 and in his paean of praise for Hawthorne, he reaches the ver-
tex of hi. acclaim when he applies to Hawthorne Hawthorne's own words from 
the "Select Party": "A great heart burns as the household fire of a grand 
intellect. itS The present study concentrates on the problem of knowledge and 
dependent problems: epistemology and scepticism are bloodless words on paper, 
but 88 their problems actually occur existentially in the indiVidual, as they 
1 Letters, p. 129. 
2Ibid • 
3Clarel, Pt. III, canto xxi, 11. 244-247. 
4Ibid., Pt. IV, canto ~viU, 1. 82. 
5The Litera!! World, VII (August 24, 1850), 147. 
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did in Melville, they are vital and personal, problems that may significantly 
affect the ''heart.'' 
What is the object of man's inquiry? what does he want to know? Mel-
1 
ville once wrote that "truth is in things, and not in words." Many philoso-
phers would credit him with only a half score, since there is a kind of truth 
in both, but Melville touched a fundamental fact: the object of the mind is 
being. Before man employs "words" to speak, write, or read, he is confronted 
with beings, and when he finally does speak, write, and read, these human 
actions are radically affected by the nature and degree of his perception of 
ontological truth, of being. Man seeks to know being, whatever is, as it 
2 is in itself. Like Melville' a Pierre, man wanta to "know what !!.." 
How much of being does man desire to know? Man's very metaphysical 
make-up seems to be penetrated with an insatiate desire to know what will 
satisfy all his questions once and for all because it is the All. Melville's 
Babbalanja is concerned with "things infinite in the finite.,,3 Melville's 
most memorable protagonists, as well as Melville himself, seek to reach the 
final and ultimate heart of truth. They want to enucleate the core of reality, 
to probe the interiority of being, to reach the omega point in each datum of 
existence--and of existence itself. Babbalanja, in Mardi, wants what is 
"beneath the seeming," the "precious pearl wi thin the shaggy oyster," the 
"circle's centre,ft or--in the terms of Melville's felicitous contruct-the 
~ardi, I, chap. xciii, 329. 
2 Pierre, Bk. III, chap. vi, p. 90. 
~ardi, II, chap. lxxvi, 328. 
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1 
"idea-1mmanens," the immanent or indwelling idea. Melville praises 
Shakespeare for his "short. quick probings at the ••• axis of reality.II2 
Ahab, too, wants to "touch the axis," to "strike through the mask,"3 Pierre, 
to strike through the helm of the Black Knight and see the "face" of Truth. 4 
The next question i. the epistemological poser: how much is man able 
to know1-or t in Melville's tems: "What may man know?"S Because knowledge 
is the progeny of a union between a knowing subject and a knowable object, it 
will be curtailed by the limitations of either. It is the intention of the 
present chapter to investigate Melville'. deliberations on the knowing subject 
--Man. Because Melville is primarily an artist rather than a philosopher, it 
will not be surprising to find in this investigation that his works do not 
offer any schematic arrangement of abstract philosophical tenets; instead, his 
views are manifested through themes, characters, dialogue, situation, and 
imagery. Melville opts for no particular process of ideogenesis in the ques-
tion of truth, certitude, knowledge, of the origin and accuracy of ideas: in 
the question of whether knowledge precedes experience or experience knowledge, 
he never completely rejects the first, the Platonic concept, e.g., of innate 
6 ideas, though he obliquely challenges their final validity on the grounds of 
1 ~'t II, chap. x, 36; chap. lxxii, 308. 
2The LiteratI World, VII (August 17, 1850), 126. 
~obY-Dick, I, chap. xxxvi, 206, 204. 
4Pierre, Bk. 111, chap. vi, p. 91. 
5C1arel, Pt. IV, canto iii, 1. 109. 
6See Mardi (II, chap. lxxvi, 326): "The essence of all ideas is 
infused," and Pierre (Bk. XXI, chap. i, p. 395): "All the great books in the 
world are but the mutilated shadowings-forth of invisible and eternally 
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the possibility of a deceptive or nonbenevolent first cause, but he more fre-
quently works in terms of the faculties and acquired knowledge,l and he in-
2 
creasingly emphasizes the importance of experience. His treatment of the cog-
nitive faculties, though fairly inclusive, is, like Montaigne's, at random. 
Most of Melville's sceptical sources from Rabelais and Montaigne on 
are in the Renaissance tradition or heavily influenced by that tradition: 
renaissance thought, particularly that of the Protestant reformation. ques-
tioned, along with the "rule of faith," the grounds of epistemological certi-
tude; the renaissance revival of the often glorious and just as often complex 
conglomeration of Greek and Roman thought-~ontaigne's numerous quotations are 
apt testimony--offered a welter of confusing and conflicting concepts; a poly-
morphic society began to replace the great medieval monolithic structure and 
challenged that structure in both its predominantly Catholic theology and its 
supporting scholastic philosophy, a philosophy heavily indebted to Aristotel-
ianism. An epistemological assumption of this traditional philosophy is the 
fundamental position of the senses in the acquisition of knowledge; the 
Dominican theologian and scholastic philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas, e.g., in 
his Summa Theologica, cites Aristotle: "The Philosopher [Aristotle] says 
unembodied images in the soul." 
lIn addition to numerous forthcoming quotations, see, e.g., such 
passages as faji's observation on King Yoky talking with his hands and a 
servitor interpreting: "Very curious to note the rapidity with which motion 
was translated into sound; and the simultaneousness with which meaning made 
its way through four successive channels to the mind--hand, sight, voice, and 
tympanum" (Mardi, II, chap. lxx, 293). 
2In The Confidence-Man, e.g., some eighteen references are made to 
experience. 
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(Metaph. i. 1; Poster. ii. IS) that the principle of knowledge is in the 
1 
senses." Further, emphasis is on a positive guarantee of certainty in sense 
perception; distinguishing sense from intellect, Aristotle, in Bk. 111, chap. 
iii of De Anaa, writes: "For perception of the special objects of sense is 
always free from error, • • • while it is possible to think falsely as well as 
2 truly, II and, again, "sensations are always true." In "Lactio Four" of his 
commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, Aquinas writes: 
Understanding may be 'correct' or 'incorrect' •••• Sensation, on the 
other hand, can only be 'correct', for the senses are infallible with 
respect to their proper objects. 3 
1 Summa Tbeologica (3 vols.; Chicago: Benaiger Brothers, Inc., 1947), 
I, 428--Pt. 1, Q. 84. Art. 6. In fairness to both Aristotle and Aquinas, how-
ever, the quotation should be qualified. Aquinas continues: 
"But Aristotle held that the intellect has an operation which is independ-
ent of the body's cooperation. Now nothing corporeal can make an impres-
sion on the incorporeal. And therefore in order to cause the intellectual 
operation, according to Aristotle, the impression caused by the sensible 
does not suffice, but something aore noble is required, for the agent is 
!!.2!:!. noble Sh!A .!h!. patient, a8 he 8ays (De Cener. 1. 5] •••• Not, in-
deed, in the sense that the intellectual operation is effected in us by 
the mere impre8sion of 80me 8uperior being8, as Plato held; but that the 
higher and more noble agent which he calls the active intellect, of which 
we have spoken above (Q. 79, M. 3, 4), CAuse8 the phantasm8 received frOll 
the senses to be actually intelligible, by a proceS8 of abstraction. 
According to this opinion, then, on the part of the phantasm8, intel-
lectual knowledge is caused by the sense8. But since the phantasms cannot 
of themselves affect the passive intellect, and require to be made actually 
intelligible by the active intellect, it cannot be said that sensible 
knowledge i8 the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but 
rather thu it is in a way the material cause." 
SOlIe interpretations of the Aristotelian theory of knowledge maintain that 
there is nothing in the intellect that is not fir8t in the senses--thia con-
cept is important in the sceptical procedure of arguing first against the 
sen8es and consequently against reason. 
2 The Ba8ic Work8 of Aristotle, ed. with an introduction by Richard 
McKeon (7th printing; New York: Random House, 1941), p. 587. 
3Ariatotle's De Anima in the Version of William of Moerbeke and the 
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Scholasticism, as exemplified, e.g., in Aquinas, does not deny mis-
takes of sense perception through some discernible reason: e.g., the taste of 
a fever-stricken person might judge "a sweet thing to be bitter, through his 
tongue being vitiated by ill humors"; or,--and Aquinas is here borrowing an 
example from Aristotle' s De Anima--one might judge "the sun to be only a foot 
in diameter, whereas in reality it exceeds the earth in size"; again, "much 
more is sense deceived concerning accidental 8ensible objects, as when it 
judges that vinegar is honey by reason of the color being the same"--but, 
Aquinas continues: 
'nae reason of this is evident; for every faculty, as such, is per M!. 
directed to its proper object; and things of this kind are always the 
same. Hence, so long as the faculty exists, its judgment concerning 
its own proper object does not fail. 
Earlier in the same article, Aquinas maintains stoutly; "Sense is not de-
ceived in its proper object. ,,1 
Renaissance sceptical and contending reaction, therefore, questioned 
2 Aristotelianism with its positive emphasis on the validity of sense knowledge; 
by stressing the inefficacy of the senses, reason is automatically subverted, 
since it depends for its principle and material cause on sense knowledge; sub-
sequently, the various fields of knowledge, sciences and disciplines, which 
depend upon both the senses and reason, were undermined. Melville is not so 
COIIl1Ientan: of St. 'naomas Aguinas, trans. Kenelm F08ter, O.P. and Silvester 
Humphries, o.P. with an introduction by Ivo Thomas, O.P. (New Haven: Yale 
Univeraity Press, 1951), p. 382. 
1 Aquinas, Summa 'naeologica, I, 438--Pt. 1, Q. 85, Art. 6. 
~ontaigne writes: "The god of scholastic knowledge is Aristotle; 'tis 
irreligion to question any of bis decrees, a8 it was those of Lycurgu8 of 
Sparta; his doctrine is a magisterial law, which, peradventure, is as false 
u another" (Montaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 250). 
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logically tidy; neverthe1ess--and probably because he inherited the aggregate 
problem of this sceptical tradition through those spokesmen who became, 
through reading, his mentors--Me1vi11e's thought easily falls within the 
order of the above sequence, i.e., a rejection of the final trustworthiness 
of the senses, of reason which depends on the senses, and of the various dis-
cip1ines which depend on both. Though Melville, as artist, does not present 
this schematic order, its various elements are assumed and incorporated in 
the themes, dialogue, and imagery of his works. While inflicting some initial 
distortion to Melville's art by subordinating it to this schema, this approach 
does clarify the implications of his scepticism, show how he employed these 
implications and thereby help bring to his predominantly sceptic themes and 
imagery a fuller understanding of their significance and suggestiveness. 
Sense knowledge" 
The external senses.--The uncertainty of sense knowledge is one of 
the chief staples of the sceptic writers. Rabelais writes: 
The soul is seldom able to report those things in such sincerity 8S it 
hath seen them, by reason of the imperfection and frailty of the corporeal 
senses, which obstruct the effectuating of that office; even as the moon 
doth not communicate unto this earth of ours that light which she re-
ceiveth from the sun with so much splendor • • • and liveliness as it was 
given her.1 
Descartes, too, has serious reservations concerning sense knowledge: 
All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as possessed of the 
highest truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses. 
I observed, however, that these sometimes misled us; and it is the part 
of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have 
even once been deceived. 2 
1 Rabe1ais, II, Bk. III, chap. xiii, 273. 
2 Descartes, p. 98. 
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Sir Thomas Browne's "Vulgar Errors" appropriately begins with a tautly organ-
ized chapter on the causes of errors or deception; using Adam and Eve as 
exemplars of the human condition Browne says: "They were deceived through 
the conduct of their senses."l Browne mentions the "fallacies of sense" and 
writes of "those wayes, which have most reference unto sense, and wherein 
2 there 1yeth most notable and popular delusion." Pascal claims: 
Man is only a subject full of error, natural and ineffaceable, without 
grace. Nothing shows him the truth. Everything deceives him. These 
two sources of truth, reason and the senses, besides being both wanting 
in sincerity, deceive each other in turn. The senses mislead the reason 
with false appearances. 3 
Pierre Bayle asserts that the "senses always impose upon us"--and his use of 
4 impose with upon gives the meaning "to practice tricks or deception." Hume 
remarks on "the imperfect judgments of our senses and imagination" and our 
5 
"fallible and uncertain faculties." 
Montaigne postpones his discussion of the senses until near the end 
of the "Apology" and gives it something of a climactic and capping position 
in the essay--he declares: "Now all knowledge is conveyed to us by the 
senses," and "upon the consideration of the senses ••• lies the greatest 
6 foundation and proof of our ignorance." Montaigne employs a number of 
1 Browne, II, 185. 
2 !.!:!!.£., 193, 194. 
3 " Pensees, 83. 
4 Bayle, 1734-1741 ed., VIII. 601. 
5 Hume, It 101, 236. 
6 Montaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, pp. 275, 274 respectively. Underlining 
mine. 
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arg\Dllents against the five external senses, arguments which He1ville eventually 
appropriates in his writings. Montaigne first questions the adequacy of the 
existing number of the senses; he writes: "I make a doubt whether or no man 
be furnished with all natural senses , ,,1 and he later observes: "We have 
formed a truth by the consultation and concurrence of our five senses; but 
perhaps we should have the consent and contribution of eight or ten to make 
2 
a certain discovery of it in its essence." In Mardi, the first of Melvi11e's 
novels to mention Montaigne, Mohi the historian asks Babbalanja: "Philosopher, 
our great reef is surrounded by an ocean; what think you lies beyond?" 
Babbalanja answers that the appearance of certain strangers proves the exis-
tence of "isles afar." and then continues: 
Nor is it at all impossible, Braid-Beard, that beyond their land may exist 
other regions, of which those strangers know not; peopled with races 
something like us Mardians [earth-dwellers]; but perhaps with more 
exalted faculties, and organs that we lack. They may have some better 
seeing sense than ours. 3 
Melville uses this thought again later in the novel: Babbalanja, in his mys-
tiea1 vision of heaven, is endowed with the use of an additional sense. When 
he later relates his vision to the other members of the quest, he eannot find 
words to tell of all the unsearehab1e things about whieh his guide discoursed, 
for as Babbalanja explains: '~y sixth sense whieh he opened, sleeps again, 
with all the wisdom that it gained," and, as he fe11 back to earth, he was 
left with only his "five sense8.,,4 It may also have been Montaigne's 
1 
.!!?!.!t., p. 275. 
2 !lli.., p. 276. 
3 Mardi, II, chap. xxix, 115-116. 
4 
.!!?!.!t., chap. lxxxiv, 376, 378. 
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discussion on the want of additional faculties that inspired a passage in 
Babbalanja's soliloquy over the bones of the dead king Marjora: 
Art thou? or art thou not? I see thee not; I hear thee not; I feel thee 
not; eyes, ears, hands, are worthless to test thy being; and if thou art, 
thou art something beyond all human thought to compass. We must have 
other faculties to know thee by.l 
In his discussion of the possible deficiency of the sense faculties, Montaigne 
turns to the example of animals who apparently possess senses that humans 
lack--e.g., the cock who crows when day is near and animals who know what 
herbs will help cure their illnesses. Melville employs the argument but con-
structs his own examples: 
Belike, the eagles, from their eyries look down upon us }<tardians t in our 
hives, even as upon the beavers in their dams, marvelling at our incom-
prehensible ways. And cunning though we be, some things hidden from us 
may not be mysteries to them. Having five keys [five senses], hold we 
all that open to knowledge? Deaf, blind, and deprived of the power of 
scent, the bat will steer its way unerringly:--could we?2 
Montaigne further questions the validity of sense knowledge because 
of the possibility of error and uncertainty in the operation of the senses 
due to illusions; e.g., an anchored ship may seem moving, or, from a distance, 
separate rocks may seem to form one island. 3 Melville, in tiThe Encantadas," 
uses a like argument but, as usual, creates his own examples. He quotes a 
statement of Cowley, that "excellent bucanier":--''My fancy led me to call it 
Cowley's Enchanted Isle, for, we having had a sight of it upon several points 
of the compass, it appeared always in so many different forms; sometimes like 
a ruined fortification; upon another point like a great city"; Melville adds: 
1 ~., It chap. lxxviii, 276. 
~ardi, II, chap. lxxi, 298-299. 
3 Montaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 277. 
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fiNo wonder, though, that among the Encantadas [Melville's microcosm] all 
1 
sorts of ocular deceptions and mirages should be met." In the third sketch, 
"Rock Rodondo," Melville describes the illusory effect of the Rock, which 
had a "sail-like look" from the "long bird-lime streaks of a ghostly white lt : 
It is visible at the distance of thirty miles; and, fully participating 
in that enchantment which pervades the group, when first seen afar in-
variably is mistaken for a sail. Four leagues away, of a golden, hazy 
noon, it seems some Spanish admiral's ship, stacked up with glittering 
canvas. Sail hoi Sail hot Sail hot from all three masts. But coming 
nigh, the enchanted frigate is transformed apace into a craggy keep.2 
At the end of the sketch, Melville circles back to the illusion with his usual 
ontological anticlimax: 
Its bird-lime gleams in the golden rays like the whitewash of a tall 
lighthouse, or the lofty sails of a cruiser. This moment, doubtless, 
while we know it to be a dead des~rt rock, other voyagers are taking 
oaths it i8 a glad populous ship. 
In this case, the illusion is uncovered, but the question remains: do we 
always discover the deceptions of our senses? As Melville sublimated the act 
of seeing to symbolize the intellectual act of knowing, so he a1.0 symbolically 
"'- .,.->,.--. 
elevated the concrete connection of mirage with sight to inaight--in this 
passage which takes a thrust at ultimate responsibility for the lack of a 
criterion, the ensuing state of fluctuating uncertainty is likened to a mirage: 
In those Hyperborean regions, to which enthusiastic Truth, and Earnestness, 
and Independence, will invariably lead a mind fitted by nature for pro-
found and fearless thought, all objects are seen in a dubioU8, uncertain, 
and refracting light. Viewed through that rarefied atmosphere the most 
immemorially admitted maxims of men begin to slide and fluctuate, and 
finally become wholly inverted; the very heavens themselves being not 
innocent of producing this confounding effect, since it is mostly in the 
1The Piazza Tales, p. 206. 
2 ~., p. 194. 
3Ibid., p. 198. 
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1 heavens themselves that these wonderful mirages are exhibited. 
In addition to the possibility of a deficient number of senses and 
of deception by illusion or mirage, Montaigne shows that the senses may be 
altered by the passions of the soul: "Our senses are • • • very often stupe-
2 fied by the passions of the soul." In Melville's "Benito Cereno," Captain 
Delano becomes disturbed and suspicious when Babo and Don Benito withdraw to 
the opposite bulwarks and begin whispering, so the Captain fears, about him-
self; he believes he sees a certain "secret sign" passed between Don Benito 
and a "suspicious" member of the crew and remarks: ttlf I could only be cer-
tain that, in my uneasiness, my senses did not deceive me."3 
Montaigne's next problem is the problem of the dream--he writes: 
"They who have ccopared our lives to a dream were, perhaps, more in the right 
4 than they were aware of." Although logically subsidiary to the epistemolo-
gical problem, the dream hypothesis, in certain respects, is more directly 
an ontological probl_ and will be treated as such in the next chapter, but 
at this point it will be examined in its relationship to illusion and sense 
knowledge. Briefly, the problem is that sense experience and dream experi-
ence can be so much alike that one can hardly be distinguished from the other 
--in fact, the very grounds for such a distinction is questioned. The example 
that comes moet forcibly to mind is Melville's character Nehemiah in Clarel. 
As the next chapter endeavors to show, Melville questions whether all men 
1 Pierre, Bk. IX, chap. i, p. 231. 
2 Montaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 279. 
3 The Piazza Tales, p. 97. 
4 Montaigne, Bk. II. chap. xii, p. 279. 
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might not live in a dream world, since reality itself might be no more than 
dream; nevertheless, as Melville writes in Clarel, this is "the world we know I 
1 (Sole know, and reason from)," and the dream is not solved or challenged by 
withdrawing into a greater dream. Nehemiah's greater dream is his unguestion-
ing faith, a faith not reconciled with fact and maintained only by becoming 
tapervious to evil and experience--
His soul pre-occupied and freed 
From actual objects through the sway 
Of visionary scenes intenae--2 
a dream that, finally, may differ only in degree rather than in kind. Kel-
ville ironically describes Nehemiah's knowledge--he knows the words of the 
"seers," can "cipher out I The mystic days and dates sublime"--but he has 
frequently to ask "the hour of day. ,,3 Nehemiah is described as having absent, 
4 
"dreamy" eyes; he has a "dreamy" interest in the young Turk with his fiery 
S 
steed; meditating on Christ's visits to the peaceful and pastoral Bethany, 
which the pilgrims are passing, Clare1 questioningly muses, "can one dream 
the dream[?]"--Nehemiah can: he is riding along "dreaming of his fairy1and.,,6 
His dream becomes identified with illusion: 
By Olivet in waning day 
The saint in fond illusion went, 
lClarel, Pt. III, canto iii, 11. 13-14. 
2 ~ •• Pt. I, canto xxvi, 11. 20-22. 
3Ibid., canto viii, 11. 44-52. 
4 !.2!!., canto ix, 1. 3. 
5 !.2!!., canto xi, 1. 79. 
6 Ibid., Pt. II, canto vi, 11. 23, 39. 
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Dream mixed with legend and event. 1 
Finally, Nehemiah's waking and sleeping states beeome inextrieab1e. He is 
frequently shown sleeping or dozing: he is able to "elose" his pious aeeounts 
2 
only after "half told I The theme he'd leave, then nod. droop, doze--"; 
C1are1 visits Nehemiah in his hermitage but presently steals forth, "leaving 
Nehemiah in slumber eaught";) Nehemiah falls asleep under the olive trees in 
Gethsemane and Vine gestures to "let this poor dreamer take his rest,,;4 
again. on route, "Released from travel, in good hour I Nehemiah dozed within 
the tower,,;5 in the eanto "Of Petra," Nehemiah, like Pierre, p1aees himself 
beneath a huge roek, but, with none of Pierre's eha11enge, Nehemiah evinees 
simple trust and is "slumbering low ... 6 
Pina11y, "dream mixed wi th • • • event" and led Nehemiah to his death 
in the Dead Sea. Montaigne says: 
We wake sleeping, and sleep waking. • • • Our reason and soul reeeiving 
those faneies and opinions that eome in dreams, and authorizing the 
aetions of our dreams with the like approbation that they do those of 
the day. 7 
In a eanto signifieantly entitled "The Sleep-Walker," Nehemiah, "with 
throbbing brain I O'erwrought by travel," falls into a vision or "eestasy" 
1 ~'t Pt. I. eanto x, 11. 67-69. 
2 ~., 11. 102-103. 
) ~., eanto xxii. 1. 114. 
4 ~., eanto xxx, 1. 99. 
5 ~., Pt. II, eanto xx, 11. 26-27. 
6 !1!!!1 •• eanto xxx, 1. 70. 
7Montaigne, Bk. II, ehap. xii. p. 279. 
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that soon blend. with .leep: 
Then, by that sleight each dreamer knows, 
Dream merged in dream: the city r08e--
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Appeared the New Jerusalem.l 
Nehemiah gives a like credence to his dream fancies as he would to hi. senaes: 
The visions changed and counterchanged--
Blended and parted--distant ranged, 
And beckoned, beckoned him away. 
In sleep he rose; and none did wi.t 
When vanished this somnambulist. 
If the sense of touch or feeling is considered under the a.pect of 
pain, Kontaigne, with Pascal and Melville following suit, is willing to credit 
it with quite positive prox:1mate effects. In the "Apology," Montaigne dis-
cusses the fact that the senae. sometimes impo.e upon our reason but add.: 
I set aside the senae of feeling, that has its functions nearer, more 
lively, and substantial, that so often, by the effects of the pains it 
helps the body to, subverts and overthrows all those fine Stoical resolu-
tions and eoapels h1.a to cry out of his belly who has resolutely estab-
lished this doctrine in his soul--"that the colic, and all other pains 
and di.ea.... are indifferent thing., not having the power to abate any-
thing of the sovereign felicity wherein the wise man is seated by his 
virtue. ,,3 
Earlier, Montaigne write. in the same vein about the philosophy of Varro and 
Aristotle and asks: "Did they extract frOil their logic any consolation for 
the gout?,,4 Pascal affirms that "all the philosophy in the world does not 
lClarel, Pt. II, canto xxxviii, 11. 7-8, 14-15, 42. 
2 ~., 11. 46-50. 
~ODta1gne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 277. 
4 ~., p. 223. 
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avail against an hour of suffering. ,,1 A similar idea of the inadequacy of 
philosophy in the face of pain is present in Melville's letter to Hawthorne, 
June l85l--Melville criticizes Goethe's pantheistic philosophy: 
What nonsensel Here is a fellow with a raging toothache. UMy dear boy," 
Goethe says to him, "you are sorely afflicted with that tooth; but you 
must live !!!. the all, and then you will be happy. ,,2 
Despite positive prox.imate effects, Melville still questions the substantiality 
of even that which causes pain, and the sense of feeling or touch is finally 
left in a state of dubiety: "What object sensible to touch I . . . may faith 
rely on[?],,3 
The final coup de grace to the possibility of sense knowledge offer-
ing any sbsolute and ultimate veridity occurs in Clarel. Margoth, the scien-
tific materialist, and Rolfe, the seeking sceptic, are debating whether the 
Jordan valley was struck by natural or supernatural forces; Margoth is q\\ite 
sure it was through natural forces: "One here perceives the sign--of course; 
I All f S mere geology, you know." Rolfe counters: "Nay, how should one know 
that?" Margoth: 
By sight, 
Touch, taste--all senses in assent 
Of common sense their parliament. 4 
5 When Margoth finishes speaking, the ass brays out a "hideous hee-haw." 
lBlaise Pascal, The Miscellaneous Writings of Pascali Consisting of 
Letters, Essays. Conversations. and Miscellaneous Thoughts, trans. George 
Pearce, Esq. (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1849), p. 196. 
2 Letters, p. 13l. 
3C1arel. Pt. I, canto xxiv, 11. 70-71. 
4 Ibid., Pt. II, canto xxxiii, 11. 50-55. 
5Ibid., 1. 76. 
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The internal senses.--Melville also undercuts the possibility of 
attaining any final verity aided by the operations of the four internal senses: 
common sense, imagination, instinct, and memory. The common sense a8 the 
first of the internal senses is here used, again, in the framework of the 
traditional philosophy against which much of the renaissance movement mili-
tated: it is not exactly considered in the context of the colloquial Ameri-
canism of tlhorse sense" or the like widely used term of "common sense," both 
of which in popular parlance have the meaning of good practical judgment, al-
though there remains a dependence of meaning of the newer form on the older; 
rather, it is used in the sense of the ~ first definition of common sense 
as "an 'internal' sense which was regarded as the common bond or centre of the 
five senses, in which the various impressions received were reduced to the 
unity of a common consciousness." Melville's use of the term in Clarell 
approximates this meaning. The reference, with its rejection of common sense, 
is, again, the one just previously cited in which Margoth claims he knows the 
Jordan valley was struck by natural forces, and he knows this--
By sight, 
Touch, t&ate--all senses in assent 
Of common sense their parli8Dlent-
and Melville allows the ass to become suddenly voluble. 
In Mardi. Babbalanja dispatches the validity of the imagination: 
"Things visible are but conceits of the eye: things imaginative, conceits of 
the fancy. If duped by one, we are equally duped by the other.,,2 
Although instinct does not enable the hunters to reach Babbalanja's 
I ~., 11. 53-55. 
~rdi, I, chap. xciii, 329. 
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"ultimate" in Mardi, Melville does, at one point, give it great praise; how-
ever, he employs the term with generic scope and does not present it in any 
clear context. In chapter xxxi Melville barely finishes referring to the in-
stincts of brutes when he uses "instinct" as a synonym for reason: "Is not 
reason subtile as quicksilver--live as lightning[?) ••• Can we starve that 
noble instinct in us, and hope that it will survive?"l The old man of Serenia, 
in his explanation of the nature of the Serenians' love for Alma [Christ), 
uses the word apposite to feeling: I~e love him from an instinct in us;--a 
fond, filial, reverential feeling. tl2 The highest encomium of instinct--wbat-
ever it means to Melville--occurs in Babbalanja's praise of Lombardo the poet: 
"For though Lombardo abandoned all monitors from without; he retained one auto-
crat within--his crowned and sceptred instinct.,,3 Instinct is not considered 
infallible, however, even in Mardi; Babbalanja quotes from one of his old 
authors: 4 "Our very instincts are prejudices." By the time of Clarel, the 
limitations of instinct are clearly expressed: 
Such counter natures in mankind--
Mole, bird, not more unlike we find: 
Instincts adverse, nor less how true S 
Each to itself t What clew, what clew? 
Montaigne writes of the internal sense of memory: "Memory is a 
faculty of wonderful use, and without which the judgment can very hardly peJform 
1 Ibid. , II, chap. xxxi, 123. 
2Ibid • , chap. !xxxiii, 368. 
3 ~., chap. lxxvi, 328. 
4 Ibid. , chap. lxxi, 298. 
SClarel, Pt. Ill, canto xx, 11. 39-42. 
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1 its office." Pascal may take his cue from Montaigne when he writes: "Memory 
is necessary for all the operations of reason."2 Melville's most trenchant 
attack on memory occurs in that epistemological mare's-nest The Confidence-
~. The con~an John Ringman (but one avatar of a Confidence-Man of divine 
proportions) feigns acquaintance with the merchant: 
"How do you do, Mr. Roberts?" 
"Eh?" 
"Don't you know me?" 
"No, certainly." 
The merchant's certainty, however, gradually crumbles under the onslaught of 
the con-man: 
"I see you have a faithless memory, Mr. Roberts. But trust in the 
faithfulness of mine." 
'~ell, to tell the truth, in some things my memory ain't of the very 
best. • • ." 
flOh, sir, suffice it that it is as I say. Doubt not that we are all 
well acquainted." 
"But--but I don't like this going dead against my own memory; 1--" 
"But didn't you admit, my dear sir, that in some things this memory 
of yours is a little faithless? Now, those who have faithless memories, 
should they not have some little confidence in the less faithless memories 
of others?" 
When the merchant still hesitates, the con-man continues in Lockean terms: 
I see, I see; quite erased from the tablet. 
He renews his attack by asking the merchant if he ever received a head injury, 
so that the events registered in his memory were "afterwards bruised out by 
the injury." The merchant is now listening with more than ordinary interest, 
and the con-man presses his advantage by relating a fictitious accident that 
happened to him as a child and which brought about the oblivion of events in 
~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xvii, p. l03. 
2 ,/ Pensees, 369. 
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his memory. He rounds off by asserting: 
You see, sir, the mind is ductile, ••• images, ductilely received 
into it, need a certain time to harden and bake in their impressions, 
otherwise such a casualty ,as I speak of viII in an instant obliterate 
them, as though they had never been. 
The merchant finally admits not to an injury but to a sickness, a brain fever 
which caused him to lose his mind completely for an interval. The con-man 
concludes: 1 "That brain fever accounts for it alL II 
Intellectual knowledge 
Montaigne vas inexorable in his deflation of esteem for the faculty of 
intellect or "reason." He devotes a large section of his "Apology" to a demon-
stration that man's exalted reason is a faculty that he shares in common with 
2 brute nature. Melville seems to have given Montaigne's argument on the 
rationality of animals some consideration as his statment in Redburn, pre-
viously cited, shows: "There are unknown worlds of knowledge in brutes. tt3 In 
Moby-Dick the narrator affirms that the "sperm whale is in some cases suffi-
ciently powerful~ knowing, and judiciously malicious, as vith direct afore-
thought to stave in, utterly destroy, and sink a large ship." He documents 
his assertion on the knowingness of the whale with an excerpt from Owen 
Chace's account of the sinking of the Whale-ship Essex: the selection contains 
such passages as "it was anything but chance vhich directed his operations," 
1 The Confidence~an, chap. iv, pp. 21-24. 
2 See, e.g., Montaigne's discussion of bees and their activities: "Can 
we imagine that such, and so regular, a distribution of employments can be 
carried on without reasoning and deliberation?tI (Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 207). 
3 Redburn, chap. xl, p. 254. 
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the whale's attacks "were calculated" and marked by "decided, calculating mis-
chief."l In the climax of the chase, when Moby Dick turns to rend the Pequod, 
knowledge becomes Omniscience--it is with a "predestinating head" that the 
2 
whale advances and with "retribution, swift vengeance, eternal malice." Mon-
taigne, in this same section on the rationality of animals, declares: "When 
I play with my cat who knows whether I do not make her more sport than she 
3 
makes me?" Melville develops this query in his poem '~ontaigne and His 
Kitten"; he has Montaigne say to the kitten: ''We, you know, in mind are one," 
and 
Pishl what fops we humans here, 
Won't admit within our sphere 
The whitest doe, nor even thee--
We, the spotless humans, we!4 
Montaigne's most devastating argument against the intellect is founded 
on the fallibility of sense knowledge; stated simply, the argument runs: man's 
knowledge comes through the senses and depends upon them for its certainty; but 
the senses are uncertain in operation; therefore, man's dependent reason and 
knowledge are subsequently uncertain. Monta1gne writes: "The uncertainty of 
5 
our senses renders everything uncertain that they produce"; earlier in his 
essay he is even more explicit: 
The sects that controvert the knowledge of man do it principally by 
the uncertainty and weakness of our senses: for since all knowledge ia 
~obY-Dick, I, chap. xlv, 258, 259. 
2 Ibid., II, chap. cxxxv, 365. "Eternal" suggests a divinity. 
3 Montaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 206. 
4 Collected Poems, pp. 381-382. 
5 Montaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 281. 
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by their means and mediation conveyed unto us, if they fail in their report 
if they corrupt or alter what they bring us from without, if the light 
which by them creeps into the soul be obscured in the passage, we have 
nothing else to hold by.l . 
On the question of the dependence of reason on the senses, Melville does not 
develop Montaigne's argument gua argument, but it is everywhere implicit in 
his works: man must work with his perceptions of tithe world we know I (Sole 
2 know, and reason from)," and, as he endeavors to do so, the question arises: 
"Whose the eye that sees aright, I If any?,,3 and he is left with the conse-
quent agonizing doubt of possible intellectual deception based on the errancy 
of sense knowledge-nif I could only be certain that • • • my senses did not 
deceive me.,,4 
The direction of Montaigne's argument against reason that activated 
5 both the most sublime disquisition on Christianity and, yet, the most 
strenuous defiance from Melville was voiced early in the "Apology": 
The means that 1 shall use [in the argument against reason] ••• is to 
crush and spurn under foot pride and human arrogance; to make them sen-
sible of the inanity, vanity, and vileness of man; to wrest the wretched 
arms of their reason out of their hands; to make them bow down and bite 
the ground under the authority and reverence of the Divine Majesty. 'Tis 
to that [the Divinity] alone that knowledge and wisdom appertain; that 
alone that can make a true estimate of itself, and from which we pur-
loin whatever we value ourselves upon. • • • "God permits not any being 
but himself to be truly wise." ••• "God resists the proud, but gives 
grace to the humble." "Understanding is in the gods:' says Plato, "not 
1 
.ill.s!.., p. 276. 
2 Clarel, Pt. III, canto iii, 11. 13-14. 
3 ~., Pt. II, canto xxii, 11. 134-135. 
4 The Piazza Tales, p. 97. 
5 Mardi, II, chap. lxxxiii. 
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at all, or very little, in men."l 
Closely connected with this argument is the idea that man is not much worth 
the serious consideration of the gods: in Pierre, Melville writes of man that 
"in his infinite comparative minuteness and abjectness, the gods do likewise 
2 despise him, and own him not of their clan"; Montaigne quotes Ennius: 
I ever thought that gods above there were, 3 
But do not think they care what men do here. 
In Book III of the Essays, Montaigne writes the following about the physical 
act of love, but his general thought is applicable here also: "I believe it to 
be true that, as Plato says, the gods made man for their sport •• . . 'What a 
strange sporting cruelty is this?,,,4 and in the same Book, he writes: "The 
goda play at tennis with us, and bandy us every way."S The indifference of 
the "gods" becomes a constantly recurring theme in Helville. 
Melville is willing to concede that "God permits not any being but 
himself to be truly wise": Babbalanja's celestial guide declares that "no 
6 
mind but Oro's [God's1 can know all. ••• perfect wisdom can be only Oro's." 
Melville is even willing to concede that "God • • • gives grace to the humble": 
Babbalanja's guide tells him, "since humility is thine, thou art one apt to 
learn. That which they own wisdom could not find, thy ignorance confessed 
~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii. p. 204. 
2 Pierre, Bk. XXII, chap. i, p. 413. 
~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 238. 
4 ~., Bk. III, chap. v, p. 406. 
5 lhM.., chap. ix, p. 444. 
6 Mardi, II, chap. lxxxiV, 375. 
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shall gain. Come, and see new things"; later, a more exalted angel hears thea 
discoursing and is drawn to Babbalanja's angelic guide, because, as he 8ays, 
"thy humility was manifest; no arrogance of knowing. Come lh2!!. and learn new 
things."l Melville could admit that it was so: that it should be so was 
another matter. 
The episode of the "willful boy" in Mardi seems significant in view 
of the fact that Melville was probably reading the "Apology" for the first 
time during his composition of Mardi. In the above cited pa8sage from the 
"Apology" in which Montaigne relates his efforts to crush human arrogance by 
leaving reason un reconciled with and subservient to faith, he speaks of the 
"vileness of man" and assays through his argUlllent to make man ''bow down and 
bite the ground under the authority and reverence of the Divine Majesty": 
Melville's "willful boy" tries to see the image of Oro [God] and exclailaB aloud 
when he cannot; the censor-bearers cry, "let him speak no more; but bow down, 
and grind the dust where he stands; and declare himself the vilest creature 
that crawls. So Oro and Alma cOlll1and. II The boy's answer may well be close to 
Melville's mind at thi8 time: 
I feel nothing in me 80 utterly vile, • • • and I cringe to none. 
But I would as lief adore your image, a8 that in my heart, for both mean 
the 8ame; but more, how can I? I love great Oro, though I comprehend hila 
not. I marvel at his works, and feel as nothing in his 8ight; but be-
cause he 18 thus omnipotent, and I a mortal, it follows not that I _ 
vile. Nor so doth he regard me. We do ourselve8 degrade ourselves, not 
Oro us. Hath not Oro made me? And therefore _ I not worthy to stand 
erect before him? Oro is almighty, but no despot. I wonder; I hope; I 
love; I weep; I have in me a feeling nigh to fear~ that i8 not fear; but 
wholly vile I .. not; nor can we love and cringe. 
1 
.!lli.., 374, 377. 
2Ibid •• chap. viii,. 29-30. 
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As Melville's scepticism deepened, he came to question the despotism of God, 
but the tems of his worship remained unchanged--"I cringe to none. • • • nor 
can we love and cringe." Ahab, too, would respond to love, but he will not 
fear or be abased: t'Come in thy lowest form of love, and I will kneel and 
kiss thee; but at thy highest, come as mere supernal power; and though thou 
launcheat navies of full-freighted worlds, there's that in here that still re-
mains indifferent." Because Ahab has come to a realization of evil and feels 
that he has been struck out at, he reasons to an element not of love but of 
warfare in the "supernal power" and concludes that the "right worship is 
defiance."l 
Melville looked for a greater coition of reason and faith than was 
offered by Christianity as he personally understood it: he was not about to 
have the "wretched arms of his reason wrested out of his hands." He poignantl 
questioned the limitations of the human intellect, but he held the tlgrand 
intellect" in high esteem. In Mardi, Babbalanja says to Yoemy: 
Nor is there any impiety in the right use of our reason, whatever the 
issue. Smote with superstition, shall we let it wither and die out, a 
dead 11mb to a live trunk, as the mad devotee's arm held up motionless for 
years? Or shall we employ it but for a paw, to help us to our bodily 
needs, as the brutes use their instinct? Is not reason subtile as quick-
silver--live as lightning--a neighing charger to advance, but a snail to 
recede? Can we starve that noble instinct in us, and hope that it will 
survive? Better slay the body than the soul; and if it be the direst of 
sins to be the murderers of our own bodies, how much more to be a soul-
suicide. Yoamy, we are men, we are angels. And in his faculties, high 
Oro is but what a man would be, infinitely magnified. Let us aspire to 
all things. Are we babes in the woods, to be scared by the shadows of the 
trees? What shall appal us? If eagles gaze at the sun, may not men at 
the gods?2 
~obY-Dick, II, chap. cxix, 282, 281. 
~ardi, II, chap. xxxi, 122-123. 
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Babbalanja's reason, finally, does not enable him to gaze at the gods nor 
attain for him his much desired HultimateU ; in Serenia, he settles for the 
"penultimate": "My voyage is ended. Not because what we sought is found; but 
1 that I now possess all which may be had of what I sought in Mardi." 
In Mardi, the maiden Yillah, through multiple associations, becomes 
the symbolic embodiment of all that man desires, the omnicomplete, the summum 
2 bonum, the sovereign good. Melville may have been struck by Montaigne's dis-
cussion of what philosopher's have propounded as the "sovereign good of man.,,3 
Among the other desiderata of human yearning is knowledge or the possession 
of truth, and it receives a lion's share of attention in Mardi: man's desire 
for knowledge is frustrated along with his other desires--"And in all this 
tour of Mardi, how little have we found to fill the heart .. . . . . how much to 
4 
slaughter all our yearnings," but, unlike the search for other goods, Mel-
ville carries the search for knowledge beyond the pales of earth, and the 
Christian neophyte Babbalanja records in his narration of a celestial vision 
what may well have been the dilemma of his author. Babbalanja inquires about 
1 Ibid., chap. lxxxv, 380. 
2 Not only is Yillah the ~ and beauty and felicity that Taji seeks, 
but she comes to represent such desiderata as the dignity of the individual--
when the willful boy is sacrificed for refusing to admit to vileness, Babbal-
anja declares that Yi11ah "must have fled" these shores long since (Mardi, II, 
chap. viii, 30); she is liberty--after observing slavery in Vivenza [America], 
it is concluded that "Yillah harboured not" in Vivenza (Mardi, II, chap. lviii, 
252); she is peace: "Yi11ah still eludes us. And in all this tour of Mardi 
how little have we found to fill the heart with peace" (Mardi, II, chap. lXXXi, 
358). Examples could be multiplied, since Yillah is usually associated with 
the positive element that is found wanting at each stage of the journey of 
quest. 
~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 270. 
4 Mardi, II, chap. lxxxi, 358. 
119 
the blest souls: "Is theirs, oh guidel no happiness supreme? their state 
still mixed? Sigh these yet to know?" 'The guide answers: "No mind but Oro's 
can know all; no mind that knows not all can be content; content alone ap-
1 proximates to happiness." 'The idea of heaven without consummate knowledge is 
not Melville's idea of heaven. Happiness becomes mixed with usadness"; in 
the second angel's eyes "swam tears unshed"; the spirits have "weeping halos," 
and around the one Shekinah, the "air was flaked with fire;-deep in which 
fell 2 showers of silvery globes, tears magnified. If Melville condemned "nomi-
nal" 3 4 5 Christianity in his first two novels and in Mardi. Later in Mardi 
his portrait of a real Christian community is sympathetically drawn, and it is 
not at variance with reason: Babbalanja addresses the old man: '~ethinks, 
that in your faith must be much that jars with reason." 'The old man answers: 
"No, brother I Right reason, and Alma, are the same; else Alaa, not reason, 
would we reject," and when the philosopher accepts Christianity he says, 
"Reason no longer domineers; but still doth speak.,,6 Reason has its place, 
but, for Taji--apparently Melville-Taji--it just doesn't go far enough.--
There might be a way to obtain supreme knowledge, but Melville questions it 
on the grounds of the price demanded: with Emersonien echoes of the pervading 
1 l!!!., chap. lxxxiV, 375. 
2 ~.t 375, 376, 377, 378. 
3 See, e.g., IYPee. chap. xxv, p. 244; chap. xxvi, p. 263; ~, chap. 
XVii, p. 74. 
4 Mardi, II, chap. ix, 32. 
5 ~., chap. !xxxiii. 
6Ibid., 370, 371. 
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OVer-Soul, Babbalanja speaks of the soul that 
intent upon itself, ••• pierces in upon its own essence, and is resolved 
into its pervading original; becoming a thing constituent of the all-em-
bracing deific; whereby we mortals become part and parcel of the gods; our 
souls to them as thoughts, and we privy to all things occult, ineffable, 
and sublime. l 
If only God knows all, then man can know all only if he is "part and parcel" 
2 
of God. But, like his fellow contemporary writers, Melville could not ade-
quately solve the problem of the One and the Many: it was simple and at least 
pseudo-sublime to reduce everything to One--the panthdsm of being resolved 
back into the "pervading original," but it could be ultimately achieved only 
at the cost of the Many--the loss of each separate and distinct individual 
1 ~., chap. lxvi, 281. 
2 Both Emerson and Whitman try to solve the problem of the One and the 
Many by somehow dissolving the Many back into the One, by positing some under-
lying, fundamental identity of man (multiple) and God or the Over-Soul (one). 
Emerson writes: "I am part or parcel of God" (Works, I, 10). In his essay 
"The OVer-Soul," Emerson applies numerous images of water: "stream, tt "flow-
ing river." "ebb," Itsea,1t "tide of being," "floats," "surges" (Works, II, 268, 
281, 284, 294, 296). Whitman, too, in writing of the "general soul" utilizes 
images of water: "The universal and fluid soul impounds within itself not 
only all good characters • • • but • • • distorted characters" (Emory Holloway 
[ed.], The Uncollected Poetry and Prose of Walt Whitman [Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1921], II, 65-66; underlining mine). Whitman 
speaks of God as "fountain" and "reservoir," and his images of the sea, of 
"float." and solution are bound up with his concept of the universal soul; 
water is implied in such lines as "lave me all over, I Bathe me 0 God in thee" 
(Emory Holloway [ed.), Leaves of Grass by Walt Whitman [The Inclusive Edition; 
Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1926], p. 348). In Leaves of Grass 
(Ed. Holloway, pp. 134, 192, 4, 349, 373 respectively), Whitman sees man 
created--tfstruck from the float forever held in solution"--only, at last, to 
return to this sae "float forever," "the partial to the permanent flowing," 
so there is a tlmerge at last" or a soul that "melts" back into God; however, 
Whitman is not able completely to reconcile or submerge the Many (individual 
personal identities) into the One, nor as a singer of the "Self" does he wish 
to, so he refers to "actual faces" within this "merge," and, consequently, the 
whole idea becomes rather vague and glutinous and comes close to conjuring up 
a phantasm of the One and the Many as a vast vat of hot chocolate full of 
partially melted marshmallows--not quite One and not quite Many. 
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identity. Melville would not pay that price; he cherished what he called his 
"sovereignty in myself" and would not be even so much as "tributary": he 
sought parity rather than identity with the One--he would treat 'with all 
Powers upon an equal basis"l and even be a "democrat to all above."2 
In some respects, Babbalanja's character does not fulfill its promise. 
Whatever else it is, Mardi is also a record of Melville's growing realization 
of the implications of scepticism, and he did not accept all of these tmplica-
tions without some struggle; he tries, e.g., to retain some proximate, if 
limited, reliability of reason: in an argument on reason that seems to at-
tempt to mitigate Montaigne's efforts to "humble lt the "arrogance" of human 
reason <as shown in the previously cited passage, a passage that Melville 
probably found offensive in tone), Melville has Babba1anja say, citing 
Bardianna, 
it [reason] is not so arrogant as some think. Nay, far too humble, at 
times it submits to the grossest indignities. Though in its best estate, 
not infallible; so far as it goes, for us, it is reliable. When at fault, 
it stands still. • • • But if this our first revelation [with transcen-
dental overtones, Melville sees reason coming directly from God and calls 
it the "first revelation"] stops short of the uttermost, so with all 
others. If, often, it only perplexes: much more the rest. They leave 
much unexpounded; and disclosing new mysteries, add to the enigma. 
Fellow-men! the ocean we would sound is unfathomable; and however much 
we add to our line, when it is out, we feel not the bottom3--
although these lines somewhat prepare us for Babba1anja's later acceptance of 
Christian faith, their static wisdom and passive acquiescence seem a far cry 
from the Babba1anja who seeks the "ultimate," who wishes to use reason to 
1 Letters, p. 125. 
2 Moby-Dick, I, chap. xxxviii, 211. 
3 Mardi, II, chap_ lxxi, 301. 
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flgaze at the gods," and who is driven almost to madness by a philosophic 
demon. The structure of the novel may be responsible: Montaigne, in his 
"Apology," writes that "Plato seems to have affected this method of phi1oso-
phising in dialogues; to the end that he might with greater decency, from 
I 
several mouths, deliver the diversity and variety of his own fancies"; Mel-
ville the sceptic, a man arguing with himself, does something akin to this by 
assuming in different instances various personae of his novel Mardi. What 
gives evidence of having been but one line of thinking in Melville becomes 
bifurcated into two characters in Mardi. In the relationship of character 
to the intensity and thrust of the search, the traits of the early Babbalanja 
seem to be transferred in the denouement to Taji: having newly discovered the 
world of mind after the novel was under way, Melville may have felt he would 
strain artistic plausibility by having his young, romantic hero Taji philoso-
phizing to the depth that Babbalanja would, and when Babbalanja comes front 
stage, Taji recedes only to come forward again as primary protagonist, after 
Babba1anja submits his reason to Christian faith, to become a hunter and 
challenger of an intensity that logically results, in Melville's terms, from 
a depth of involvement and perception comparable to Babbalanja's. The split 
results in neither character reaching tragic heroic proportions. Melville was 
eminently successful when he channelled this side of his thought in the one 
character of Ahab. 
In this early novel of Mardi, Melville, the growing sceptic, can still 
say of reason, at one point, that, though limited, "it is reliable," until his 
increasing awareness of the possibility of deception, not only through the 
~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 235. 
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senses but by some responsible first cause or power renders even this relia-
bility uncertain, and, even at this early juncture, he sees reason as "reliable' 
only "so far 88 it goes," which, for Melville isn't far enough. Babbalanja 
finds reason or knowledge limited even in heaven and Melville finally rejects 
the possibility of being "privy to all things occult, ineffable, and sublime" 
by being resolved into the "pervading original" because of the implied price 
deaanded of one'a aovereign individuality. Aa Melville became more deeply 
cognizant through hia reading and writing of the problems of sceptici .. and 
realized more fully its pervading intellectual frustration, his tone becomes 
more militant, hia defiance more marked: Moby-Dick becomes a battle of wits. 
In his colossal quest !lover all sides of earth,,,l the "calculatingtf 
Ahab seeks an encounter unto death with the "calculating" sperm whale Moby 
Dick, whoae significance spills over from that of a particular white whale to 
become a symbol for all of Nature and, finally, a surrogate for God. In this 
great battle of wits, the "grand intellect" of Ahab is able to subdue lesser 
intellects, even that of his most formidable human opponent Starbuck: 
My soul is more than matched; she's overmanned; and by a madmanl In-
sufferable ating, that sanity should ground arma on such a field! But 
he drilled deep down, and blaated all my reason out of mel 2 
Ahab speaks of his ttbrain-battering fight,") and "The Battering-Ram" 
becomes "the sperm whale's head,,4_-the locus of the intellect. Head imagery 
plays an important role in the novel. Ahab's obsession i8 to thrust "through 
~ObY-Dick, I, chap. xxxvi, 203. 
2 ~., chap. XXXViii, 211. 
3 ~., chap. XXXVii, [209]. 
4 ~., II, chap. lxxVi, 69. 
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1 the vall," and, to hill, "the White Whale is that vall, tt particularly the 
head, which is described as a "dead, blind wall" and a "dead, impregnable, 
uninjurable wall.,,2 
Parts of the Sperm Whale's head that receive special attention are 
the spout or spiracle, which "is on the top of his head,,,3 and the forehead or 
brow. The jetting of the whale spout becOllles symbolic of what is "ponderous 
and profound tf and of the "act of thinking deep thoughts. I • 4 In a sentence re-
plete with sceptical iIlplications, Melville writes of the spout (as he has of 
all the other Itinexplicable" parts of the whale): "And as for this whale-
spout, you might almost stand in it, and yet be undecided as to vhat it is 
5 precisely." Further, a warning is given: 
Nor is it at all prudent for the hunter to be over-curious touching 
the precise nature of the whale-spout. It viII not do for him to be peer-
ing into it, and putting his face in it. You cannot go with your pitcher 
to this fountain and fill it, and bring it away. • • • I have heard it 
said, and I do not much doubt it, that if the jet is fairly spouted into 
your eyes, it will blind you. The wisest thing the investigator can do 
then, it seems to me, is to let this deadly spout alone. 6 
Ahab, however, is not the prudent hunter but, like Taji, a "hunter that never 
rests.,,1 and on the third and last day of the chase, in his groping for the 
axis of reality, Abab cOIle. "fairly within the 81Iloky mountain mist ••• 
1 illS· , I, chap. XXXVi, 204. 
2 !!!!!!. , II, chap. lxxvi, 69, 71. 
3 !!?!.!!. , chap. lxxxv, 112. 
4 1lli.. , 116. 
5 !!?!.!!. , 115. 
6 1lli.. , 115-116. 
7Mardi, II, chap. lxxxv, 382. 
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thrown off from the whale's spout"; he "staggered; his hand smote his forehead. 
'I grow blind; handal stretch out before me that I may yet grope my way. ,,1 
The whale's forehead, the "Battering-a_," is a hieroglyphically 
2 
"wrinkled brow"; the whale has no "features"-"nothing but that one broad 
firmament of a forehead, plaited with riddles.,,3 In the climactic three-day 
4 
chase and actual encounters with the "grand god" Moby-Dick. the head of both 
man and Sperm Whale assume near allegorical proportions in the epic struggle 
of Ma.a to "conquer. 1t to comprehend the Divine Mind, to "clutch I God's 
secret."S the key to the "problem of the universe. lt6 But the "secret" re-
mains elusive: man's best efforts are seemingly met by the disdainful indif-
ference of the gods, or, if man persists so as to demand attention, he is 
faced with possible powers of malign destruction, a destruction which, given 
the earnestness of man's quest and aspirations and the seriousness of his 
plight, but bespeaks an even greater indifference. 7 
In an episode reminiscent of Montaigne's remark on Plato--ItI believe 
it to be true that, as Plato says, the gods made man for their sport •••• 
~ObY-DiCk, II, chap. cxxxv, 363-364. 
2 1!!!., I. chap. xxxvi, 201. 
3 Ibid., II, chap. lxxix, 83. 
4 ~., chap. exxxiii, 335. 
SClarel, Pt. II, canto XXi, 11. 29-30. 
6 Moby-Dick, I, chap. xxxv, 197. 
7For further consideration of the qualities of active malignity and 
indifference as being not exclusive see the section on "An indifferent deity" 
in chapter V. 
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'What a strange sporting cruelty is this?",l_-the White Whale takes Ahab's 
boat in his mouth and plays with it "as a mildly cruel cat her mouse," and 
the bluish pear1-white lining of the jaw is "within six inches of Ahab's 
head.,,2 Finally, in an effort to extricate himself from the Whale's mouth, 
Ahab is dumped "flat-faced upon the sea," and the "regal," dignified, and in-
domitab1e old man bobs ludicrously in the waves--and f~e1p1ess Ahabts head was 
seen, like a tossed bubble. ,,3 The Whale then litera11y--and figurative1y--
swims circles around Ahab, and the center of the circle tfhad now become the 
old man t a head. ,,4 
This disdainful indifference oil the tlgoda" to the intellectual asp ira-
tions of man had been prepared for three chapters earlier in "The Hat." In 
seeming anticipation of his intellectual parity, Ahab doffs his hat and stands 
bareheaded to no one. As a further assertion of his individuality, he wears 
5 '6 the hat "slouched," and keeps it on even while he sleeps. While Ahab is 
perched aloft keeping watch for Moby Dick, a sea-hawk (birds, in Melville, are 
often connotative of heavenly agents7) swiftly circles Ahab's head, then 
snatches his hat and darts away with it. Melville's narrator records: "An 
eagle flew thrice round Tarquin's head, removing his cap to replace it, and 
~ontaigne, Bk. 111, chap. v, p. 406. 
~obY-Dick, 11, chap. exxxiii, 336. 
3 Ibid., 337-338. 
4 !!?H., 338. 
5 Ibid., 1, chap. xxx, 160; 11, chap. exxx, 319; chap. exxxiii, 340, 34 
6 !!?H., 1, chap. LI, 297. 
7 Ibid., II, chap. exxxv, 367. 
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thereupon Tanaqui1, his wife, declared that Tarquin would be king of Rome."l 
But Ahab's efforts will not be crowned: the wild hawk drops his hat into the 
sea. A quarter of a century later, the apparent futility of the search is 
still a question for Melville, and, in Clarel, Mortmain is victim to the same 
action of a !fgreat bird": 
Oh, the hag, 
That from the very brow could pluck 
The cap of a philosopher 
So near the sky, then, with a mock, 
Disdain and drop it. 2 
Undaunted by disdain, the Pequod's single-purposed, monomaniacal cap-
tain of the hunt, by the very degree of his defiance, demands destruction. As 
the hunters approach the Whale on the first day of the chase, they are able 
to see "the vast, involved wrinkles of the slightly projecting head beyond.,,3 
After sounding, the Sperm Whale rises, his great mouth yawning beneath the 
boat. Ahab whirls the boat away: "Now, by reason of this timely spinning 
round the boat upon its axis, its bow, by anticipation, was made to face the 
4 
whale's head while yet under water." Bested on the first day, Ahab returns 
to the chase the second day, Hand cheering his men, he told them he would 
5 take the whale head-and-head,--that is, pull straight up to his forehead." 
The Whale offers "appalling battleU and "dashed his broad forehead" against 
1 Ibid., chap. cxxx, 323. 
2 Clarel, Pt. III, canto xxv, 11. 134-138. 
3 Moby-Dick, II, chap. cxxxiii, 333. 
4 
.!.hl&., 336. 
5 Ibid., chap. cxxxiv, 347. 
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1 the bottom of Ahab's boat, spilling him out once more; then, satisfied that. 
his work for that day is done, the Whale departs, pushing "his plaited fore-
2 head through the ocean." On the fatal third day Ahab declares: "Forehead to 
3 forehead I meet thee, this third time, Moby-Dick!" Accepting the challenge, 
4 Hoby Dick comes "head on" among the boats, and, later in the fray, wheels 
round on Ahab's boat "to present his blank forehead at bay."S 
By his designations for the Whale's forehead in earlier chapters (e.g., 
as a "dead, blind wall,,6), Melville slowly invests his concrete symbolism with 
abstract connotations, until he is able to pronounce his dictum on the apparent 
futility of man's quest for truth in a later, apparently isolated, metaphori-
cal aentence, the terms of which, through accretion, have become packed with 
7 
significance: "The dead, blind wall butts all inquiring heads at last" --a 
significance that is powerfully translated into the accelerated action of the 
denouement when the questing world-ship is irrevocably sundered by the Sperm 
8 Whale--smote by "the solid white buttress of his forehead." 
Though Melville never lost his appreciation of the intellect and never 
personally or through his protagonists gave up the quest, he clearly saw the 
1 Ibid •• 347, 349. 
2 
.ill.Q.. , 349 • 
3 !.!t!!. , chap. cxxxv, 356. 
4 !ill. , 360. 
5 
.!lli.. , 363 • 
6 !ill. , chap. lxxvi, 69. 
7 !lli. , chap. cxxv, 300. 
8 !lli.. , chap. CXXXV, 365. 
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limitations of reason--the battle of wits, "reason's endless battle," would 
continue but not avail to find the secret to the problem of the universe, 
not avail to "solve the world": 
let him [man] rule--
Pull down, build up, creed, system, school, 
And reason's endless battle wage, 
Make and remake his verbiage--
But solve the worldl Scarce that he'll do: 
Too wild it is, too wonderful. l 
Intuition 
Of all the means whereby man comes to knowledge, intuition is apparent 
ly the last one Melville is willing to abandon. Writing of Hawthorne's genius, 
Melville implies some connection between the "heart" and intuition: 
For it is not the brain that can test such a man; it is only the heart. 
You cannot come to know greatness by inspecting it; there is no glimpse 
to be caught of it, except by intuition; you need not ring it, you but 
touch it, and you find it is gold. 2 
Further, Melville writes with approbation of the tlintuitive Truth lf in 
Shakespeare: 
But it is those deep, far-away things in him; those occasional flashings-
forth of the intuitive Truth in him; those short, quick probings at the 
very axis of reality,--these are the things that make Shakespe.e, Shake-
spere. 3 
In Moby-Dick, published one year after the Mosses review, the narrator 
remarks: 
rainbows do not visit the clear air; they only irradiate vapour. And so, 
through all the thick mists of the dim doubts in my mind, divine intui-
tions now and then shoot, enkindling my fog with a heavenly ray. And for 
lClarel, Pt. IV, canto iii, 11. 110-115. 
2The Literary World, VII (August 17, 1850), 126. 
3Ibid• 
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this I thank God; for all have doubts; many deny; but doubts or denials, 
few along with them have intuitions. Doubts of all things earthly, and 
intuitions of some things heavenly; this combination makes neitherlbeliever 
nor infidel, but makes a man who regards them both with equal eye. 
The quotation ends in sceptical suspension between two polarities. 
Intuition gives no final and incontestable assurance, however. Pierre, 
in the novel of the same name, ponders on tithe intuitively ccrtain, however 
literally unproven fact of Isabel's sisterhood to him,,;2 yet, later, his doubts 
return: "How did he know that Isabel was his sister?") Just before Pierre 
knocks on the door of the low, red farm-house that shelters Isabel, the young 
enthusiast is musing and 
his sublime intuitiveness also paints to him the sun-like glories of god-
like truth and virtue; which though ever obscured by the dense fogs of 
earth, still shall shine eventually in unclouded radiance, casting illus-
trative light upon the sapphire throne of God. 4 
Pierre's "sublime intuitiveness" about the "glories of god-like truth and 
virtue" becomes suspect, however, when Pierre becomes "the fool of Truth, the 
fool of Virtue."S 
In what is probably the most inexorably dark novel of Melville's dark 
period, the "intuitions of some things heavenly" cOIle under fire: in The 
Confidence-Man, the merchant relates the calamities of an unfortunate man, and 
in the shattering piece of satire that follows, Melville reveals a Calvinistic, 
Old-Testament penchant for expecting merited recompense here in this temporary 
~obY-D1ck, II, chap. lxxxv, 116-117. 
2 Pierre, Bk. VII, chap. viii, p. 195. 
) 
~., Bk. XXVI, chap. 1i, p. 492. 
4 ~., Bk. VI, chap. i, p. 156. 
5 llli,. , Bk. XXVI, chap. iv, p. 499. 
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and mundane sphere. He indicates that it is a gullible faith that overlooks 
the "unjust" imposition of calamity in this life, and he concludes with a 
devastating blow at intuition: the confidence-man, with tongue in cheek, 
warns against admitting the existence of "unmerited misery," especially if 
"brought about by unhindered arts of the wicked," since to do so might affect 
one's "conviction of a Providence," and, having pointed up directly through 
narration and obliquely through satire that such tlunmerited misery" does, in 
fact, exist in experience, Melville, who places great emphasis on experience 
throughout the novel, plants his last and most lethal bit of irony in the 
mouth of the confidence-man: 
It was of the essence of a right conviction of the divine nature, as 
with a right conviction of the human, that, based less on experience 
than intuition, it rose above the zones of weather. l 
If Melville viewed intuition as somehow related to the heart, and, 
judging from his Mosses review. he seems so to have viewed it, then, despite 
his regard for the tfheart," the dependability of intuition is still not beyond 
question, since Melville did not view the dependability of the heart of man 
as beyond question: in Clar~~ the piercing query is made: 
2 Hast proved thy heart? 
The disCiplines 
, 
Even as the whole ascending structure collapses if the foundations of: 
the building are undermined, so the authority of the various disciplines is 
automatically toppled when the intellectual and sense knowledge upon which it 
1 The Confidence-Man, chap. xiii, p. 84. 
2 Clarel, Pt. III, canto vi, 1. 71. 
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is based are found to be infirm. At various junctures in the Works of 
Rabelais, which Melville read, religion, philosophy, medicine and law come in 
for a sound drubbing, and the arts and sciences--poetry, painting, music, 
astrology, mathematics, scientific projects, all are shown as subject to 
Queen Whims. 
Montaigne, in the "Apology," shows that the claims of astrology, logic, 
geometry, physics, metaphysics, rhetoric, grammar, mathematics, the liberal 
1 
arts and sciences have all been questioned, and, throughout the essays. 
nothing is too sacred to escape Montaigne's own inquiries. Pascal notes this 
tendency of Montaigne in his essay "On Epictetus and Montaigne": 
Then Montaigne examines very deeply the sciences:--Geometry, the uncer-
tainty of which he points out in its axioms, and its terms which it doea 
not define, as extension, motion, &c.; physics and medicine, which he 
deprea.es in a variety of ways; history, politics, morals, jurisprudence, 
&c. So that, without revelation, we might believe according to him, that 
life is a dream, from which we do not wake till death, and during which, 
we have as few principles of truth as in natural sleep.2 
Melville, in turn, though he makes no exhaustive attempt to bring all 
the various fields of knowledge under indictment, does include a representa-
tive group and deflates the pretensions of several kinds of disciplines. In 
Mardi, Yoomy the poet challenges the historian Mohi: "In all your chapters, 
you yourself grope in the dark. Much truth is not in thee, historian. ,,3 
Mohi later avenges himself by questioning the veridity of the creations of 
art and retorts after Yoomy's poetic tale: "He has not spoken the truth," 
and Babbalanja adds that "things visible are but conceits of the eye: things 
~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 234. 
2 Pascal, 1835 ed., p. 581. 
~rdi, I, chap. xciii, 324. 
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imaginative, conceits of the fancy. If duped by one, we are equally duped by 
1 the other." The inadequacy of the arts, even their possible danger if placed 
in the wrong hands, is brought forward in Clarel. Rolfe requests of Ungar: 
Ungar answers: 
Tell us if for earth may be 
In ripening arts, no guarantee 
Of happy sequel. 
Arts are tools; 
But tools, they say are to the strong: 
Is Satan weak? weak is the Wrong? 
No blessed augury overrules. 2 
The foibles of law are lampooned in the account of the "lawyer"-
sorcerers in the isle of Minda, who construe the law to serve their own ad-
vantage and will not give over their clients until such clients are "finan-
cially or physically defunct.,,3 Government and politics come under scrutiny 
in the description of the wine-bibbing congressmen and of their government, 
4 
whose "federal temple of freedCllll ••• was the handiwork of slaves"; the rise 
and fall of kingdClllls is rehearsed and the precariously anarchically-inclined 
populace of the democratic republic is warned: "Better be secure under one 
king, than exposed to violence frCllll twenty millions of monarchs, though one-
self be of the number"--the contemporary example of France, for Melville, was 
a timely example: "Better be the subject of a king, upright and just; than a 
1 !ill., 329. 
2Clarel, Pt. IV, canto xxi, 11. 12-18. 
~ardi. 11, chap. xl, 163. 
4 Ibid., chap. lvii, 243. 
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1 freeman in Franko, with the executioner's axe at every corner." In Clarel. 
Melville is still warning against the latent dangers of democracy: 
One demagogue can trouble much: 2 
How of a hundred thousand such? 
Although the complaint is more immediately of a moral nature in some of these 
instances, the lack of a criterion is tacitly understood. 
In Moby-Dick, Ahab decries the uncertainty of science before trampling 
on his quadrant: t'Tbou canst not tell where one drop of water or one grain 
of sand will be to-morrow noon; and yet with thy impotence thou insultest the 
sunl Science I Curse thee, thou vain toy.,,3 In Clarel, the materialistic 
scientist Margoth is called a "vrl:t wightU and "kangaroo of science,,;4 "the 
ray I Of Science' beacon" gives but "dreary" light and a "shallow knowledge."S 
"No umpire" to render judgments in the "battle of the star and clod," 
6 
"Science the feud can only aggravate." 
Philosophy, too, is unable to withstand critical inspection. Media 
tells Babbalanja: "The free, airy robe of your philosophy is but a dresm, 
which seems true while it lasts; but waking again into the orthodox world, 
straightway you resume the old habit.,,7 Babba1anja, a philosopher himself, 
1 ng .. 244, 242. 
2 Clarel, Pt. IV, canto xxi, 11. 115-116. 
~ObY-Dick, II, chap. cxviii, 274. 
4 Clarel, Pt. II, canto xx, 1. 108; canto xxi, 1. 11. 
5 Ibid., canto xxi, 11. 97-101. 
6 ng., Pt. IV, canto xxxv, 11. 14-16. 
7Mardi , II, chap. xvi, 57. 
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shows, through the symbol of the short-lived light of the slough-inhabiting 
glow-worm by which the philosopher Midni reads, the limitations of this on-
tologist who must go "forever ••• halting and stumbling through his studies, 
and plunging through his quagmires after a glim."l Pierre, too, recognizes 
the unreliability of the "so conveniently adjustable drapery of all-stretchable 
Philosophy.tt2 
Because it concerns the problem of philosopky, the question of Mel-
ville's scepticism arises: by labelling Melville a sceptic, is there an at-
tempt to confine him within some philosophical school or system all of which 
he rejected as uncertain and relative? The tagging on of labels is usually 
fraught with the danger of a certain amount of misrepresentation: no man's 
philosophy is precisely that of another; however, through the study of scepti-
cal sources which profoundly shaped his mental attitude toward reality. and 
supported by the uncertainties of national and familial background and per-
sonal reverses, Melville was caught up in the current of sceptical thought 
stemming particularly from the Renaissance, and Melvillean scepticism most 
closely approximates the questing attitude of the Pyrrhonian sceptics. To 
align Melville with the Pyrrhonians is not to align him with a schematized 
philosophical system--a claim to comprehend reality which Melville did not 
profess. Pyrrhonian scepticism is a doubting, questioning, questing attitude 
rather than a circUMscribed school of philosophy: as Diogenes Laertius says, 
writing of the various sects or schools of philosophy, 
1 Ibid., chap. Ii, 213. 
2 Pierre, Bk. XXV, chap. iii, p. 472. 
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if by the name sect we understand those who incline to rules which are 
consistent with the principles which they profess, then the Pyrrhonean 
cannot be called a sect, for they have no rules or principles. l 
Doubt and the quest form the prevalent intellectual atmosphere of 
Clarel. Although the degree of Melville's self-projection through his mask 
or persona Rolfe in Clarel remains questionable, if Melville does intend some 
autobiographical equation in the canto in which Derwent labels the ttPoised at 
2 
self-center and mature" Rolfe a ''Pyrrhonist,'' there would be no essential in-
compatibility with Melville's later statement in Billy Budd in what, consider-
iug Melville's esteem for "honesty" and lack of cant, may be a personal view 
issued under the alias of an tthonest scholar": ''You are aware that I am the 
adherent of no organized religion, much less of any philosophy built into a 
system. ,,3 
The pretensions of scholarship in general, moreover, were punctured 
early when, in Mardi, the renowned erudition of the scholar Doxodox is dis-
4 
covered to be nothing more than occult gibberish. 
The ttdivine sciences" do not fare any better. In Mardi, Media at-
tacks both the divine and natural sciences; Yoomy, Mohi, and Babba1anja debate 
on the nature of amber and ambergriS, and Media laughs to himself: "It's 
pleasant to sit by, a demi-god, and hear the surmisings of mortals, upon 
things they know nothing about; theology, or amber, or ambergris, it's all 
1 Diogenes Laertius, p. 12. 
2 C1arel, Pt. IV, canto 1ii, 1. 127; pa. II, canto xxi, 1. 32. 
3 Billy-Budd, ed. Hayford-Sealts, leaf 127, p. [74]. 
4 Mardi, II, chap. lxvii, 286. 
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the sde."l Pascal, as seen in the last cited passage frOlll his thoughts, had, 
at least, the comfort of faith in revelation, but science and the scientific 
method had raised new questions about Scripture or revelation. After Babba-
lanja's geological "sandwich System" account of creation, Media remarks: 
'~ohi tells us that Mardi [earth] was made in six days; but you, Babba-
lanja, have built it up from the bottom in less than six minutes." 
"Nothing for us geologists, my lord. At a word we turn you out whole 
systems, suns, satellites, and asteroids included. Why, my good lord, my 
friend Annonimo is laying out a new Milky Way, to intersect with the old 
one, and facilitate cross-cuts among the comets. 2 
Melville probably alludes in this chapter to the friction between the literal-
ist interpretation of Genesis ("six dayslt of creation) and the long periods of 
time requisite to the geological explanation (the "six minutes" mentioned by 
Media merely mean the time required for Babbalanja's telling--not the time he 
implies the actual process required). Although Melville ridicules geology by 
ironically attributing to it the power of creation, the questions raised by 
science did not leave Melville entirely unmoved. 
Further, if Scripture is God's revelation to man, how is it to be in-
terpreted? Melville himself found what he personally felt was substantiation 
for many of his darkest views: the Old Testament wilderness and Ishmael 
themes he saw as analogues for man's predicament upon earth--sons arbitrarily 
cast off, orphans grappling with the primeval, chaotic forces of nature; he 
questioned the possible nonbenevolence of God as the instigator of evil as 
well as good-Melville marked in his Bible Isa. 45: 7: "1 form the light, and 
create darkness: 1 make peace, and create evil: I the LORD do all these 
1 !k!!., chap. XVii, 63. 
2Ibid., chap. xxviii, 113. 
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things." Melville brooded on the possible insignificance and annihilation of 
man--as an epigraph to his poem. "Buddha" and in an allusion concluding chapter 
xxxi of White Jacket, Melville used James 4:14: "For what is your life? It. 
is even a vapour, that appeareth for a little time, and then vanisheth away." 
What is, for Melville, the ambiguity of Scripture, is dramatized situa-
tionally in Clarel: the prodigal Lyonese youth gives a predictably sensual 
rendering of the Song of Solomon. Between ramblings on wine and women he 
recites: 
Thy white neck is like ivory; 
I feed among thy lilies, dear: 
Stay me with flagons, comfort me 
With apples; thee would I enclosel 
Thy twin breasts are as two young roes. 
Clarel protests: 
Nay. pardon me, 
But you misdeem it: Solomon's Song 
Is allegoric--needs must be. 
But the youth retorts: "Proof, proof,pray, if 'tis not too long."l Clarel, 
like Melville, has no "proof." 
Self-knowledge and the variable subject 
If man turns, in his quest for criterione, to the subject he supposedly 
knows best, himself, and tries to elicit constants from the structure of his 
own nature, he still seems, according to Melville, foredoomed to failure. Man 
can no more comprehend himself than any other thing. Montaigne asks: "Those 
people • • • that are ignorant of nothing • • • have they not sometimes in 
their writings sounded the difficulties they have met with of knowing their 
1 Clarel, Pt. IV, canto xxvi, 11. 179-189. 
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own being?"l and, after listing an impressive array of conflicting opinions, 
he adds: 
Man is no better instructed in the knowledge of himself, in his corporal 
than in his spiritual part. We have proposed himself to himself, and his 
reason to his reason, to see what she could say. I think I have suffi-
ciently demonstrated how little she understands herself in herself; and 
who understands not himself in himself, in what can he?2 
Montaigne extends the argument in a more comprehensive sceptical thrust by 
quoting from Pliny, !!S.. Rist. ii.l: "As if he could understand the measure 
of any other thing, that knows not his own.") A parallel thought occurs in 
Browne's ReU.gio Medici: "No man can judge another, because no man knows 
himself .tA 
In Melville's Mardi, Taji asks: 'tOh stars! oh eyes, that see me, 
vberesoeter I roam: serene, intent, inscrutable for aye, tell me, Sybils, what 
I ,,5 am. Babbalanja, too, suffers the conundrum of defining his own identity: 
Though I have now been upon terms of close companionship with myself for 
nigh five hundred moons, I have not yet been able to decide who or what I 
am. To you, perhaps, I seem Babbalanja; but to myself, I seem not myself. 
All 1 am sure of is a sort of prickly sensation allover me, which they 
call life; and, occasionally, a headache or a queer conceit admonishes me, 
that there is something astir in my attic. But how know I, that these 
sensations are identical with myself? For aught I know, I may be somebody 
else. At any rate, I keep an eye on myself, as 1 would on a stranger. 6 
In Moby-Dick, the self that is mirrored back in the golden doubloon is a 
~ontaigne, Bk. 11, chap. xii, p. 250. 
2 Ibid., pp. 259-260. 
) !!l1!!., p. 260. 
4 Browne, II, 95. 
SMardi, 1, chap. lviii, 208. 
6 !!l1!!. t II, chap. xxxix, 155. 
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1 
"mysterious self," and the narrator in Pierre says, "'Bxplain ye my deeper 
mystery,' said the shepherd Chaldean king, smiting his breast, lying on his 
back upon the plain; tand then, I will bestow all my wonderings upon ye, ye 
2 
stately stars! tt, In The Confidence-Mas, the merchant becomes indignant when 
the confidence-man questions hie identity: 
"I hope I know myself." 
"And yet self-knowledge is thought by some not 80 easy. 
my dear sir, but for a time you may have taken yourself for 
else? Stranger things have happened.") 
Who knows, 
somebody 
Linked with the inability to know self is the inability to know God. In his 
"Apology" Montaigne quotes St. Bernard: "'1 know by myself,' says St. Bernard, 
'how incomprehensible God is, seeing I cannot comprehend the parts of my own 
being. ,,,4 Melville has Clarel entertain a corresponding thought: 
But if in vain 
One tries to comprehend a man, 5 
How think to sound God's deeper heart! 
A primary reason for man's inability to know even himself is his 
variableness and mutability. The inconstancy of man is an ever recurring 
theme in Montaigne: '~an, in sooth, is a marvellous, vain, fickle, and un-
stable subject, and on whom it is very hard to form any certain or uniform 
6 judgment," and he quotes Herod. 1. 86 on "the uncertainty and mutability of 
~ObY-DiCk. II, chap. xcix, 190. 
2 Pierre, Bk. III, chap. ii, p. 70. 
3The Confidence-Man, chap. iv, p. 22. 
4 Montaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 252. 
S Clarel, Pt. II, canto xxxii, 11. 117-119. 
~ontaigne, Bk. I, chap. i, p. 2. 
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human things, which in an instant are subject to be totally changed into a 
I quite contrary condition." 
The "Apology" contains an extended argument against the whole man in 
both hi. intellectual and corporal stability: 
Besides this infinite diversity and division, through the trouble that 
our judgment gives ourselves, and the incertainty that every one is sensi-
ble of in himself, 'tis easy to perceive that its seat is very unstable 
and insecure. How variously do we judge of things?--How often do we alter 
our opinions? What I hold and believe to-day I hold and believe with my 
whole belief; • • • but has it not befallen me, not only once, but a 
hundred, a thousand times, every day, to have embraced some other thing 
with all the same instruments, and in the same condition, which I have 
since judged to be false? ••• It is certain that our apprehensions, our 
judgment, and the faculties of the soul in general, suffer according to 
the movements and alterations ot the body, which alterations are continual. 
Are not our minds more sprightly, our memories more ~rompt and quick, and 
our thoughts more lively in health than in sickness? 
M'ontaigne also quotes Plutarch's eleamenes: "Neither am I the 8ame man now as 
when I am in health: being now another person, my opinions and fancies are 
also other than they were before.") 
Melville, too, influenced by the fluidity of his own temperament, saw 
the "self" as a complex of changing states and mercurial moods: "Por man is 
heir I To complex moods.,,4 Writing to Hawthorne in November 1851, Melville 
says: 
This is a long letter, but you are not at all bound to answer it. 
Possibly, if you do answer it, and direct it to Herman Melville, you 
will missend it--for the very fingers that now guide this pen are not 
precisely the same that just took it up and put it on this paper. 
1 !h![., chap_ xviii, p. 25. 
2 ~., Bk. II, chap. xii, pp. 262-263. 
) ~., p. 291-
4 Clarel, Pt. I, canto iv, 11. 10-11. 
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Lord, when shall we be done changing?l 
'----PorHOntaigne, man was part of a more universal flux: 
Finally, there is no constant existence, neither of the objects' being nor 
our own; both we, and our judgaents, and all mortal things, are eve~ore 
incessantly running and rolling; and consequently nothing certain can be 
established from the one to the other, both the judging and the judged 
being in a continual motion and mutation. 2 
In Mardi, Babbalanja, too, questions man's place in a universe of change: 
Nothing abideth; the river of yesterday fl~~eth not to-day; the sun's 
rising is a setting; living is dying; the very mountains melt; and all 
revolve:--systems and asteroids; the sun wheels through the zodiac, and 
the zodiac is a revolution. Ah gods! in all this universal stir, am 1 
to prove one stable thing?3 . -
Earlier in the November 1851 letter to Hawthorne, cited above, Melville writes: 
In me divine maganimities [sic) are spontaneous and instantaneous--catch 
them while you can. The world goes round, and the other side comes up. 
So now I can't write what I fe1t. 4 
In Pierre, the narrator remarks: 
As a statue, planted on a revolving pedestal, shows now this limb, now 
that; now front, now back, now side; continually changing, too, its 
general profile; so does the pivoted, statued soul of man; ••• look for 
no invariableness in Pierre. Nor does any canting showman here stand by 
to announce his phases as he revolves. Catch his phases as your insight 
may.5 
MelVille, in The Confidence-Man, shows the influence of Montaigne's 
essay "Of the Inconsistency of Our Actions"; Montaigne writes: 
I have often thought even the best authors a little mistaken in so 
~etters, p. 143. 
~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 281. 
3Mardi, It chap. lxxviii, 277. 
4 Letters, p. 142. 
5 Pierre, Bk. XXV, chap. iii, p. 469. 
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obstinately endeavouring to mould us into any consistent and solid 
contexture. l 
Melville defends the inconsistency of one of his characters against what he 
calls the usual demand made upon the writer of fiction that "in the depiction 
of any character, its consistency should be preserved" by arguing that a re-
quirement equally insisted upon is that "fiction based on fact should never be 
contradictory to it," and that, in fact, or. "in real life, a consistent char-
acter is a .!!!!! .!!!!.. If Rather, the self is "at different periods, as much at 
variance with itself as the butterfly is with the caterpillar into which it 
changes."2 
Lack of a universal con census 
A multiplication of variables does not produce one constant, and the 
effort to reach a universal criterion through the common consensus of many 
men, each variable in his own entity, but produces the contrary condition of 
increased diversity. In a statement that also further confirms the previous 
section, Montaigne writes: "Never did two men make the same judgment of the 
same thing; and 'tis impossible to find two opinions exactly alike, not only 
in several men, but in the same men, at different times.,,3 
Again, it is the "Apology" that offers the most trenchant argument. 
After a few scattered assertions on "the rash and fortuitous change of our 
~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. i, p. 152. 
2 The Confidence-Man, chap. xiv, pp. 89-90. 
~ontaigne, Bk. III, chap. xiii, p. 494. 
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opinions,,,l and the "infinite variety of our reasons and opinions,,,2 the 
essay zeros in on the heart of the argument: 
Now if on our part we received any thing without alteration, if human 
grasp were capable and strong enough to seize on truth by our own means, 
these means being common to all men, this truth would be conveyed froa 
hand to hand, from one to another; and at least there would be some one 
thing to be found in the world, amongst so many as there are, that would 
be believed by men with an universal consent: but this, that there is no 
one proposition that is not debated and controverted amongst us, or that 
may not be, makes it very manifest that our natural judgment does not 
very clearly discern what it embraces; for my judgment cannot make my 
companions approve of what it approves; which is a sign that I seized it 
by some other means than by a natural power that is in me and in all 
other men. 3 
The apparent diffusiveness of the "Apology" itself, with its hOdge-
podge of quotations and observations, becomes, in effect, integral to Mon-
taigne's purpose: the variegated amalgam of his materials is a montage illus-
trating his variegated and unstable subject--man. Montaigne thus offers, e.g., 
the various and conflicting opinions on what constitutes physical beauty;4 
in a section on the notions of the Supreme Being, God becomes everything 
from SUD and air, serpents, dogs 5 and oxen to our own souls; the soul 1s 
opined to be anything from blood 6 to an area between the eyebrows. Montaigne 
concludes tersely that "men ••• are not agreed about anyone thing.,,7 Later 
1 
.!..!?.!!. , Bk. II, chap. Xii, p. 201 • 
2 223. Ibid. , p. 
3 262. Underlining mine. ~., p. 
4 221-222. !lli.. , pp. 
5 
.!ill. , pp. 237-239 • 
6 252-253. Ibid. , pp. 
7 Ibid., p. 262. 
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in Book II of the Issays there occurs hi. wonderfully paradoxical statement 
the tlthere never wea in tbe world two opinions alike. no aore than tvo hairs 
or two ,rains: tbe 1I0st uaiveraal quality is diversity. ,.1 The aarae thouaht 
1a echoed in Book III: ItThere 1. no quality so UAiver.al, in this itaage of 
things, .s diversity and variety.n2 
In addition to his readins of Montaigne, Malville vas confronted with 
the s .. a concluaion--or lack of ODe--in his other reading at this period. An 
artistic prOjection of the problem of diveraity and disagreement characteria .. 
Rabelais'. worka. To Panurge's "doubt"' and "prabl_atic th_e,,4--n .. ely, 
"Whether he should "arry, or not .. arry1US--u IDany various opinions are praf-
ferred as there are those in the different professions. In Book III, chapter 
xii, no agreement i. reached on the reading of the Virgilian Lottery; in Book 
III~ chapter xiv, there i. no agreqaent on the interpretation of Panurse'. 
dream of the felicity of his future married state; Book III, chapter xviii is 
entitled: "HOW PANTAOltmL AND PANURG! DID DlVERS1.Y [sic] EXPOUND TB.E VERSES 
-
OF THE STBYL 01 PARZOUST,n Book Ill, chapter xl1v, -'BOll PANTAGRU!1. 'REl..ATETH A 
STRANGE HISTORY 0., THE PERP1.EXITY 0., HOKAN JUDGMENT"; and chapter xlvi of the 
SaDle Book ia entitled, "HOW PANTAG'RUEL AND PANtTRGE DIVERSELY INTERPRET THE 
WORDS OF TltIBOULIT" (Tr1boulet i. tbe fool, and each lIan reads into b1s worda 
1 ~., chap_ xxxvii, p. 363. 
2 Ibid., Ik. III, chap. xiii, p. 493. 
, 
aabelais. Ill, Bk. III, chap. xxx, 22. 
4 IM.d •• chap_ xxxv, 49. 
5Ibid• 
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and inane actions what he wishes and finds diverse significances in the empty 
wine bottle Triboulet returns to them). 
Finally, in an effort to obtain a definitive answer, Pantagruel and 
1 Panurge resolve to make a visit to the oracle of the holy bottle. Signifi-
cant for the problem of Melville'. scepticism is the development of this pil-
grimage in Rabelais's Book IV. The "Explanatory Remarks" on Book IV, chapter 
i state that "By Pan tag rue 1 and his attendants, who embarked for the Oracle 
of the Holy Bottle, we may understand" the "search after truth; which Rabelais 
2 places in the bottle." In their search for the oracle of the bottle, the 
travellers visit many countries, and "all the countries in this voyage are 
3 islands" --a device which, in addition to the idea of the quest. Melville 
adopts in Mardi. In the explanatory remarks to chapters xxxii and xxxiii of 
Book V, there is again mention of the "Oracle of the Bottle, or rather ••• 
the knowledge of truth.,,4 The travellers at last reach the temple of the holy 
bottle. On the portal of the temple are the words: "In wine, truth,"S and 
6 the doors of the gates are "wrought with little vine-branches." When the 
bottle speaks, it orders Panurge to "TRINe," i.e., to drink. The oracle but 
speaks in confirmation of an action already performed. Bacbuc, the priest at 
the oracle, returns Panurge to the "fantastic fountain" from which the 
1 Ibid., chap. xlVii, 101. 
2 Ibid., 166. 
3Ibid., 167-in "Explanatory Remarks" for Bk. IV, chap. i1. 
4 ~., IV, 119-120. 
S Ibid., Bk. V, chap. xxxvii, 248. 
6Ibid • 
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travellers have already drunk: "Bacbuc asked us then, how we liked our tiff. 
We answered, that it seemed to us good harmless sober Adam's liquor, ••• 
1 
mere element." But Bacbuc then explains: "Drinking of this miraculous li-
quor, you will find its taste like any wine that you shall fancy to drink. 
Come then, fancy and drinktt; "drink once, twice, or thrice more, said Bacbuc. 
still changing your imagination, and you shall find its taste and flavour to 
be exactly that on which you shall have pitched. ,,2 Through his artistic 
finale emerges Rabe1ais's message of the relativity and subjectivity of Truth 
--each one who drinks the water of the fountain finds it a different wine. 
Melville writes in Mardi: "Truth dwells in her fountains; where every one must 
drink for himself.,,3 Bacbuc says: "If you observe what is written in Ionian 
letters on the temple gate, you may have understood that truth is in wine. 
The Goddess Bottle therefore directs you to the divine liquor; be yourself 
4 the expounder of your undertaking." 
The present problem of the absence of a universal consensus, a cri-
terion, marks a profound change of stress in Melville's thought. He is not 
beyond questioning the constancy of man even in Typee (1846)--he askst '~at 
dependence could be placed upon the fickle passions which sway the bosom of 
the savage? His inconstancy and treachery are proverbial. ,,5 In this early 
romance, however, it is the concept of universality that is accented: 
1 ~ .. chap. xlii, 263. 
2 ~., 264. 
~rdi, I. chap. lxxxii, 290. 
4 ~., chap. xlv, 270. 
5 Typee, chap. xi, p. 101. 
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They [Typees] seemed to be governed by that sort of tacit COlllllon-sense 
law which, say what they will of the inborn lawlessness of the human race, 
has its precepts graven on every breast. The grand principles of virtue 
and honour, however they may be distorted by arbitrary codes, are the same 
all the world over; and where these principles are concerned, the right 
or wrong of any action appears the same to the uncultivated as to the en-
lightened mind. It is to this indwelling, this universally diffused per-
ception of what is just and noble, that the integrity of the Marquesans 
in their intercourse with each other is to be attributed.1 
Six years later, the title hero of Pierre will follow his "indwelling, . . . 
universally diffused perception of what is 1ust and noble and be duped into 
becoming the "fool of Virtue." Between the publication of the two works, Me1-
ville was deeply affected by personal reverses as well as by his further read-
ing in sceptic sources. That Melville had become well aware of the problem 
of the universal and the particular is evinced in his June 1851 letter to 
Hawthorne: "What plays the mischief with the truth is that men will insist 
upon the universal application of a temporary feeling or opinion.,,2 
The positive position of Melville's sceptical self-argument is not 
lacking in Mardi--as, of courae, it never is, completely, in Melville's works 
--and a statement appears that endorsea the notion of a common core of cri-
teria: "The catalogue of true thoughts is but small; they are ubiquitous; no 
man's property; and unspoken, or bruited, are the same,,,3 but the negative 
side of Melville's argument begins to take precedence in the aame novel, and 
the preoccupation with diveraity, relatiVity, and subjectivity occurs in the 
majority of his major works thereafter. In volume II, chapter xi of Mardi, 
Babba1anja tells of the enigma of the banian tree. The episode ia, finally, 
1 
.ill.!!., chap. xxvii, p. 270. Underlining of "universally" added. 
2 Lettera, p. 131. 
l.Mardi. II, chap_ xxii, 90. 
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an allusion to the evasiveness of truth, but more immediately, coming, as it 
does, in the discussion of Maramma with its many religious references--
"altars," "idols or images," "gods," "his Holiness" the "Pontiff, It "abbey," 
"pagoda," "eremite," "hermit"-the search for the "original and true" banian 
trunk among all the maze of "rooted branches" seems relevant to the prolifera-
tion of religious beliefs and the consequent confusion. The lack of consensus 
is illustrated when each of the nine blind men grasps a different branch and 
believes he has found the "one," original and true trunk. 
The best known example occurs in Moby-Dick. In "The Doubloon, til each 
man who reads the markings on the coin projects his own subjective state--
the coin, "the image of the rounder globe." ''but mirrors back his own mysteri-
ous self"-rather than discovering any uniform and objective validity. The 
"crazy""'Witty" Pip points up the subjective diversity in his thrice repeated 
paradigmatic litany: "I look, you look, he looks; we look, ye look, they 
look." Stubb eavesdrops on the various "interpreters" and observes: "There's 
another rendering now; but still one text. All sorts of men in one kind of 
world, you see." This philosophic exemplum is given overt expression in 
Pierre: "Nature is not so much her own ever-sweet interpreter, as the mere 
supplier of that cunning alphabet, whereby selecting and combining as he 
pleases, each man reads his own peculiar lesson according to his own peculiar 
mind and mood. tt2 
In The Confidence-Man, perhaps taking his cue from Rabelais's Book V, 
chapter xxix, where it says, "80 many Men, so many Minds, It or from Bayle, who 
~obY-Dick, II, chap. xcix, 188-195. 
2 Pierre, Bk. XXV, chap. iv, p. 476. 
writes: 
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1 
"We commonly say, quot capitl1l ~ sensus, as many Men so many Minds," 
Melville entitles the novel's second chapter "Showing that Many Men Have Many 
Minds." The contents of the chapter show the varying responses to the pre-
sence on board the Mississippi steamer Fidele of a deaf-mute: comments range 
from "Odd fish!" and "Humbug!" to "Singular innocence" and "Jacob dreaming at 
Luz. n The narrator remarks: "Such the epitaphic comments, conflictingly 
spoken or thought, of a miscellaneous company.,,2 Because of the many conflict-
ing variants in human nature, Melville, later in The Confidence~an, suggests 
that 
upon the whole, it might rather be thought. that he, who. in view of its 
inconsistencies, says of human nature the same that, in view of its con-
trasts, is said of the divine nature, that it is past finding out, thereby 
evinces a better appreCiation of it than he who, by always representing it 
in a clear light, leaves it to be inferred that he clearly knows all about 
it. 3 
In the searching doubt of Melville's self-argument "the other side cOlies up" 
for a mOlient, and, later in the same chapter, he stresses the universal aspect 
of a common human nature: 
The grand points of human nature are the SUle to-day they were a thousand 4 
years ago. The only variability in them is in expression, not in feature. 
The stress, if not the conclusion, of his argument, however, returns to the 
concept of multiplicity. 
Almost twenty years later, in Clarel (1876), Melville is still creat-
ing situations to exemplify the predicament of aan's manifold reactions to 
1 Bayle, 1710 ed., IV, 2792. 
2 The Confidence~n, chap. ii, p. 6. 
3 ~., cbap. xiv. p. 91. 
4 ~., p. 92. 
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reality. At the monastery of Mar Saba is a palm tree reportedly planted by 
St. Saba himself. Derwent, Vine, Mortmain, Rolfe, and Clarel all react to 
1 the palm, each in a diverse manner. 
In Melville's sceptical argument with himself, he seems to argue, in 
Clarel, through a debate between Ungar and Rolfe, that it may well be that 
man's nature is uniform, but that it is truly so, or, if it 1s, !h!! 1t is, 
is seemingly impossible to discern through the undulating proscenium of shift-
ing circumstances and transient phenomena. Ungar argues: 
Rolfe replies: 
The human nature, the divine--
Have both been proved by many a sign. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
For man, like God, abides the same 
Always, through all variety 
Of woven garments to the frame. 
Yes, God is God, and men are men, 
Forever and for aye. What then? 
There's Circumstance--there's Time; and these 
Are charged with store of latencies 
Still working in to modify.2 
Finally, in his last and posthumously published work, Billy Budd, Mel-
ville is still pursuing the same problem. The apparently tangential conclud-
iug chapters following the death of Billy are, by their presentation of the 
variety of adversely contending human impressions of Billy Budd and his ac-
tions on board the Bellipotent, actually integral to the final expression of 
lFor the varying reactions to the palm tree see Clarel, Part III: 
canto xxv, 11. 67-70 for Derwent; canto xxvi, 11. 26-64 for Vine; canto xxviii, 
11. 51-98 for Mortmain; canto xxix, 11. 31-82 for Rolfe; canto xxx for Clarel. 
2 ~., Pt. IV, canto xxi, 11. 67-82. 
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1· 
Melville's question. As an antinomy to the often prevalently presumed and 
complacent concept of the commonality of human nature, Melville stresses 
plurality--each man ~ generis--and a consequent condition which renders it 
questionable whether man can elicit from such heterogeneity any homogeneous, 
universal and absolute standards, standards which would. in fact, show that 
man understood himself: 
1 
leaf 321. 
Such counter natures in mankind--
Mole, bird, not more unlike ve find: 
Instincts adverse, nor less how true 2 
Each to itself. What clew, what clew? 
See Billy Budd, ed. Hayford-Sealta, pp. 192-193, first note for 
2 . 
Clarel, Pt. III, canto xx, 11. 39-42. 
PAlT 11 
PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS CONSEQUENT 
TO THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITERION 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEM 
ttls all but dream?" 
Clarel. 
A-conseguent problem 
For Melville, the knowing subject is limited by the possible defi-
ciency and definite weakness of his faculties, his variability, and, it must 
1 be added, the limitation of his experience. But what of the knowable object? 
The lack of noetic certitude in the knowing subject gives rise to an onto1o-
gica1 difficulty concerning the nature of a consequently uncertain reality, 
and the inability to get behind appearances engenders the suspicion that 
perhaps there is not anything behind to "get at. If Finally, even appearance 
itself comes under suspicion, until life and reality are questioned as being 
~ontaigne, in a quotation from Cicero's Acad. 1. 12, draws attention 
to man's limited experience due to the very brevity of his life: 
Almost all the ancients have declared that there is nothing to be known, 
nothing to be perceived or understood: the sense. are too limited, men's 
minds too weak, and the course of life too short (Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 
230). 
Melville takes issue with this last point of the quotation, however: 
But years attain not truth, 
Nor length of life avails at all 
(Clarel, Pt. I, canto xvii, 11. 172-173). 
The reason "length of life" does not avail is because "the more we learn, the 
more we unlearn; we accumulate not, but substitute; and take away more than we 
add. We dwindle while we grow" <Hardi, II, chap. xx, 80). For Melville, "you 
know nothing till you know all; which is the reason we never know anything" 
(Redburn, chap. xxvi, p. 154). Neither is it possible for one man to be 
"coextensive with ~ is" (The Confidence-Man, chap. xiv, p. 90). 
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merely illusion or dream. 
The phenomena1-noumena1 problem 
Although Kant gave the phenomena1-noumena1 problem a more recent 
terminology and philosophical elaboration in the Critique of Pure Reason and 
personally found it not an insuperable problem, the problem as problem is 
much older and for Melville. at least, traces back among the moderns to his 
readings in Montaigne. Por Kant, ~ Ding ~~, a thing-in-itself, is 
called noumenon. But noumenon can be known only by intellectual intuition, 
which Kant denies to man; according to Kant, man has only sensible intuition 
and knows only phenomenon: in the "Preface" to the second edition of the 
Critick of Pure Reason Kant writes that "we can have no cognition of an 
object, as a thing in itself, but only so far as it is an object of sensible 
I intuition, that is, as phenomenon. 11 Kant himself did not deny the existence 
of noumenon: 
We must be enabled, at least, to think these objects as things in them-
selves, even though not to cognize them. For, otherwise, the absurd 
proposition would thence result, that there would be appearance 
(phenomenon) without anything which then appeared. 2 
Unfortunately, "thinking does not make it so," and Kant obliterates the 
possibility of any kind of speculative proof and, for many, leaves the exis-
tence of noumenon problematical--man may not know what ~, only what appears. 
Kant himself was content to accept phenomenon or appearance as reality 
IImmanuel Kant, Critick of Pure Reason, trans. Francis Haywood (2d 
ed.; London: William Pickering, 1848). p. xxxi. 
2llli. 
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for scientific knowledge. As Norman Kemp Smith points out, Kant posited an 
Jtimportant distinction between appearance (Erscheinung) and illusion (Schein)." 
Erscheinung is the appearance of a given object: Schein "signifies a repre-
2 
sentation, such as may occur in a dream, to which nothing real corresponds." 
But the question remains whether Kant, despite his intentions, actually suc-
ceeded in proving the grounds for such a distinction. Smith continues to 
explain Kant's view of appearance: "The further qualification must be added, 
that the predicates of appearance are constant and are inseparable from its 
representation,,;3 Smith later challenges this view: "That certain perceptions 
are more constant than others does not prove that all alike [extended objects] 
may not be classed as illusory. ,,4 Smith's reason for challenging Ken t derives 
from Kant's epistemology or theory of knowledge, which is heavily subjective: 
matter that is received is chaotic, confused, unformed; it is Kant's categories 
of the mind which help constitute and create, "fora,tI what is actually known. 
Smith points out that Kant's critics (Lambert, Mendelssohn, and Garve) rightly 
"objected that if bodies in space are representations existing, as he [Kant) 
so often asserts, only 'within us,' their appearing to exist 'outside us' is 
5 a complete illusion.,t Kant observed that it is an nabsurd proposition" to 
have appearance without anything which appears: Melville questioned whether 
1 A Commentary to Kant's • Cri tigue of Pure Reason' (London: Macmillan 
and Co., Ltd., 1923), p. 148. 
2Ibid• 
3 lill., p. 149. 
4 lill., pp. 150-151. 
5 ~., p. 150. 
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reality was not, in fact, an "absurd proposition" and no more than dream or 
illusion. 
Prior to Kant, Hume enunciated the same problem of man's inability 
to know beings in themselves and, unlike Kant, made no assertions about their 
actual existence but rather stressed the impossibility of any absolute knowl-
edge in this regard. In his Treatise of Human Nature in a section entitled 
"Of Scepticism with regard to the Senses,." Hume writes: 
But as no beings are ever present to the mind but perceptions, it follows, 
that we may observe a conjunction or a relation of cause and effect be-
tween different perceptions, but can never observe it between perceptions 
and objects. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that from the existence or any 
of the qualities of the former, we can ever form any conclusion concerning 
the existence of the latter, or ever satiafy our reason in this particular. 
A few pages later Hume adds: 
We suppose external objects to resemble internal perceptions. I have 
already shown, that the relation of cause and effect can never afford us 
any just conclusion from the existence or qualities of our perceptions to 
the existence of external continued objects: and I shall further add, that 
even though they could afford such a conclusion, we should never have any 
reason to infer that our objects resemble our perceptions. 2 
In An Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, in his section on "Sceptical 
Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding," Hume concludes briefly: 
"Nature has kept us at a great distance from. all her secrets, and has afforded 
us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects"~--Melville, 
too, pondered the problem of nature's "secret" and came close to concluding 
there wasn't any; in his 161 April? 1851 letter to Hawthorne, with whom he 
enjoyed talking "ontological herOics," Melville wrote: 
iuume, I. 274. 
2 lk!.4 •• 279. 
3 lk!.4., IV. 41. 
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And perhaps, after all, there is ~ secret. We incline to think that the 
Problem of the Universe is lilte the Freemason's mighty secret, so terrible 
to all children. kturns out. at last, to consist in a triangle, a mallet, 
and an apron,--nothing morel l 
Perhaps there is B2 secret--already latently suggested in this passage is 
Melville's great ontological anticlimax, his suspicion that perhaps t'being" 
is really "nothing." 
The problem confronting Hume and Kant (though divergently resolved). 
the problem of the bridge between mental and extramental reality, i8 antici-
pated by Montaigne; i.e., how do we know that the form of an object we are 
perceiving--that is, the form supposedly received by the material senses to be 
refined in the alembic of the mind--is actually a truly representative form 
of an actually existing object perceived? Montaigne asks (using "foreign 
subjects" in the present sense of "object"): 
And to say that • • • the senses convey to the soul the quality of foreign 
subjects by resemblance. how can the soul and understanding be assured 
of this resemblance, having of itself no commerce with foreign subjects? 
As they who never knew Socrates cannot, when they see his picture. say 
it is lilte him. 2 
He asserts simply: ''We have no cOllUllunication with being.") This inability to 
ca.municate with being, the 1mpasse of phenomena, appearances, becomes the 
"wall" symbol in Melville's writings: Ahab wants to thrust "through the wall";4 
Pierre-Enc.ladus is foremost in hurling himself against the precipice's 
~tters, p. 125. 
~ontaigne, Blt. II, chap. xii, p. 281. 
3Ibid• 
~oby-Diclt, I, chap. xxxvi, 204. 
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"unresounding wall,,;l Bartleby dies "at the base of the wall" with "his 
2 head touching the cold stones"; the questing world ship of "The Berg" strikes 
the berg's "dead indifference of walls" and without budging it goes down "in 
bafflement. ,,3 The wall symbol finally, and more importantly, expands to 
connote the cause itself of the frustration of man's desire to communicate 
with Being--the indifference and unresponsiveness of the First Cause, or God, 
who becomes concretized and embodied in the White Whale, and "the White Whale 
4 in that wall," a "dead, impregnable, uninjurable wall." 
Melville first mentions Kant in Mardi,S where he also refers to 
"Abstract Noumenons,,:6 that he understood the Kantian use of noumenon at the 
time of the writing of Mardi, as previously noted, is questionable though 
possible, but it is highly probable that, a year and half later, he came to 
understand the phenomenal-noumenal problem in a Kantian context because of 
his prolonged discussions with the German scholar Adler. If he understood 
the problem, he apparently did not accept Kant's solution. It must be stressed 
again, however, that his understanding of the problem was, in all likelihood, 
conglomerate, derived from collected sceptical sources. 
If man's best efforts are incapable of penetrating appearances in 
order to comprehend what Babbalanja calls "the essence of things; • • • that 
1 Pierre, Bk. XXV, chap. iv, p. 482. 
2 The Piazza Tales, p. 64. 
3Collected Poems, pp. 203-204. 
4 ~oby-Dick, I, chap. xxxvi, 204; II, chap. lxxvi, 71. 
SMardi, I, chap. iii, 14. 
6 ~., II, chap. lxvi, 282. 
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1 
which is beneath the seeming," a resulting problem arises which questions 
the very existence of anything beyond appearance, and of appearance itself, 
and engenders a fear of possible deception. 
Question of deception 
The idea of deception is prevalent in a number of the quotations al-
ready cited from Melville's sceptical philosophical sources. It is Descartes 
2 
who posed what Pascal and Hume saw as "the highest point in sceptical doubt": 
If • • • it were repugnant to the goodness of Deity to have created me 
subject to constant deception, it would seem likewise to be contrary to 
his goodness to allow me to be occasionally deceived; and yet it is 
clear that this is permitted.) 
Browne, as already seen, begins his "Vulgar Errors" with the problem of decep-
tion and discusses the "deceptible condition" of men who are deceived by 
Satan, one another, themselves, and the conduct of their senses. The devout 
Pascal says of the man without grace: "Everything deceives him • .,4 Bayle 
offers the argument of the "new Philosophers" that color is a modification of 
the soul rather than something existing externally in substances of objects 
5 
of the senses, and he writes: 
Ever since the beginning of the World all Men, except, perhaps, one in 
two hundred Millions, do firmly believe that Bodies are coloured. and 
yet 'tis a Mistake. I ask, whether God deceives Men with respect to 
1 ~., chap. x, 36. 
2 Popkin, pp. 181-182. 
3 Descartes, p. 101. 
4 , Pensees, 83. 
5 See Moby-Dick, I, chap. xlii, 244. 
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those Colours? If he deceives them in that respect, what hinders but 
he may deceive them with respect to Extension[?] __ l 
and the problem keeps broadening. 
The theme of deception is of fairly constant recurrence in Melville: 
not only is there the possibility of self-deception--"!f I could only be cer-
tain that ••• my senses did not deceive me,,2_-but there is the question of 
interpersonal deception: "Do we then mutually deceive? Off masks, mankind. 
that I may know what warranty of fellowship with others my own thoughts 
possess,") and, at a more pragmatic level, a senile old miser has enough of a 
lucid moment to suspect he has been deceived out of his gold by the Confidence-
Man: 4 "Somehow, can't trust my senses any more, since trusting him." 
Reality itself is delusive; in The Confidence-Man, the etymologically~inded 
Melville has the Sophomore (Greek sophos and moros, the "wise-fool") remark: 
5 
"No appearances can deceive me." The universe itself, Ishmael says earlier, 
in Moby-Dick, is at times taken Jlfor a vast practical joke," and God Himself 
is the "unseen and unaccountable old joker,,6_-here , in this statement, is 
seen the tendency, which occurs in both Melville's sources and in Melville 
himself, to push beyond the immediate and intermediate to the extremity of 
responsibility. Melville considered this terminal responsibility, this "god," 
1 B.yle, 1710 ed., IV, 2620. 
2 The Piazza Tales, p. 97. 
3 ~., II, chap. v, 20-2l. 
4 
chap. 134. The Confidence~an, xx, p. 
5 ~., chap. ix, p. 62. 
6 Moby-Dick, I, chap. xlix, 286. 
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whether under the Christian appellation of "God" or under other aliases--Fate, 
Jove, Jupiter, Jehovah, Confidence-Man, etc.--as the ultimate deceiver. Ahab 
I 
wonders "what cozening, hidden lord" commands him; Pierre accosts Fate: 
"Thou art a palterer and a cheat; thou hast lured me on through gay gardens 
to a gulf,"2 and the "purple promise" of the Delectable Mountains (connected, 
in Bunyan, with paradisaical promise) becomes a IIcunning purpleness" curtain-
ing IIstark desolation" and "ruin";) in Israel Potter, the IIBunker" Hill 
Monument assumes remarkable affinities to the Deity, and the devil-God 
4 Confidence-Man ("Jehovah shall be thy confidence") is the master deceiver--
in The Confidence-Man, Melville seams his satire with such terms as "fleece," 
"fool," "goose," "bluff," "joke," "gull," "bogus," "dupe," "sham," "false," 
"humbug," "imposture," "spurious," "decoy," "deception," "deviltry," 
"sharpers," "delUSion," "charlatan," until the whole context of the novel, 
Melville's world picture, becomes a maze of deception with "Jehovah" the 
supreme Confidence-Man and deceiver. 
The fear of deception is one of man's most common fears, because it 
is a frustration of one of his most fundamental drives, the drive to know. 
In Mardi, Melville's island king Donjalolo must renounce his right to rove 
I ~., II, chap. cxxxii, 330. 
2 Pierre, Bk. III, chap. vi, p. 90. 
3 ~., Bk. XXV, chap. iv, pp. 478-479. 
4 The Confidence-Man, chap. xlv, p. 334. Throughout this study, the 
term "devil-God" is used .!!.Q.!:. in the Manichean sense of two goda, one of which 
is evil--an evil-god or devil-god as opposed to a good-god; rather, it implies 
more the Christian concept of God and the devil as ambiguously combined in ~ 
Being, a devil-God--this is how indifferent Melville sees the primal power 
may be. 
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beyond his own circumscribed glen, and, for Melville, every man is, in a 
certain analogous sense, a Donjalolo unable to communicate with the "outside" 
world, with extramental reality, and, like Donjalolo, may conclude: "Better 
know nothing, than be deceived."l 
Question of a nonbenevolent deity 
It would seem that only a final power or deity that is malign, rather 
than benign, could be responsible for man's tldeceptible condition." As 
abundant Melville scholarship has shown, Melville seriously questioned the 
notion of a benevolent deity. In Mardi, Yillah, as the summum bonum, becomes 
inextricably submerged in the evil Hautia, "the vortex that draws all in,,2 __ 
3 
"in some mysterious way seemed Hautia and Yillah connected": the situation 
4 
of "goodness," as seen in Yillah with her "blue, firmament eyes," is ques-
tioned through the parallel case of Ady who is tltransformed" into one of the 
5 
evil Hautia's maidens, so that, seeking her, one sees "blue eye within black." 
Melville poses his question through a like situation at the end of Pierre 
where the blue-eyed Lucy, representing light or goodness. becomes engulfed 
or overshadowed by the dark, evil-influenced, poison-bearing Isabel; Melville 
almost thumpingly identifies his symbol: Lucy's brother cries "Lucy I A lightS 
~ardi, 1, chap. lxxxii, 290. 
2 Ibid., 11, chap. xc, 395. 
3 Ibid., chap. lxxxvii, 386. 
4 Ibid., It chap. xliii, 158. 
5 Ibid., II, chap. lxxxix, 392. 
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a lightl--LUCyl"l as he stumbles through the darkness of the prison cell. 
Melville restates the 8ame question of ambiguity in Pierre through the two 
portraits of the "father" that somehow, though one is noble in air and the 
other of shadowy significance, become ambiguously one: "Consider in thy mind, 
2 Pierre, whether we two paintings may not make only one" --the present instance 
provides an apt example of Melville's tendency, mentioned in the section 
which discusses his possible debt to Pierre Bayle, to push beyond any definite 
duality, as, e.g., that of Manicheism, or instrumental causation to a single 
principle, a tendency which Bayle himself gives occasional evidence of possess-
ing. Further, it is the portrait with the darker connotations that seems the 
truer likeness. 
Like the white-robed Moor in Clarel,3 the whiteness of Moby Dick is 
but a deceptive covering for the blackness of "eternal malignity." The shark 
is one of Melville's symbols for evil, and his oft quoted references to sharks 
are illustrative of his view of the ambiguous conjunction of good and evil in 
the Primal Power: the narrator in Mardi remarks, liAs well hate a seraph as a 
shark. Both were made by the same hand,,;4 a like thought occurs in Clarel: 
"The shark thou mad'st, yet claim'st the dove"j5 and Queequeg gives pronounce-
ment that "de god wat made shark must be one dam Ingin. ,,6 Timoleon arraigns 
1 Pierre, Bk. XXVI, chap. vii, p. 504. 
2 ~., Bk. IV, chap. v, p. 115. 
3 Clarel, Pt. III, canto xii, 11. 65-130. 
4 Mardi, I, chap. xiii, 47. 
5 Clarel, Pt. I, canto xiii, 1. 71. 
6 Koby-Dick, II, chap. lxvi, 26. 
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"heaven as compromised in wrong,,,l and, in Clarel, the Syrian monk sees the 
devil as fair, Christ as pale and dim, 2 "but as the shade of Him.,,3 When 
the devil and Syrian monk join in colloquy the devil asserts of God: 
Yea, yea, and He is everywhere--
Now and for aye, Evil and He. 4 
Rolfe later remarks: 
No, disproportionate is evil 
In influence. !!!! do I say? 
But speak not evil of the evil: 
Evil and good they braided play 
Into one cord. 5 
Melville does not deny the presence of goodness, but he often sees it as re-
solving back into evil or else vitiated by its very copresence with evil--
Rolfe asks: "Need'st foul all sweets, thou Beelzebub?,,6 Primarily and 
finally, however, Melville seems to view the apparent conjunction of good and 
1 Collected Poems, p. 214. 
2 This concept of the preponderance of the dark side of reality is 
also present in Pierre where the dark Isabel 1s portrayed as provocatively 
substantial, as Pierre comes to realize to his own harassment, whereas Lucy--
connected with traditional concepts of light, heaven and God (Isabel describes 
Lucy'. eyes as "heaven[')s own blue," and Lucy is connected with PlinlimDlon 
in that both are Welsh [flforeign" or alien], "pale"-complected, and Plinli.1IIDon 
eyes are "blue, bright," Lucy's are blue and "vividlf)--is rather unsubstantial: 
she has "delicate feet," "two thin white hands," a "slight, airy, almost 
unearthly figure"; "one husbandly embrace would break her airy zone, and she 
exhale upward to that heaven whence she hath hither come, condensed to mortal 
sight"; she is "fragile" and faints easily; she is described by the "s light-
ness of her person"; she is compared to lithe highest, and purest, and 
thinnest ether." 
JClarel, Pt. II, canto xviii, 1. 83. 
4 ~., 11. 102-103. 
5 ~., pro IV, canto iv, 11. 25-29. 
6 Ibid., Pt. 1, canto xxxiv, 1. 62. 
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evil as one of questionable ambiguity; it may be wondered if he was reminded 
of this conjunction through the connotations of the names of Phoebe and Maule 
as light and darkness respectively when he wrote to Hawthorne that "the 
marriage of Phoebe with the daguerreotypist is a fine stroke, because of his 
turning out to be a Maule."l 
In the quotation from Isa. 45:7, marked by Melville in his Bible and 
formerly cited--tlI form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and 
create evil: I the LORD do all these things," Melville found biblical justi-
fication for his questionings of the ambiguity of the first cause. Melville's 
Lightning-Rod Man, in the short story of the same name, is thus called Jupiter 
Tonans because he so stood "in the Greek statue of old, grasping the lightning-
bolt"; the lightning-bolt is, however, a lightning-rod shaped into "three 
keen tines." The ambiguous combination of good and evil is, therefore, pro-
jected through the sceptre of the likewise ambiguously named "dark l1ghtning-
king"--a sceptre which is both trident, devil's fork, and bolt of lightning, 
the god Jupiter's ensign1a. 2 When Melville dives below the undergirdings 
that support the superstructure of reality, he seems to find a fulcral point 
that is schizophrenic in nature. With such a power at the fundament of 
reality, it becomes not inconceivable that that reality is deceptive, delusive, 
dreaa. 
The dream tradition 
The epistemological problems articulated by Montaigne lead him 
1 Letters, p. 125. 
2 The Piazza Tales, pp. 172, 180. 
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logically to a consideration of a questionable reality. Near the end of the 
"Apology," Montaigne writes: "They who have compared our lives to a dream 
were, perhaps, more in the right than they were aware of."l Montaigne dis-
tinguishes between a waking and sleeping state, but he intimates that the 
distinction is,perhaps, more one of degree than of kind: 
When we dream, the soul lives, works, ana exercises all its faculties, 
neither more nor less than when awake; but more largely and obscurely, yet 
not so much, neither, that the difference should be as great as betwixt 
night and the meridian brightness of the sun, but as betwixt night and 
shade; there she sleeps, here she slumbers: but, whether more or less, 'tis 
still dark, and Cimmerian darkness. We wake sleeping, and sleep waking. 
I do not see so clearly in my sleep; but as to my being awake, I never 
found it clear enough and free from clouds: moreover, sleep, when it is 
profound, sometimes rocks even dreams themselves asleep; but our waking 
is never so sprightly that it rightly purges and dissipates those whimsies, 
which are waking dreams, and worse than dreams. Our reason and soul re-
ceiving those fancies and opinions that come in dreams, and authorizing 
the actions of our dreams with the like approbation that they do those of 
the day, wherefore do we not doubt whether our thought, our action, is not 
another sort of dreaming, and our waking a certain kind of sleep?2 
One of the most famous formulations of the dream-reality problem occurs 
in the first meditation of Descartes, who met the problem with his reading of 
Montaigne. Descartes first describes his locale, then remarks: 
How often have I dreamt that I was dressed, and occupied this place by 
the fire, when I was lying undressed in bed? At the present moment, how-
ever, I certainly look upon this paper with eyes wide awake; the head 
which I now move is not asleep; I extend this hand consciously and with 
express purpose, and I perceive it; the occurrences in sleep are not so 
distinct as all this. But I cannot forget that, at other times, I have 
been deceived in sleep by similar illusions; and, attentively considering 
those cases, I perceive so clearly that there exist no certain marks by 
which the state of waking can ever be distinguished from sleep, that I 
feel greatly astonished; and in amazement I almost persuade myself that I 
am now dreaming. 3 
~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. Xii, p. 279. 
2Ibid • 
3 Descartes, p. 99. 
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Although important, the basic question seems not so much to be that of dif-
ferentiating between ordinary dreaming and waking states, but to define pre-
cisely what it means to be awake in a conscious relational encounter with 
"reality"--is that which we are encountering substantial, "really real, II or is 
it perhaps just hallucinatory, the deceptions and illusions, however sharp and 
more keen at times, of a higher degree or layer of dream existence: is life, 
indeed, only an "ungraspable phantom"l and Being Nothing? That Melville some-
times thought so seems evident. 
Sir Thomas Browne, often called "The English Montaigne," remarks: 
"The world to me is but a dream or mock-show. tt2 Later, in the same volume, 
the following passage appears: 
I am happy in a dream. • • • There is surely a nearer apprehension of 
any thing that delights us, in our dreams, than in our waked senses • 
• • • And surely it is not a melancholy conceit to think we are all 
asleep in this world, and that the conceits of this life are as mere 
dreams, to those of the next, as the phantasms of the ni~ht, to the 
conceit of the day. There is an equal delusion in both. 
A few pages later Browne again comments: 
Let us call to assize the loves of our parents. the affections of our 
wives and children, and they are all dumb shews and dreams, without 
reality, truth. or constancy.4 
Pascal, who was also familiar with Montaigne and with Descartes, pre-
sents the dream argument of the Pyrrhonists and the refutation offered by the 
Dogmatists. The Pyrrhonistic dream-argument is first given: 
~obY-Dick. I, chap. it 4. 
2 Browne, II, 60. 
3 
.!!?,g., 111. 
4 Ibid., 116. 
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A man has no assurance whether he sleeps or wakes; seeing that in his 
sleep he does not the less firmly believe that he is awake. than when be 
really is so. He sees spaces, figures, movements; he 1s sens1ble of the 
lapse of time; he measures it; he acts. in short. as 1f he were awake. So 
that as one half of life 1s adm1tted by us to be passed in sleep, in 
which, however~it may appear otherwise, we have no perception of truth, 
and all our feelings are delusions; who knows but the other half of life, 
in which we think we are awake. is a sleep also. but 1n some respects 
different from the other. and from which we wake. when we, as we call it. 
sleep. As a man dreraa often that he is dreaming. crowding one dreamy 
delusion on another. 
Pascal next g1ves the Dogmatists' refutation: 
The only strong point of the Dogmatists is, that we cannot, consiste~ 
with honesty and sincerity, doubt our own intuitive principles. We know 
the truth. they say. not only by reasoning, but by feeling, and by a 
quick and luminous power of direct comprehension; and it is by this last 
faculty that we discern first principles. It is 1n vain for reasoning, 
wh1ch has no share in discovering these prinCiples. to attempt subverting 
them. The Pyrrhonists who attempt this, must try in vain. However unable 
we may be by reasoning to prove the fact, yet we know that we do not dream. 
And this inability may prove the feebleness of our reason, but not 88 they 
pretend. the want of reality and substance 1n the subjects of our knowl-
edge.2 
Pascal. however, commits himself wholly to neither view and asks simply: I~O 
shall clear up this perplexity?,,3 
Bayle declares: "1 therefore have not any good proof of the existence 
of bodies.,,4 Kant. on the other hand, clearly attempts to distinguish his 
idealism from so-called Empirical Idealism. which, in effect, maintains that 
the existence of extended beings is no more true than the existence of dreams: 
It would be doing us an injustice, if it were wished to attribute to 
us the Empirical Idealism fallen 1nto discredit long ago, which, whilst 
1 Pascal, 1835 ed •• p. 529. 
2Ibid • 
3Ibid• 
4Bay1e, 1734-1741 ed., VIII, 596. 
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it adaits the proper ~e.lity of space, denies, or at least considers 
therein as doubtful, the existence of extended beings, and allows between 
dreaaiDg and truth in this point, of no sufficiently demonstrable dif-
ference. l . 
Kant continues: 
Our transcendental Ideali .. on the contrary adaits, that the objects 
of external intuition are also really just so as they are envisaged in 2 
space, and all changes in tt.e such as the internal sense represents them. 
Kant's assertion is, however, as many philosophers have hastened to point out, 
a reasonable assuaption rather than a proven conclusion. 
The American dre. 
Frederic I. Carpenter's discussion of "The .Aaerican Dre." hinges on 
the central notion of democracy and ita optimistic corollaries--nfreedOll," 
"progress," an "ideal new world," "that dre. of a better, richer, and happier 
life. ,,3 When Carpenter lists his "four answers to the probl_ of this dre_." 
the four separate attitudes all concern the possibility of a perfect democracy~ 
Carpenter designates that there are those who respond to the "drs.1t in a 
negative way--seeing a perfect democracy as nonreali.able, and this includes 
Melville, but the discussion of democracy proceeds on the level of a "way" 
of existence rather than of existence itself. It is at this deeper, more 
radical level that Melville's search carries him, and in this substratua of 
inquiry, the phrase "The .Aaerican Dre." begins to assuae darkly ironic 
~t, p. 344. 
2 'Ib:1d~, pp. 344-345. 
3Frederic I. Carpenter, _erican Literature and the Dre_ (New York: 
Philosophical Library, Inc., 1955), pp. 3-10. 
4 
.!!!!!!.. p. 7. 
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signification. 
Richard P. Adams has titled one of his periodical articles "Ataerican 
1 Renaissance: An Epistemological Problem": Professor Ad .. s accordingly con-
fines his remarks to the outstanding writers of the period known as the "Ataeri-
can Renaissancen-to Emerson, Poe, Hawthorne, Thoreau, Melville, and Whitman. 
The epistemological problem and its accompanying ontological problem is, 
however, concomitant with American belles-lettres. Lulu Rumsey Wiley says of 
our early Ataerican novelist Charles Brockden Brown (1771-1810) that "he was 
2 
essentially a philosopher"; he learned French so that he might study French 
sources, and he "had read and assimilated so much of European philosophy • • • 
that unconsciously he garnered from that material without once reflecting that 
it was not originally his own. ,,3 An early biographer of Brown, William Dunlap, 
noted his tendency toward scepticism: 
Ever fond of analysis, Charles, even in very early life, would take 
no opinion upon trust. He found in his own mind abundant reason to reject 
many of the received opinions of mankind, and to doubt the reality of 
many facts upon which those opinions are founded. Much of his reading at 
this time tended to bewilder rather than enlighten and to confirm his 
predisposition to scepticism.4 
On a number of issues, Professor David Lee Clark writes of Brown, "he reflects 
the skepticism of David Hume and other eighteenth-century English and French 
1 Emerson Society Quarterly, No. 35 (II Quarter, 1964), 2-7. 
2The Sources and Influence of the Novels of Charles Brockden Brown 
(New York: Vantage Press, Inc., 1950), p. 114. 
3 Ibid., p. 113. 
4 The Life of Charles Brockden Brown: Together with Selections from 
the Rarest of His Printed Works, from His Original Letters, and from His 
Manuscripts before Unpublished (2 vols.; Philadelphia: Published by James P. 
Parke, 1815), I, 69-70. 
1 philosophers." 
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Brown's novels are marked by a sense of uncertainty, mystery, and 
secrecy. Fraud and deception occur frequently. On the first page of the 
first chapter of Arthur Mervyn, Dr. Stevens sees Arthur for the first time and 
remarks: "My sight was imperfectly assisted by a far-off lamp,,2_-a vague 
medium of perception, the questionable situation, the difficulty of knowing 
is immediately established. There is a prevalence of the interrogative fora 
throughout Brown's novels; an early question, "What should I infer from this 
incident?",3 is indicative of the mood of the book. The structure of Brown's 
novels approaches a dream fora, particularly in the case of Edgar Huntly; or 
Memoirs of a Sleep-Walker. The novel is replete with sleepwalking, gothic 
nightmarish qualities, descriptions of a darkness that produces an obscurity 
and uncertainty that is underscored in the characters' speeches. Many im-
portant scenes occur at night, and characters appear and disappear as in a 
4 dream. Brown's world, too, is problematic. 
In his perceptively edited organic anthology, Selections from Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, Stephen E. Wicher states that Emerson '~ade his own final 
1 Charles Brockden Brown: Pioneer Voice of America (Durham, North 
Carolina: Duke University Press, 1952), p. 55. 
2 Charles Brockden Brown, Arthur Mervyn: or, Memoirs of the Year 1793 
(2 vols.; Vol. I--Philadelphia: Printed and Published by H. Maxwell, 1799; 
Vol. II--New York: Printed and Sold by George F. Hopkins, 1800), I, 1. 
3 Ibid., I, 34. 
4 For observations on Edgar Huntly, I am indebted to Mr. Phillip 
Northman and to Dr. Harrison Hayford for whom Mr. Northman prepared his paper 
on the novel. 
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1 
rejection of skepticism very clear." This rejection, however, was directed 
against a complete acceptance rather than a partial consideration, for, as 
Whicher explains, Emerson had to work to "rescue his old hope from his new 
skepticism"; the naive optimism of Nature was gone--he came to assume the 
enigmatic nature of the world, and u to marry faith and skepticism . . . 
[became] his settled aim as an author."2 Whicher reasons that it is the re-
suIting shock of opposites that makes "Experience" probably Emerson's strongest 
essay. The skeptical element of the essay is evident; in the poem which pre-
faces it, and in the essay itself, "Dream" or illusion is one of the "lords 
of life. ,,3 In the essay Emerson writes: "Dream delivers us to dream, and 
there is no end to il1usion.,,4 
The dream and nightmare quality found in Brown's early novels also 
found its way into the works of Poe and Hawthorne (Hawthorne will be briefly 
considered in conjunction with Melville). W. H. Auden, in the "Introductiontt 
to his edition of Selected Prose and Poetry of Edgar Allan Poe, observes that 
Poe's characters somehow live outside our normal concepts of space and time, 
and. in what Auden calls stories of pure adventure such as Gordon Pym (though 
his designation of such a story as "pure adventure" is questionable), be 
5 finds that the "hero is as purely passive as the 1 in dreams." Also 
l(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960), p. 253. 
2Ibido 
3Emeraon, Works, 111, 43. 
4 1lli. .• 50. 
5(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p. vii. 
174 
noticeable in some of Poe's stories is a "vagueness of description" that 
1 brings a sense of illusion. Poe makes an overt statement of the ontological 
dream problem in his poem tlA Dream Within A Dream": 
You are not wrong, who deem 
That my days have been a dream; 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
All that we see or seem 2 
Is but a dream within a dream. 
Poe's categorical assertion is, however, changed to a sceptical query at the 
end of the poem: 
Is ill that we see or seem 3 
But a dream within a dream? 
In 1916, a quarter of a century after Melville's death (1891), Mark 
Twain's "The Mysterious Stranger" was posthumously pubUshed in Harper's Maga-
zine (May-November. 1916). The stranger, Satan, goes by the name of Philip 
Traum, i.e., Dream. The Twain scholar Walter Blair has pointed out that the 
story was never really finished and that "one cannot know how Twain might 
4 have managed revisions-always important in his writing." Nevertheless, the 
fact that Twain wrote the particular type of ending he did at all is signifi-
cant. S In the final chapter, Traum and the narrator, Theodor Fischer, meet 
for the last time. Traum announces: 
lIbido 
2The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe, ed. James A. Harrison (Virginia 
Edition, 17 vols. in 10 vols.; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., 1902), VII 
[in V), 16. 
3Ibid• 
4Selected Shorter Writinas of Mark Twain, ed. Walter Blair (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962), p. xxi. 
SA. B. Paine, Twain's literary executor, found the final chapter 
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Life itself is only a vision, a dream. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Nothing exists; all is a dream. God--man--the world--the sun, the 
moon, the wilderness of stars--a dream, all a dream; they have no exis-
tence. l 
Although Traum's final explanation is lengthy, it has been elected to cite the 
major part of it here because of its relevance to the line of thought and 
questioning that characterizes much of Melville's work: 
Strange! that you should not have suspected years ago--centuries ago, 
eons, ago!--for you have existed, companionless, through all the eterni-
ties. Strange, indeed, that you should not have suspected that your uni-
verse and its contents were only dreams, visions, fiction I Strange, be-
cause they are so frankly and hysterically insane--like all dreams: a God 
who could make good children as easily as bad, yet preferred to make bad 
ones; who could have made every one of them happy, yet never made a 
single happy one; who made them prize their bitter life, yet stingily cut 
it short; who gave his angels eternal happiness unearned, yet required 
his other children to earn it; who gave his angels painless lives, yet 
cursed his other children with biting miseries and maladies of mind and 
body; who mouths justice and invented hell--mouths mercy and invented hell 
--mouths Golden Rules, and forgiveness multiplied by seventy times seven, 
and invented hell; who mouths morals to other people and has none himself; 
who frowns upon crimes, yet commits them all; who created man without 
invitation, then tries to shuffle the responsibility for man's acts upon 
man, instead of honorably placing it where it belongs, upon himself; and 
finally, with altogether divine obtuseness, invites this poor, abused 
slave to worship him! ••• 
You perceive, ~, that these things are all impossible except in a 
dream. You perceive that they are pure and puerile insanities, the silly 
creations of an imagination that is not conscious of its freaks--in a 
word, that they are a dream, and you the maker of it. The dream-marks 
are all present; you should have recognized them earlier. 
It is true, that which I have revealed to you; there is no God, no 
universe, no human race, no earthly life. no heaven. no hell. It is all 
a dream--a grotesque and foolish dream. Nothing exists but you. And you 
are but a thought--a vagrant thought, a useless thought, a homeless though 
wandering forlorn among the empty etemitiesl2 
separated from the others and added it (Ibid.). 
1 Ibid., p. 387. 
2 Ibid., p. 388. The ellipsis marks at the end of the first quoted 
paragraph are present in the text. 
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The final sentence is Fischer's concluding remark: "He vanished, and left IDe 
1 
appalled; for I knew, and realized, that all he had 8aid wu true." 
Not only was the ontological problem in American literature concomitant 
and immediately peripheral with Melville's writing, but it has continued with 
ever broadening scope into our contemporary era: in a 1955 p08t8cript to a 
later edition of On Native Ground" first published in 1942, author Alfred 
Kuin announces that alienation is dead: "'nle tension between writer and 
outside world has vanished becau8e the contemporary writer no longer believes 
in an objective reality outside him8elf.,,2 
Melville and a dream reality 
The lack of a stable, universal criterion and the consequent state of 
nondirectional drifting, the inability to penetrate elusive and shifting ap-
pearances to grasp a core of reality, the impossibility of proving, without 
doubt, the actual existence of an external world, the possibility of deception 
even in the final court of appeals, all lead to the fear that appearance, 
' .. 
perhaps, i8 all there is and life and reality are merely an illusion and dream. 
The idea is incipient in Mardi, where Babbalanja, true to form, is rhapsodizing 
Says old Bardianna, "Did I not so often feel an appetite for my yams. I 
should think everything a dream";--so puzzling to him seemed the things of 
this Mardi. But Alla-Malo1la goes further. Says he, "Let us club to-
gether, fellow-riddles: ••• we are air, wind, breath, bubbles; our 
being is told in a tick.,,3 
lIbido 
2See Douglas M. Davis, "The Literary Critic: He Determines the Shape 
of Our Literature," The National Observer, October 25, 1965, p. 22. 
~frdi, II, chap. xxxix, 160-161. 
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In Redburn, Melville mentions a dream-like fascination caused by shifting 
ambiances of reality, 
a certain wonderful rising and falling of the sea; I do not mean the waves 
themselves, but a sort of wide heaving and swelling and sinking allover 
the ocean. • • • 1 
I felt as if in a dream all the time. 
By the time of Moby-Dick, the passing and concluding observation of 
the passage from Redburn becomes integral to the over-all structure of the 
novel. Melville did some of his most serious reading in sceptic sources prior 
to and during his composition of Moby-Dick as allusions in the novel from 
sections of Montaigne, particularly the "Apology," and from Browne and Bayle 
show. Further, Melville's reading of and meetings with Hawthorne seem to 
have deeply influenced the crystallization of his own sceptical form, includ-
ing the corollary dream form. Melville saw Hawthorne as a sceptic in the best 
sense of the word: in his review of Mosses from an Old Manse, Melville cites 
the passage from "The Intelligence Office" ending with the bit of dialogue, 
"I seek for Truth,tt2 to which he prefaces: 
I submit it, then, to those best acquainted with the man personally, 
whether the following is not Nathaniel Hawthorne; and to himself, whether 
something involved in it does not express the temper of his mind--that 
lasting temper of all true, candid men--a seeker, not a finder yet. 3 
The observation is reminiscent of the note, already cited. in Melville's copy 
of Montaigne where the dogmatists, those who claim to have found truth, are 
1 Redburn, chap. xiii, p. 81. 
2 Nathaniel Hawthorne, Mosses from an Old Manse (New York: Wiley & 
Putnam, 1846), Pt. II, p. 87. 
3 The Literary World, VII (August 24, 1850), 146. 
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distinguished from the sceptics, those who are still seeking it. l 
Melville's first reaction to his reading of Hawthorne's Mosses was 
one of dream-like quality: 
The soft ravishments of the man spun me round about in a web of 
dreams, and when the book was closed, when the spell was over, this 
wizard "dismissed me with but misty reminiscences, as if I had been 
dreaming of him. ,,2 
The dream-like texture of Hawthorne's writing is easily seen in the night-
marish quality of "My Kinsman, Major Molinewe." Even more to the purpose is 
"Young Goochnan Brown" to which Melville makes explicit and extended reference 
, 
in his review; Seymour Gross calls attention to the "dream logic" of the story: 
and Hawthorne himself asks if Goochnan Brown had "only dreamed a wild dream"; 
if so, it was "a dream of evil omen" and a distrustful man did he become 
"from the night of that fearful dream. IA Whatever the combination of inf1u-
ences,by the time of Moby-Dick, a dream tissue envelops and impregnates the 
novel. 
Although, in his discussion of Moby-Dick as a work of art, Mr. 
Bezanson does not relate the dream texture of the work to Melville's philoso-
phic structure, his discerning comments on the dream form of the novel are 
particularly relevant and summary to the present ontological problem. Mr. 
Beaanson writes: 
~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 231, n. 1. 
2The Literary World, VII (August 17, 1850), 125. 
3Seymour Gross, ''Hawthorne's 'My Kinsman, Maj or Mo linewe, .. " A Case-
book on the H.awthorne Question, ed. Agnes McNeill Donohue (New York: Thomas 
Y. Crowell, 1963), p. 61, n. 13. 
4 Hawthorne. Pt. I, p. 83. 
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Ishmael's predilection for keying his narrative in the symbolic mode 
suggests another aspect of structure. Moby-Dick lies close to the world 
of dreams. We find the narrator recalling at length a remembered dream 
of his childhood. Stubb attempts a long dream-analysis to Flask after he 
has been kicked by Ahab. It is not strange, then, that young Ishmael's 
moment of greatest crisis, the night of the tryworks when he is at the 
helm, should be of a traumatic order. More subtly, numerous incidents 
of the narrative are bathed in a dream aura: the trancelike idyll of 
young Ishmael at the masthead, the hallucinatory vision of the spirit 
spout, the incredible appearance on board of the devil himself accom-
panied by IIfive dusky phantoms," and many others. The narrator's whole 
effort to communicate the timeless, spaceless concept of "The Whiteness 
of the Whale ll is an act of dream analysis. "Whether it tJas a reality or 
a dream, I never could entirely settle," says the narrator of his child-
hood dream; and so it was with much of what occurred aboard the Peguod. 
Ishmael's tale is to be listened to in terms of a tradition that runs 
from Revelation to Finnegan's Wake. Dream sense is an important mood in 
Moby-Dlck; and dream form, to the extent there is such a verbal form, is 
an inCipient structural device of the book. At regular intervals the 
narrator, in his intense effort to explain himself, resorts to a brief 
passage in which there is a flashing concentration of symbols that hold 
for a moment and then disappear. It is a night device for rendering day-
experience, and in Moby-Dick it happens again and again. l 
In an important sense, however, the dream form of Melville's novels differs 
from that of the book of Revelation in which the insight is so great, so in-
expressible in any ordinary context, that only a vision or dream-setting can 
divorce it from ordinary reality and begin to apprOXimate its sublimity and 
intensity: for Melville, the dream is not a means of conveying an illuminat-
ing perception of a greater reality but a designation for the bewildering, un-
sequential, "ungraspable phantom of life," for an absence of insight and 
knowledge about reality that leaves its very existence problematic. The 
dream structure that Professor Bezanson finds so pervasive in Moby-Dick may 
likewise be found in equal force in Clare1 with its many references to and 
situations involving dreams and sleep. 
lwa1ter E. Bezanson, ''!toby-Dick: Work of Art," Moby-Dick Centennial 
Essays, edt Tyrus Hi1lway and Luther S. Mansfield (Dallas: Southern Methodist 
University Press, 1953), pp. 48-49. 
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The erasure of the line between dream and reality occurs in Pierre's 
assertion: "It is all a dream--we dream that we dreamed we dream"l--there 
will be occasion to elaborate on this statement in the following chapter on 
ethics. Dream and reality merge into each other and are interchangeable in 
significance as Pierre has his "remarkable dream" of Enceladus. In his "Dia-
logues Concerning Natural Religion," Hume had written of a universe of "hos-
tile" and "insufficient" beings: 
The whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind Nature, impregnated 
by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her lap, without 
discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive children. 2 
Melville compares his "American Enceladus" with Balthazar Marsy's Bassin d' 
Encelade with its sculptured leaden Titan and remarks in a similar vein as 
Hume: 
Marsy gave arms to the eternally defenseless; but Nature, more truthful, 
performed an amputation, and left the impotent Titan without one service-
able ball-and-socket above the thigh.3 
When the "phantom" faces him, Pierre no longer sees Enceladus, but on the 
Titan's armless trunk Pierre sees "his own duplicate face and features," and 
all the dream horror is his actual grief. 4 The fact that reality might be 
no more than illusion or dream does not mean that man i8 less vulnerable to 
it or suffers less; he may but know the highest suffering of seeing all other 
suffering as purposeless. Among Melville's miscellaneous poems appears a 
short verse entitled simply "To----------"; in it, Melville witnesses to the 
1 Pierre, Bk. XIX, chap. ii, p. 382. 
2 HUIle, II. 526. 
3Pierre, Bk. XXV, chap. iv, p. 482. 
4Ibid• 
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impact of a dream reality: 
Ah, wherefore, lonely, to and fro 
Flittest like the shades that go 
Pale wandering by the weedy stream? 
We, like they, are but a dream: 
Then dreams, and less, our miseries be; 
Yea, fear and sorrow, pain, despair 
Are but phantoms. But what plea 
Avails here? phantoms having power 
To make the heart quake and the spirit 1 cower. 
It is, in fact, the painful and unreasonable aspect of "reality" that often 
argues for its nightmarish, dream quality. In "The Encantadas" Huni1la, 
seated on a high cliff, watches her husband and brother die, "when dashed 
by broad-chested swells between their broken logs and the sharp teeth of the 
reef, both adventurers perished before Hunilla's eyes,,,2 and the unexpected 
and uncontrollable horror of the scene becomes dream-like: 
And there, the invisible painter painted to her view the wave-tossed and 
disjointed raft, its once level logs slantingly upheaved, as raking masts, 
and the four struggling arms undistinguishable among them; and then all 
subsided into smooth-flowing creamy waters, slowly drifting the splintered 
wreck; while first and last, no sound of any sort was heard. Death in a 
silent picture; a dream of the eye; such vanishing shapes as the mirage 
shows. 3 
Chapter xvi of The Confidence-Man begins: 
The sky slides into blue, the bluffs into bloom; the rapid Mississippi 
expands; runs 8parkling and gurgling, allover in eddies; one magnified 
wake of a seventy-four. The sun comes out, a golden hussar, from his tent, 
flashing his helm on the world. All things warmed in the landscape, leap. 
Speeds the daedal boat as a dream. 
I Collected Poems, p. 392. 
2 The Piazza Tales, p. 223. 
3 ~., pp. 223-224. 
4 The Confidence-Man, chap. xvi, p. 100. 
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This passage has been called "idyllic"l and praised for its poetic quality!2 
the style, however, is appropriately deceptive. The world is a shifty, un-
substantial, bluff of a one: the "sky slides into blue, the bluffs into 
bloom [double entendre]." The river runs "allover in eddies It or small 
whirlpools and seems to be lacking a main current of direction and suggests 
man'. similar plight; it is "one magnified wake of a seventy-four"--a 
"seventy-four" is a type of warship and suggests Melville's view of a world 
in constant warfare. The SUD is probably a god image (a symbol used fre-
quently in Scripture and used in this sense at the beginning of The Confidence-
Man)--a god in warrior's garb and suggestive of a state of warfare with earth. 
Melville's microcosmic world, his ship, is a "daedal" boat; again, as many 
times elsewhere in the novel, the term may be used with a double entendre: 
"daedal" may lIean "variegated," but also a "cUBningly" formed boat speeding 
"as a dream"-the elusiveness and illusiveness of reality. 
In Clarel, in the midst of Bacchic carousings at Mar Saba, during 
which a number of participants openly violate or mock precepts of their re-
spective creeds, a pensive Clarel stands by a lattice overlooking the Kedron 
gulf: 
1 
With what sweep 
Doubt plunges, and from maw to maw; 
Traditions none the nations keep--
Old ties dissolve in one wide thaw; 
John D. Seelye, ItTimothy Flint's 'Wicked River' and The Confidence-
Man," ~, LXXVIII (March, 1963). 77. 
2Elizabeth Foster writes: "The herb-doctor is ushered onto the stage 
by an extraordinary description of natural scenery, extraordinary for its 
heightened poetic tone and lushness of poetic ornament unmatched anywhere else 
in this novel" (Hendricks House The Confidence-Man. p. Ix). 
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The Frank, the Turk, and e' en the Jew 
Share it; perchance the Brahmin too. 
Deeply impressed by Nehemiah's recent death and jarred by the contrasting 
boisterous sceae he asks: 
Are these the pilgrims late that heard 
The wheeling desert vultures scream 
Above the Man and Book interred[?] 
The whole bizarre incongruity of the human scene, the apparent lack of all 
rational sequence, leads him to ask: 
Is life indeed a dream?l 
A few cantos later the significantly named Wandering Jew asks in his per-
plexity: "Is all but dream?,,2 Melville persisted in this query until the 
time of his death; in his last work, Melville has Billy Budd ask: 
But aren't it all sham? 
• • • it is dreaming that I 3 am. 
Melville's epistemological quandary brings him to question not only the nature 
of existents but existence itself. 
1 Clarel, Pt. III, canto xiv, 11. 103-121. 
2 ~.t canto xix, 1. 126. 
3Bill! Budd, ed. Hayford-Sealts, leaf 349, p. [132]. 
CHAPTER V 
THE ETHICAL PROBLEM 
"How can one sin in a dream?" 
Pierre. 
Ethics and the epistemological view 
Montaigne conjectures that because of the lack of certainty, man has 
no fixed rule for morals. Prior to Montaigne and the renaissance, general tra-
dit10Ditl--views saw divine law as eternal. immutable, and good: as divine law 
became manifest to man through his reason, a natural endowment, it became known 
as natural law. and this was man's general criterion of ethics as well as a 
basis for law; when natural reason acted to reach a particular practical judg-
ment about personal duty, this judgment became conscience--conscience was not 
considered as a separate faculty but as an !£! of the faculty of intellect as 
reason. Montaigne, again, reacts against this traditional view: ftThe laws of 
1 
conscience, which we pretend to be derived from nature, proceed from custom." 
Pascal writes poignantly of the lack of a criterion, a "fixed point": 
The licentious tell men of orderly lives that they stray from nature's 
path, while they themselves follow it; as people in a ship think those 
move who are on the shore. On all sides the language is similar. We 
must have a fixed point in order to judge. The harbour decides for those 
who are in a ship; but where shall we find a harbour in morality.2 
~ontaigne, Bk. It chap. xxii, p. 44. 
2 '" Pensees, 383. 
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Pascal suggests that perspective determines a fixed point of measurement in a 
painting and then asks: 1 "But who shall determine it in truth and morality?" 
Hume, too, rejects a morality based on natural law and decides instead that 
"the experienced train of events is the great standard by which we all 
2 
regulate our conduct." 
In Melville's works, a principal example of the fatal realization of 
the lack of a moral criterion occurs in the character Pierre, who, in his 
enthusiasm, prays: '~ay I, in all my least shapeful thoughts, still square 
myself by the inflexible rule of holy right.,,3 The tragedy of Pierre is con-
ceived in the very strength of his belief in and enthusiasm for this cri-
terion or standard, this "inflexible rule." Like the ftimmemorially admitted 
maxims of men" that "slide and fluctuate, and finally become wholly inverted, .. 4 
Pierrets "inflexible" rule, too, fluctuates and inverts and leads him into 
5 the "monstrouseat vice." Early in the novel, Pierre crawls under the Terror 
Stone, emblematic of an indifferent deity, and invokes the Stone to fallon 
him and crush him if virtue is "unmeaning. ,,6 Later, Melville has Pierre re-
phrase the same invocation to the "stony" walls: "If ••• the uttermost 
Virtue, after all, prove but a betraying pander to the monstrouseat vice,--
7 then close in and crush me, ye stony walls" --in the novel's penultimate 
1 illS., 381. 
2 Hume, IV, 166. 
3 Pierre, Bk. V, chap. vi, p. 150. 
4 Ibid. , Bk. IX, chap. i, p. 231. 
5 Ibid., Bk. XIX, chap. ii, p. 381. 
6 
.illS. , Bk • VII, chap. v, p. 189. 
7 
.illS. J Bk • XIX, chap_ ii, pp. 380-381. 
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chapter, Melville's imagery sugge.t. that the stony wall. of Pierre,~s situation 
have clo.ed in to crush him, for Pierre i •• een .tanding "in a low dungeon of 
the city pri.on. The cUilber.OIIl8 stone ceiling almost rested on his brow; .0 
that the long tiers of ma •• ive cell-galleries above .eamed partly piled on 
him. ,,1 
Ethic. and the ontological view 
Ethics and ontology are reciprocally interdependent: becau.e of 
certain p.ychological factors, a person's view of reality may often depend 
upon hi. ethical ~~~e--or lack of one; logically, however, the ontological 
problea, the view of reality, precede. and forms one'. ethical per.pective 
of the right and wrong of human action. Emer.on, with hi. tran.cendental type 
of ideali .. exhort. men to "build therefore your own world.,,2 Reality be-
com •• comformable to man a. ethical agent, a. a being po ••••• ing the power to 
will-for the early !!'aeraon, man wills realit~: 
He can reduce under hi. will not only particular event. but gr.at 
cla •• es, nay, the whole series of events, and so conform all facts to 
his character. • • • the world becames at last only a realized will. 3 
4 In such a view, the only "sin" is Imitation. For the man who views reality 
as a .trictly moni.tic aaterialist there should logically be no ethical quea-
tion, since man, for him, is amoral. Such a view may be seen in adherent. to 
the materialistic Marxi.t ideology existing in the Soviet Union today. 
• • • 
1 ~., Bk. XXVI, chap. vi, p. 502. 
2Eaeraon, Work., I, 76. 
3 ~., 39-40. 
4See Emerson'. • •• ay ''Fate,'' Works, VI, particularly p. 20: "Fat. 
is known to us as limitation. Whatever l:1JBits us we call Fat •• " 
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Melville, too, was profoundly influenced in his view of ethics by his 
more fundamental epistemological and ontological views: from an epistemo1ogi-
cal standpoint, it may be asked how one conforms to or transgresses against 
norms and criterions that are not perceptible or that, at best, remain highly 
questionable and doubtful; viewed against the ontological problem, human ac-
tions are inconsequential in a world where there are, perhaps, no criterions, 
where Being may be Nothing and reality only a dream. Melville succinctly 
places this problem through the question posed by Pierre: "From nothing pro-
ceeds nothing. • • • How can one sin in a dream?"l If nihilism is considered 
as a doctrine which denies any objective ground of moral principles, the 
nihilistic element of Melville's moral probing becomes evident, since he 
questions the presence of any objective reality at all. Again, however, 
Melville offers a question, not a conclusion. If Being is Nothing, then 
2 
"Virtue and Vice" become but "two shadows cast from one nothing" --so it 
3 
"seems" to Pierre. The question is again raised in "Timo1eon": 
What basis then? 0, tell at last, 
Are earnest natures staggering here 
But fatherless shadows from no substance cast?4 
An indifferent deity 
The lack of clear-cut distinctions, more, a suggested ambiguous connec-
tion in the question of truth-falsehood, light-darkness, dream-reality, being-
1 Pierre, Bk. XIX, chap. ii, p. 382. 
2Ibid• 
3Ibid • 
4Co11ected Poems. p. 215. 
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nothing, goodness-evil, and especially, virtue-vice, led Melville to attack 
the apparent indifference of the "gods." The insouciance of the gods is 
suggested in Montaigne's "Apology" in the quotation from Ennius: 
I ever thought tbat gods above there were; 1 
But do not think they care what men do here. 
The concept of indifference is openly stated in Hume's "Dialogues Concerning 
Natural Religion": Philo is allotted the final and extended portion of the 
dialogue, and Bume, who had read Bayle, has him question the Hanichean system 
as a possible explanation for the "strange mixture of good and ill which ap-
2 pears in life." Philo, however, sees no particular combat between a malevo-
lent and benevolent being and finally rejects the Manichean hypothesis. Be 
decides instead: "The true conclusion is, that the original Source of all 
things is entirely indifferent • • • and bas no more regard to good above ill, 
than to beat above cold.,,3 In Book I, chapter iii of Sartor Resartus, whicb 
4 Melville borrowed from Duyckinck in 1850, Carlyle, too, mentions a "god-
like indifference."S 
For man, vested with inefficient faculties, truth becomes undiscernible 
from falsehood, if, indeed, it i8 discernible; light appears to be swallowed 
up in darkness or forms an _biguous 11ai80n--a8 in the "dark l1ghtning-
~onta1gne, Bk. lIt chap. xii, p. 238. 
2 Hume, II, S26. 
3Ibid., 526-527. 
4 Sealts, No. 123. 
5 Bendricks Bou8e Moby-Dick. p. 812, note for 461.13. Carlyle knew 
Bume's "Dialogues" (see Faery Neff, Carlyle [New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 
Inc., 1932], p. 31). 
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1 king"; reality gives evidence of being no more than dream, Being Nothing. 
The quality of indifference does not necessarily contradict earlier Melvillean 
designations of the deity as malign, even when that malignity is active: one 
can, in general, be quite indifferent to flies and yet swat or crush one if it 
is annoying. Again, a not incongruous combination of malignity and indif-
ference may be seen in the parental figure who strikes out at a child fortui-
tously or unjustly, showing, by the very action, a lack of genuine personal 
concern and the presence of an underlying indifference--perhaps the final 
malignity of them all. 
In probing the question inadvertently raised by Descartes and many 
ways rephrased by Bay1e-ttls God the Devil?"--Me1vi11e sought the utmost 
example and foundation for the mysterious connection of contradictories, and 
he shows a special concern for the question of goodness-evil, particularly 
moral goodness and evil or virtue and vice. In Mardi, there are moral over-
tones in the mysterious connection of Yi11ah and Rautia: Yil1ah is singularly 
gui1e1ess--Taji remarks, "Often I thought that Paradise had overtaken me on 
earth, and that Yillah vas verily an angel, and hence the mysteries that 
2 hallowed her"; Rautia, conversely, entices, "Come I let us sin, and be 
merry.,,3 The question of an indifferent deity becomes full-blown in Moby-
~. Several terms come into playas Melville develops this theme of indif-
ference: again, the vall image is used, particularly a "dead" val1--connoting 
unresponsiveness on the part of an indifferent deity, effecting, for man, a 
lThe Piazza Tales, p. 180. 
~ardi, I, chap. lxiV, 226. 
3Ibid., II, chap_ xc, 395. 
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lack of communication not stmply with participating beings (if such do exist) 
but with Being Itself. The term "stolidity" is used synonymously: in his 
personal copy of the poem "The Berg." Melville cancelled the words in the 
last line, "dead indifference" of walls, and substituted "dense stolidity" 
of walls. l Earlier in the poem, Melville describes the iceberg as "stolid. 1t2 
A synonym for "stolid" is "impassive," which means "showing indifference" or 
being "insensible," i.e., bereft of emotion or sensation--the narrator says 
of the "dead lt wall of the Whale's head: "I do not think that any sensation 
lurks in it.,,3 Also connected with the concept of indifference is that of 
the impersonal; Ahab addresses the "supernal power": "In the midst of the 
4 personified impersonal. a personality stands here." 
The terms "indifferent,n "stolidity," and "impersonal" are used to 
describe the carpenter through whom Melville has Ahab question the nature of 
the ugods." Melville invests the carpenter with god-like qualities; he is 
called both a "man-maker"S and an Uundertaker. ,,6 Because he is tlone day making 
legs, and the next day coffins to clap them in, ,,7 Ahab tells him: 
"Thou art as unprincipled as the gods, and as much of a jack-of-
all-trades." 
1 Selected Poems of Herman Melville, ed. Hennig Cohen (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1964). p. 220. 
2 Collected Po .... p. 203. 
1Moby-Dick, II, chap. lxxvi, 70. 
4 !!!!!!., chap. exile, 281. 
5 !h!4., chap. cviii, 237. 
6 
.!ill., chap. cxxvii. 308. 
7Ibid• 
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"But I do not mean anything, sir. I do as I do." 
"The gods again."l 
Ahab then asks him if he ever sings while working on a coffin, and the carpen-
ter answers, "Oh, I'm indifferent enough, sir, for that."2 It is said of the 
carpenter that he "was prepared at all points, and alike indifferent and 
without respect in all,,,3 and he is described by the "indifferent promptitude 
4 
of his character." Further, for nothing was the carpenter more remarkable 
than for a certain "impersonal stolidity as it were; impersonal, I say; for 
it so shaded off into the surrounding infinite of things, that it seemed one 
with the general stolidity discemible in the whole visible world. ,,5 
Justice, in simple terms, means to give everyone his due. The presence 
of injustice, the lack of any discriminative recognition for virtue and vice, 
made Melville question the indifference of the deity--Melville has Ahab say: 
"To neither love nor reverence wilt thou be kind; and e'en for hate thou canst 
but kill; and all are killed.,,6 And so it is. Starbuck asks, "Is this the 
end of all my bursting prayers? all my life-long fide1ities?",7 and is killed. 
a Ahab darts his iron and "his far fiercer curse, into the hated whale" and 
1 !lli. , 309. 
2~. 
3 
.!!l.M. , chap. cvii, 233. 
4 
.!!l.M. , chap. ex, 248 • 
s 
.!.12.!!!. , chap. cvii, 234 • 
6 Ibid. , chap. cxix, 281. 
7 !E..!S.. , chap. ex:x:xv, 364. 
8 !l!!!!. , 363. 
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declares, "From. hell's heart I stab at thee; for hate's sake I spit my last 
breath at thee,,,l and Ahab is killed. It may be wondered if Melville is pur-
suing something of the same question in Billy Budd, for both the depraved 
Claggart and innocent Budd are killed and dropped into the sea. In Moby-Dick, 
the narrator describes "the demoniac indifference with which the White Whale 
2 tore his hunters, whether sinning or sinned against": here, the not incon-
gruous connection of malignity and indifference is evident in the description 
of the actively malign actions of the White Whale as "demoniac indifference." 
In Pierre, the father figure, who shades into a symbol of the deity, 
is himself responsible for the presence of evil. In the unreasonable world 
depicted in the novel, whether reality is more than dream or not, for all 
practical purposes it might as well be only dream. In such a world, ethics 
become meaningless; there exists no objective ground for moral principles, and 
3 the only apparent moral is "that there is n2. moral." Pierre's attempted 
heroic virtue but leads him into vice, and the theme of indifference is again 
sounded: 
We learn that it is not for man to follow the trail of truth too far, 
since by so doing he entirely loses the directing compass of his _ind; 
for arrived at the Pole, to whose barrenness only it points, there, the 
needle indiffferently respects all pointa of the horizon alike. 4 
The narrator in Pierre observes: "Eternally inexorable and unconcerned ia 
1 lli..!!., 366. 
2 ~., chap. cxxx, 318. 
3Editor Murray's observation in Hendricks House Pierre, p. xvi. 
4 Pierre, Bk. lX, chap. i, p. 231. 
193 
Fate, a mere heartless trader in men's joys and woes,,,l and Pierre. as he 
hears Isabel's story, remarks: "My heart was only dark with ill-restrained 
upbraidings against heaven that could unrelentingly see such innocence as 
2 thine so suffer." In MobY-Dick. Melville writes of the little negro Pip, 
another instance of suffering innocence, that his insanity is like heaven's 
3 
wisdom. in which, weal or woe, he feels "indifferent as his God. II The 
primary symbol for the indifferent deity in Pierre is stone. 
Further, indifference may be a disdainful indifference. As Knceladus, 
representative man, confronts the "majestic mount,lf an analogue for divine 
nature, his "stark naked" and "indignant chest" is exposed to the defilements 
of the birds (whose significance, in Melville, usually transcends that of 
mere natural objects4 to represent heavenly agents or powers), birds '\mich 
1 Bk. V, chap. v, 148 • .ill!.. , p. 
2 
..!.MS. , Bk. VIII, chap. v. p. 222 • 
\.obI-Dick, II, chap. xciii, 170. 
4Me1vi1le, however, sees nature, too, as indifferent: in Mardi (I, 
chap. lxix, 244), Babba1anja quotes Bardianna on the fact that "if not against 
us, nature is not for us"; in Clare 1 (Pt. I, canto XXXVii, 1. 48), Rolfe 
speaks of "nature with her neutral mind." Melville often describes the in-
difference of nature after cataclysmic events--the ripest moment for man's 
eternal "Why?": after the sinking of the Pequod, the "sea rolled on as it 
rolled five thousand years ago" (Moby-Dick, II, chap. exxxv, 367); in their 
edition of Billy Budd (pp. 196-198, note for leaf 334), Professors Hayford and 
Sea1ts offer a protracted, because significant, note on the indifference of 
nature after Billy's execution. 
At a little lower layer, MelVille, like Bayle, seems to be obliquely 
demonstrating that contrary to Christian tradition, which sees nature as 
ordered, harmonious, and beautiful and then argues a posteriori from effects 
to cause, from creation to Creator, to posit like positive attributes in the 
Godhead, it is possible to sceptically tilt the scale and argue a posteriori 
to far different conclusions because of the existence of evil and indifference 
in the world. Melville writes of the "indifferent" carpenter that his "im-
personal stolidity" shaded off and "seemed one with the general stolidity 
discernible in t e whole visible world" (Koby-Dick, II, chap. evii, 234. 
Under1inin mine • 
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for untold ages had cast their foulness on his vanquished crest."l 
In The Confidence-Man, the supposition that virtue and vice are "two 
shadows cast from one nothing" is pushed, with almost Swiftian logic, to its 
inexorable conclusion. The good (e.g., the young Episcopal clergyman and the 
charitable lady) and the bad (e.g., the egoistic, greedy Sophomore and stingy 
old miser) are both duped--~ are duped by the devil-god Confidence-Man who 
2 
regards all with "indifferent eyes." Those seeking a path of virtuous con-
duct, as the purported husband of Goneril and the honest China Aster, are re-
duced to nothing; like Pierre, each ia simply the "fool of Virtue.,,3 
The theme of indifference is also sounded in Melville's short stories 
and poems. A passage from lithe Encantadas" implies an indifferent deity be-
cause of the random outcome and inconsequence of man's efforts: 
But in all things man sows upon the wind, which bloweth just there 
whither it listeth; for ill or good, man cannot know. Often ill comes 
from the good, as good from ill.4 
In his poem "Off Cape Colonna," Melville says of the columns of the Sunium 
temple: 
Over much like gods! Serene they saw 
The wolf-waves board the deck, 
And headlong hull of Falconer, 5 
And many a deadlier wreck. 
As Hume's Philo understands it, "the original Source of all things is entirely 
1 Pierre, Bk. XXV, chap. iv, p. 481. 
2 The Confidence-Man, chap. xlv, p. 336. 
3 Pierre, Bk. XXVI, chap. iv, p. 499. 
4 The Piazza Tales, p. 227. 
5 Collected Poems, p. 248. 
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indifferent • • • and has no more regard to good above ill, than to heat 
above cold. ,,1 
Melville. merit. and the Protestant ethic 
Melville was probably helped to his view of an indifferent deity 
through his animadversions on success and merit. In his book The Organization 
!!!!!., William H. Whyte, Jr. describes the Protestant ethic as "pursuit of indi-
vidual salvation through hard work, thrift. and competitive struggle. tl2 The 
industrious man was the virtuous man; if a man grew rich it was because he 
deserved to. and "what for centuries had been looked on as the meanest greed. 
a rising middle class would interpret as the earthly manifestation of God's 
will.,,3 The ethic included a good deal of Old Testament mentality according 
to which the ebb or flux of one's success and prosperity was often held to be 
indicative of the degree of amity eXisting, in the particular case, between 
4 God and man. "Success was moral as well as practical" -success meant lIlerit. 
Melville, too, believed in the ethic of "hard work"--flToi1 is man's 
allotment; toil of brain. or toil of hands, or a grief that's more than either, 
the grief and sin of idleness tiS_but long before many young and deserving 
businessmen at the turn of the century came to the realization that success 
~uae, II, 526-527. 
2(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), p. 4. Mr. Whyte's use of the 
tem "Protestant." is, of course, a not,> entirely warranted generalization. 
3 
..!1!.!!!. , p. 16 • 
4 15. ..!1!.!!!. , p. 
5Mard!, I, chap. lxiii, 223-224. 
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did not necessarily mean merit but only the right personal connections, Mel-
ville recognized the dichotomy between success and merit. Perhaps because 
of his training in the tenets of the Dutch Reform Church, Melville was imbued 
with a Calvinistic, Old Testament-generated belief that merit should be syno-
noaous with success--the fact that it was not Melville seemed to find a part 
of the general injustice of man's existential plight and but one more clue to 
the indifference of the gods. The concept of success, just previously des-
cribed, appears to be, predominantly, one of financial success; Melville, too, 
would have welcomed financial success--he had written to Hawthorne, "Dollars 
1 damn me" -but, for Melville, success meant much more: it meant recognition 
2 
of good done, sanctions.b.!I!. and BOW for virtue performed. 
In "Timoleon" Melville asks in the tenor of the Protestant ethic: 
"[Is] God's will avouched in each successful man?,,3 In the POUl, Melville has 
just shown that the "successful man," Timoleon's brother Timophanes, is not 
the meritorious man but an "egotist.,,4 Melville gives a two line resume of 
the events of the poem, Timoleon's eclipse and belated glory, and then asks: 
Is that high Providence, or Chance? 5 
And proved it which with thee, Timoleon? 
Timoleon's choice, seen at the end of the poem, seems to rule out the 
1 Letters, p. 128. 
~elville, personally, wanted recognition, including financial recog-
nition, for what he recognized as his best writing. He wrote to Hawthorne: 
"What I feel most moved to write, that is banned,-it will not pay" (Ibid.). 
3collected Poems, p. 209. 
4Ibid• 
SIbid. 
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possibility of tlprovidence" being avouched in the successful man and leaves, 
through implication, "Chance" or indifference, for after Corinth condemns 
Timoleon the city again acclaims him, but on no more sound reasons than that 
"men's moods" again have changed and the world turns "in fickle ways. ,,1 TIle 
Corinthians assure Timoleon, "Justice in long arrears is thine, tl2 and eagerly 
recall him to Corinth. That Timoleon recognizes the chance-like, fortuitous, 
and untrustworthy nature of this "Justice" is evinced in the simple assertion 
of the closing line, since Timoleon, in exile, 
3 
never for Corinth left the adopted shore. 
Melville's tendency to identify Chance with indifference will be considered 
further in the following section on fate and free will. 
Melville's recognition of the division existing between success and 
merit is evident in Mardi. Babbalanja remarks: "Fame is an accident; merit 
a thing absolute. ,,4 Later, he again asserts: "Truth and Merit have other 
symbols than success. ,,5 Melville was not so cOlllpletely unrealistic as to 
deny all merit to the successful man, but he saw that it was not commensurate 
with success, that it could, in fact, be an insignificant entity in the randOlll 
formula that culminated in success; he writes of Pierre: 
The brightest success, now seemed intolerable to him, since he so plainly 
saw, that the brightest success could not be the sole offspring of Merit; 
but of Merit for the one thousandth part. and nine hundred and ninety-nine 
1 
.!lli. •• p. 215. Underlining added. 
21bid• 
3Ibid• 
4Mardi. II, chap. xxii, 88. 
SIbid., chap. lxiv, 274-275. 
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1 
combining and dovetailing accidents for the rest. 
Fate and free will 
Although Melville was undoubtedly moved toward his view of fate and 
free will by his Calvinistic religious background, this predominantly fatalis-
tic view was corroborated by his subsequent philosophical reading. In Rabe-
lais, Melville would have read the description of the loadstones which open 
the gates to the temple of the holy bottle. Engraven on the loadstone on the 
right side are the words: "Fate leads the willing, and the unwilling draws. If 
Cut into the left loadstone is: "ALL THINGS TEND TO THEIl END • .,2 Speaking of 
men's actions, Montaigne says that it is "the gods ••• themselves that put 
them [men] in the way and mind to do them • .,3 In the "Apology, II Montaigne 
quotes from Manilius: 
One mad in love may cross the raging main, 
To level lofty Ilium with the plain; 
Another's fate inclines him more by far 
To study laws and statutes for the bar. 
Sons kill their fathers, fathers kill their sons, 
And one arm!d brother 'gainst another runs. 
This war's not their's, but fate's, that spurs them on 
To shed the blood which, shed, they must bemoan; 
And I ascribe it to the will of fat% 
That on this theme I now expatiate. 
Further, Melville's stress on the predominance of fate is a logical 
corollary to his conception of reality as possible dream or illusion. In the 
1 Pierre, Bk. XXV, chap. iii, p. 472. 
2 Rabelais, IV, Bk. V, chap. xxxvii, 249. 
~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 240. 
4 ~., pp. 205-206. 
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preceding chapter, a line from Auden was quoted concerning the hero who "is 
1 
as purely passive as the I in dreams"; this passivity, this sense of being 
maneuvered and controlled rather than of being "in control" strengthens the 
sense of being fated rather than of being in possession of free will. 
In Mardi, Vee-Vee, the little bugler, falls from the shoulders of a 
paddler and nearly breaks his arm. Babbalanja reasons: 
Minus human inducement from without, and minus volition from within, Vee-
Vee has met with an accident which has almost maimed him for life. • • • 
Are not all mortals exposed to similar, nay, worse calamities, ineffably 
unavoidable 12 
The incident leads to a discussion of fatalism. Babbalanja defines "Fatalism" 
as that which "presumes express and irrevocable edicts of heaven concerning 
particular events.,,3 Babbalanja argues that if events prophesied of nations 
have irrevocably come to pass, this fact bespeaks foreordination, and, moving 
from the social aggregate to the individual, he likewise argues: "Wherefore 
our own future is foreknown and foreordained. ,,4 The srgument continues and 
reasons that even as these nations were given previous knowledge of the forth-
coming events and could not forestall them, so neither can man. 
Mohi the historian responds to Babbalanja's argument: "This whole 
discourse seems to have grown out of the subject of Necessity and Free Will. 
Now, when a boy, I recollect hearing a sage say that these things were 
1 Poe, Selected Prose and Poetry, p. vii. 
~ardi, II, chap. xxxi, 120-121. 
3 
.lli.!!., 121. 
4 
.lli.!!., 123. 
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1 
reconcilable." This remark sparks in Babba1anja the following anecdote of 
King Normo and his fool, significantly named Willi: 
Now, though Willi ever obeyed his lord, by the very instinct of his 
servitude, he flattered himself that he was free; and this conceit it was 
that made the fool so entertaining to the king. One day, said Normo to 
his foo1,-"Co, Willi, to yonder tree, and wait there till 1 come. tt "Your 
majesty, I will," said Willi, bowing beneath his jingling bells; "but I 
presume your majesty has no objections to my walking on my hands:--I am 
free, I hope." "Perfectly," said Normo, "hands or feet, it's all the 
same to me; only do my bidding." "I thought as much, tf said tU1li; so. 
swinging his limber legs into the air, Willi, thumb after thumb, essayed 
progression. But soon, his bottled blood so rushed downward through his 
neck, that he was fain to turn a somerset and regain his feet. Said he, 
"Though I am free to do it, it's not so easy turning digits into toes; 
I'll walk, by gadl which is my other option. tI So he went straight forward, 
and did King Normo's bidding in the natural way.2 
It may be that Melville, through Babba1anja's anecdote, is leaving a bare 
vestige of option working within necessity, but it may also be that, given 
Melville's persistent emphasis on fate, the passage is to be read as an anec-
dote supporting the view of necessity and demonstrating that the man who 
thinks himself free is, like Willi, a fool. To hazard a contradiction, the 
fact that Willi is, as it were, necessarily forced to choose to proceed in 
the "natural way," because of the physical eontingency of the blood rushing 
to his head, may point ahead to Babbalanja's eonsiderations on man as being 
:3 
necessitated through the very structure of his nature. 
Mohi's point is not forgotten, however, and Melville eontinued to 
question the reeonei1iation of fate and freedom; even when he does not en-
tire1y rule out the possibility of free will, it is seen, if not as effeetua11y 
1 
.!.!?!9... 127. 
2Ibid • 
3Ibid., ehap. xxxix, 155-158. 
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nil, as barely minimal at best and as subservient to and, as it were, playing 
into the hands of fate or necessity. In chapter xlvii of Moby-Dick, "The 
Mat-Maker," Melville gives a concise presentation of fate and free will, 
reconciling them with each other and with indifference in a tour de force on 
the metaphor of a 100m that would be worthy of the metaphysieal poets. The 
presentation is set in a dream atmosphere: at the beginning of the chapter 
Ishmael describes the strange "dreaminess" that reigns "allover the ship and 
allover the sea. ltl A minimal freedom is seen working within necessity_ In 
the weaving of the mat on the "Loom of Time," the "unalterable," "straight," 
2 
"fixed threads of the warp" represent fate or necessity. Ishmael, in an 
action representing free will, weaves in the woof, but only as the "unchang-
3 ing" vibration of the warp admits these threads to interblend. On an actual 
loom, a movable bar, called a batten, strikes home the threads of a woof, i.e., 
slides them snuggly into place. Melville's batten is Queequeg's oaken sword, 
4 
which "drove home every yarn. 1I Idly looking off, Queequeg, with his "impul-
sive," tfindifferent" sword, plays god "carelessly and unthinkingly" hitting 
the woof slantingly, or crookedly, or strongly, or weakly.5 This indifferent 
sword "finally shapes and fashions both warp and woof,,6_-both fate and free 
will. It is further maintained that the "indifferent sword must be 
~obY-Dick, I, chap. xlvii, 269. 
2Ibid., 269-270. 
3 !!?!,g,., 269. 
4Ibid• 
5 
.!!!!.!! •• 269-270. 
6 ~., 270. 
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chance. ,,1 
Melville offers a concluding summary: 
The straight warp of necessity, not to be swerved from its ultimate course 
--its very alternating vibration, indeed, only tending to that; free will 
still free to ply her shuttle between given threads; and chance, though 
restrained in its play within the right lines of necessity, and sideways 
in its motions directed by free will, though thus prescribed to by both'2 
chance by turns rules either, and has the last featuring blow at events. 
Ishmael asserts: "Ay, chance, free will, and necessity-no wise incompatible 
--all interweavingly working togE>ther."3 Melville concludes, however, by 
giving even greater precedence to Fate in the heavily fated tragedy of Moby-
~: the "ball of free will,,4 drops from Ishmael's hand, and, as he des-
cribes the Indian Tashtego standing nloft in the cross-trees and crying out for 
whales, his terms recall Babbalanja's discussion of "prophets," "seers," and 
"Fatalism" in Mardi: "You would have thought him some prophet or seer behold-
ing the shadows of Fate, and by those wild cries announcing their coming. ItS 
The idea of free will working within or playing into the hands of fate, 
1 !h!!.. Melville's thought apprOXimates Hume's: "A perfect and total 
indifference is essential to chance" (Hume, It 171). Melville's alignment of 
indifference with chance is suggested in "Timoleon," cited, in part, in the 
preceding section. Timoleon addresses his "quarrel" to the gods and, in 
language that is reminiscent of the stone imagery of Pierre, challenges them 
on their indifference: 
Your marbles in the temple stand--
Yourselves as stony and invoked in vain? 
(Collected Poems, p. 214). 
To the question of Providence or Chance presiding in the events of Timoleon's 
life, the terms of the poem tend to lean heavily toward Chance. 
2!lli.. 
lIbido 
4Ibid• 
5 ~., 270-271. Compare with Mardi, II, chap. xxxi. 121-124. 
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weaving and "interblendingft :with the "given threads" of necessity, l se_s, in 
a certain senae, exemplified in the person of Allab. Allab' s purpose to dis-
_ .. ber his disa .. berer is, finally, unsuccessful, but his attempt to .. sail 
Moby Dick is a will act: "I've willed; and what I've willed, I'll doJ,,2 Yet, 
even as he pursues his own "determinate, uusurrenderable wilfulness,,,3 he is 
4 fulfilling the part of "the Fates' lieutenant." It lIay be argued that Mel-
ville is showing that, in the end, the whole business just resolves to fatalism 
anyway. But there is evidence that something more cClllplex is occurring. Kel-
ville may be endeavoring to reconcile two disparate views, both of which be 
needs in tbe epic struggle of Moby-Dick. Like Sbakespeare's use, in Otbello. 
of two different time sequences, whicb, tbougb inconsistent with each otber, 
add to the effectiveness of tbe draaa, so, too, does Melville, consciously or 
unconsciously, sea to allow two inconsistent views, one of fate and one of 
free will, which add to tbe draaatic tension and impact of the novel: first, 
Allab's "quarrel witb God" (to borrow Thompson IS pbrase) largely owes to tbe 
fact that God or UPate is the bandspike" wbich turns .an around in this world;5 
Abab reasons that it i8 God who does the "thinking" and "living" in him, like 
a "cozening, ••• cruel, remorseless emperor .... aking him do what he would not 
dare do in hie "own proper, natural heart. ,,6 On the other hand, Allab is free 
1 llli,., 269-270. 
2 llli,., chap. xuvii, 210. 
3 ~., chap. xxviii, 154. 
4 llli,., II, chap. cxxxiv, 352. 
5 !ill., chap. exuii, 330. 
6Ibid• 
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to fight. A robust element of free will seems to be present in the "defiance" 
1 
exhibited by both Ahab and Pierre: both possess an "unsurrenderable wilful-
ness." The impression comes through that Ahab is destroyed but not conquered, 
Pierre crushed but unyielding. Ahab, like the great burnt pine mentioned in 
2 Clarel, remains IIGigantic--killed, not overthrown." Even after Ahab declares 
that all is "immutably decreed\! and he is the "Fates' lieutenant," he announces 
to the crew that it is ItAhab's hawser [that] tows his purpose yet.,,3 Mel-
ville uses the concept of fate to offer a motive of defiance, and the concept 
of freedom for the quality of defiance, a freedom that allows the old man to 
remain, in spirit, the indomitable hero that he is. 
In Pierre, fate and free will are no longer spoken of as interblending 
or weaving together, but as of being in debate. It is said that Pierre was 
not arguing Fixed Fate and Free Will; rather, "Fixed Fate and Free Will were 
arguing him, and Fixed Fate got the better in the debate.,,4 Some inconsistency 
5 
remains, however, for even as Pierre becomes the "fool of Fate," he remains 
6 
"immovable" and wilfully defiant. 
In Clarel, it is, again, the predominance of fate that is stressed in 
Rolfe's story of a mariner, the master of a ship, whose night-watch conversattD 
1 ~., chap. cxix, 281 and Pierre, Bk. XXVI, chap. vi, p. 502. 
2 C1are1, Pt. II, canto xvi, 11. 1-4. 
3 Moby-Dick, II, chap. cxxxiv, 352. 
4 Pierre, Bk. XI, chap. i, p. 254. 
5 Ibid., Bk. XXVI, chap. iv, p. 499. 
6 ~., chap. vi, p. 502. 
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with a aubaltern are described: 
The master ever spurned at fate, 
Calvin'a or Zeno's. Always still 
Man-like he stood by man's free will 
And power to effect each thing he would, 
Did reason but pronounce it good. 
The subaltern held in humble way 
That still heaven's overrulings sway 
Will and event. 1 
When the master is the sole survivor from an ensuing wreck, he declares, "I 
willed it.,,2 But on his next venture "a whale I Of purpose aiming, stove the 
b ,,3 ow. After this event, reminiscent of the action of Moby Dick, the mariner 
is a marked man: Jonah-like, he is thought to be 11l-omened and cannot secure 
a place on another ship. He becomes a night patrolman on the quay, works in 
every kind of weather and is grateful for a crust. No longer "Man-11ke," he 
meekly puts his trust in Calvin's deterministic creed: the mariner 
Praised heaven, and said that God was good, 
And his calamity but just.4 
Ironically, Melville's point is that it is unjust; he resents the .fact that 
man must feel compelled to recognize the preponderance of fate and that "God" 
will not allow the new American religion of individualism--of an actively 
willed self-reliance spiritually subsidized by the deity. 
Melville seriously considered the question of man's being fated in 
and by his individual nature, his particular metaphysical make-up. In Mardi, 
1 Clarel, Pt. It canto xxxvii, 11. 30-37. 
2 Ibid., 1. 74. 
3 ~., 11. 83-84. 
4 ~., 11. 104-105. 
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Babbalanja declares that men "are governed by their very natures" and are 
1 
saints or sinners according as they are Itconstitutionally" constructed. 
Professors Hayford and Sealts have treated this question in the "Notes & 
Commentary" section of their edition of Billy Budd and have brought together 
2 the following examples. In addition to the above example from Mardi, which 
Hayford and Sealts also include, they mention, from White Jacket, the ship 
Neversink's master-at-arms, Bland, who is by nature nan organic and irreclaim-
able scoundrel,,;3 in his copy of Arnold's Essays in Criticism Melville wrote 
that men are "influenced ••• by the very fibre of the flesh, & chalk of the 
bones. 4 We are what we are made"; Mortmain, in Clarel, considers whether 
human wickedness may lie 
Nearer the core than man can go 
Or Science get--nearer the slime 
Of nature's rudiments and lime 
In chyle before the bone. Thee, thee, 
In thee the filmy cell is spun--
The mould thou art of what men be: 
Events are all in thee begun--
By thee, through thee,5 
Clagg art , in Billy Budd, is said to be possessed of "an evil nature ••• born 
wi th him and innate, in short 'a depravity according to nature. ",6 In such a 
view as the foregoing, if strictly adhered to, moral accountability, sin, 
~ardi, II, chap. xxxix, 156. 
2Billy Budd, ed. Hayford-Sealts, pp. [162-163], note for leaf 130. 
3White Jacket, chap. xliv, p. 234. 
4 Sealts, No. 17. 
5 Clarel, Pt. II, canto xxxvi, 11. 96-103. 
6 Billy Budd, ed. Hayford-Sealts, p. [76], leaf 134. 
207 
virtue and vice, and consequent retributive justice become, in effect, mean-
ingless, although antecedent Justice may come under serious attack. 
Melville and the sense of sin 
Melville's attitude toward sin in the sense of a culpable wrong action 
against right reason (and ultimately against God, whose divine law is mani-
I fested through right reason), not just as wrong action performed unwittingly, 
is particularly difficult of precise definition. The question turns partly on 
Melville's view of free will, since, for a man to be culpable or guilty of 
sin, he must possess a power rendering him responsible for the sinful action. 
Inversely, a sense of personal responsibility might point to a concept of 
free wilL It may be objected that free will, as Melville sees it, is so 
negligible as to be effectually nonexistent--even as it plays into the plans, 
or weaves into the warp, of fate. Melville's notion of merit, however, would 
seem to be incompatible with a rigid view of fate in which man, pawn-like, 
would not be capable of individually earned merit: this may be an incompati-
bility, however, which Simply exists, reasonable or not. 
There is limited and questionable evidence of a possible sense of sin. 
In Mardi, Taji kills Aleema, Yillah's priest-custodian. Early descriptions of 
the act extenuate the element of guilt: Taji does not realize what he is 
2 doing--"Ere I knew it, my cutlass made a quick lunge," and neither are his 
I This concept of sin is, again, the traditional, Christian one: 
divine law manifested through right reason is natural law; therefore, to act 
contrary to right reason is to act contrary to natural law and the divine law 
which it manifests. As evidenced in Montai8ne, the sceptic challen.ges the 
notion of "right reason" and natural law. 
2 Mardi, I, chap. xli, 154. 
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motives clearly defined: 
Remorse smote me hard; and like lightning I asked myself, whether the 
death-deed I had done was aprung of a virtuous motive, the rescuing a 
captive from thrall; or whether beneath that pretence, I had engaged in 
this fatal affray for aome other, and selfish purpose; the companionship 
of a beautiful maid. l 
Later, however, a sense of wrong is evident. Taji says of his soul: 
At bottom guilt brooded. Sifted out, my motives to this enterprise justi-
fied not the mad deed, which, in a moment of rage, I had done: though, 
those motives had been covered with a gracious ~retence; concealing my-
self from myself. But I beat down the thought. 
In the end, the matter is left with a question mark; Taji asks, as he con-
templates the stars: "But how your mild effulgence stings the boding heart. 
Na I a murderer, stars?") Possible culpability is, however, lessened even 
more when, later in the novel, Babbalanja challenges the presence of responsi-
bility in the fated man. 4 
There ia a sense of sin in Pierre's observation that "his father must 
have becOlle insane from a sin-grief irreparable. ,,5 The quotation, again, 
offers only tenuous evidence, since the "father" image in Pierre merges into 
that of the deity, and the epithet of "insane" may not be completely implau-
sible as applied to the deity, since Melville questioned the source of an un-
reasonable world. 
In Clarel, it is Mortmain who considers that events are begun in the 
1 n.!.!t. , chap. xlii, 157. 
2 Ibid. , chap. xliv, 162. 
3 
.lli!t. , chap. lviii, 208 • 
4 
.lli!t. , II, chap. XXXi, 124. 
.5 Pierre, Bk. XXI, chap. ii, p. 400. 
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very "mould" of man,l but it is also Mortmain who questions the "sins refined" 
of the malefactors who brought down destruction upon the cities of the plain. 
He follows the traditional view, exemplified in Dante's Infemo,2 that sins 
of the spirit are more deadly than sins of the flesb. The ghosts of the male-
factors seem to be crying out, "Conjuring yet to spare, but spare!,·3 Mort-
main's answering reflections are accusatory, seemingly denoting responsibility: 
Fie, fie, that didst in formal will 
Plot piously the posthumous snare.4 
Melville's use of "fot'llal" in the above quotation is questionable: if Melville 
means, by "fot'llal," that an action is done according to the nature of the 
inner fot'll or essence of a thing, it may be wondered if he has in mind a sort 
of fata1is. by the metaphysical make-up of a person's inner nature, a point 
discussed in the preceding section. The accusatorial tone of the passage, 
however, seems incongruous with such a view. There is a possibility that 
Melville used "fot'lla!" in the sense of "done in due form, ceremonial," i.e., 
an action done as something carefully planned and voluntarily performed with 
deliberation: the ghosts are said to have plotted their own posthumous snare. 
asks: 
Two spirits debate over Mortmain's deliberations. The first spirit 
1 
Be it far from me to impute a sin, 
But may a sinless nature win 
Those deeps he knows'S 
Clare1, Pt. II, canto xxxvi, 1. 101. 
~elvi1le owned Dante's work--see Sea1ts, No. 174. 
3C1arel, Pt. II, canto xxxvi, 1. 58. 
4 ~., 11. 59-60. 
S Ibid., 11. 121-123. 
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The second spirit demurs: 
Sin shuns that way; 
Sin acts the sin, but flees the thought 1 
That sweep a the abyss that sin has wrought. 
2 Mortmain's heart is declared to be innocent and true. The necessity for the 
sinner to "flee the thought" points back to the guilt-ridden Taji's admission: 
"But I beat down the thought. tI 
The sense of ain in Melville's works is, however, more often blended 
with hia sense of fatalism and neeessity. Melville, reinforced by his read-
iugs in scepticism, is apparently reacting against the seeming inanity of the 
Calvinist paradox in which God ordains man's nature. state, and actions, but 
in which, nevertheless. man is held responsible for God'. fortuity. Speaking 
of men's actions, Montaigne saya that it is "the goda ••• themselves that 
put them [men] in the way and mind to do them.,,3 By making God the author of 
sin, He becomes guilty of the sin: this thought is many ways rephrased in 
Bayle, who uses it to argue, at least ostensibly, for two principles, one good 
and one evil. Hume's argument for necessity is as follows: 
The ultimate Author of all our volitions is the Creator of the world, who 
first bestowed motion on this immen8e machine, and placed all beings in 
that particular position, whence every subsequent event, by an inevitable 
nece8sity, must result. 4 
Hume continues from this hypothesis to question the nature of the "ultimate 
Author" and the source of moral evil: 
1 ~.t 11. 123-125. 
2 ~., 1. 126. 
~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 240. 
4 Hume, IV, 116. 
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Human actions, therefore, either can have no moral turpitude at all, as 
proceeding from so good a cause; or if they have any turpitude, they must 
involve our Creator in the same guilt, while he is acknowledged to be 
their ultimate cause and author. l 
Because of his greater tendency toward a fatalistic view, Melville, 
too, was inclined to impute guilt where, in such a view, it ultimately re-
sides. Melville had fairly well formed the core of his argument in Mardi. 
After arguing, with an eye on Old Testament history, that prophecies made 
about certain nations have come to pass, he has Babbalanja reason: "Now, if 
things foreordained concerning nations have in times past been revealed to 
them previous to their taking place, then something similar may be presumable 
concerning individual men now living. tt2 Babbalanja asks if a foreordained 
event, namely suicide, in some way supernaturally revealed to him could by 
any means be avoided and concludes: 
If not possible, then that suicide would not be mine, but Oro's [God's). 
And, by consequence, not only that act, but all my acts, are Oro's. In 
sum, • • • he who believes that in times past, prophets have prophesied, 
and their prophecies have been fulfilled; when put to it, inevitably must 
allow that every man now living is an irresponsible being. 3 
In Moby-Dick, Ahab, who is pondering the question of fate, addresses 
Starbuck: 
Look I see yon albicorel who put it into him to chase and fang that 
flying-fish? Where do murderers gOt man? Who's to doom, when the 
judge himself is dragged to the bar14 
Melville again reasons, through Ahab's analogy of the ~lbicore, that beings 
lIbido 
~ardi, II, chap. xxxi, 123. 
3 
.Th!!!., 124. 
4 Moby-Dick, II, chap. xxxii, 330. 
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act according as they are constituted and asks how the judge (the final judge) 
can doom. a murderer when he is guilty for making hilll one. The argument point. 
back to Babbalanja'. like argument in Mardi: 
Tell a good man that he i. free to ca.ait murder.--will he murder? 
Tell a murderer that at the peril of hi. soul he indulge. in murderous 
thoughts,--will that make him a saint?l 
Media warns Babbalanja that he is "on the verge" of relieving man of ttmoral 
2 
accountability" with his theory. Pierre, tempted to commit incest, declares: 
"Let the lode look after their own cClllbustibles. If they have put powder-
casks in me-let th_ look to itl,,3 Melville's uae of the victita, his por-
trayal, for __ ple, of two leading protagonists, Allah and Pierre-Kneeladus. 
as mutilated, truncated, ultimately lIIpotent individuals, shows man as a 
victim more sinned against than ainning. 
Traditional pre-Renaissance and also sCllle versions of contemporary 
Scholastic philosophy 4 baaes ethics, ult1mately, on the Divine Law: law is 
an ordinance of reason, and, because the divine reason is eternal, its ordi-
nances are etemal1m,. The eternal law lIlay be seen in the objective order 
of essences. Government or direction to an end is the effect of law. 
Providence or the plan of government for the common good of the whole world 
~ardi, II, chap. xxxix, 158. 
2Ibid• 
3PieII!, Bk. XIX, chap. ii, p. 381. 
4 The following brief schema is based on the medieval philosopher-
theololian Aquinas' a "Treatise on Law. tt Summa Theololica, Ia IIae, Qq. 90-
108, particularly 90-97, and on Paul J. Glenn, A Tour of the Summa (St. 
Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1960), pp. 166-171. 
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1s in the mind of God. God is the perfect Govemor. The divine law directs 
all things to their proper ends, and all movements in the universe are subject 
to the etema1 law working through divine providence and divine lovernment, 
but man is directed in a special way since he is rational and can become 
aware of the order of things and his own purpose for existing, his own proper 
end. Eternal law manifest to lIan through right reason is natural law: 
natural law is promulgated through the growth and deve1op1lent of rilht reason. 
Eteraa1 law manifest to this individual lIan through his particular reason is 
his natural law or ethical criterion. Although the exact line of natural law 
cannot be drawn, its basic principles are evident--the first moral principle 
is "Do good, avoid evil. II Human, t_pora1, or positive.!!!!. is fomed when 
human reason interprets and applies natural law in particular eases. Positive 
law declares natural law but does not establish it. HUlian laws are fomed to 
control differences in individuala (e.g., to restrain evil lien) and to;'supple-
ment the natural law. Because just hUlllan laws derive, through the natural law, 
from the eternal law, they bind a man in conscience. linally, because the 
mind's grasp of the precepts of the natural law is not dependable beyond first 
CGllllon principles, revelation, i.e., divine revealed law, is necessary to 
insure against human deficiency. 
Sceptical objections to the foregoing traditional view are manifold. 
lirst, there mayor may not be a divine law, and, if there is such a law, it 
aight not be reasonable. Secondly, how can the divine law be seen in the 
nature of objective reality when this reality may not even exist. In view 
of the physical and moral evil in the world, is there a divine providence? 
Again, the fallibility of reason would be appealed to: 1f reason 1s as veak 
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and variable as sceptics claim it is, how much confidence can be placed in an 
eternal law manifested through that reason? Man is supposed to do good and 
avoid evil, but is it really possible to clearly discern what is good, and 
what is evil? If eternal law and reason and, therefore, natural law remain 
in such a questionable state, how sound is human positive law that is fomed 
around particulars and circumstances of greater relativity? How can revela-
tion insure against human deficiency when revelation itself is subject to 
contrary interpretation? 
Among sceptical sources with which Melville was familiar, Rabelais 
and Montaigne, in particular, soundly berate the law. A generous portion of 
Rabelais's satire is directed against law, lawyers, and justice, and the ele-
I 
ment of sc,pticism is in evidence. Book III, chapter xxxix is entitled "HOW 
PANTAGRUEL WAS PRESENT AT mE TRIAL OF JUDGE BRIDLEGOOSE, WHO DECIDED CAUSES 
AND CONTROVERSIES IN LAW BY THE CHANCE AND FORTUNE OF THE DICE." Most legal 
cases are thought to be too tlambiguous, intricate, abstruse, perplexed, and 
2 
obscure." Any judgment turns out to be all right because sCllle kind of 
reason can be argued on either side: the uncertainty of judicial judgments 
is everywhere attested to. 
Montaigne, who frequently commented on the capricious nature of 
ethical codes, was also quick to see the corresponding imperfection of law: 
Since the Ethic laws, that concern the particular duty of every one in 
himself, are so hard to be taught and observed, as we see they are, 'tis 
no wonder if those which govern so many particular men are much more so. 
Do but consider the form of this justice that governs us; 'tis a true 
1 See, e.g., Rabelais, III, Bk. III, chaps. xxxix-xliii. 
2 Ibid., chap. xliii, 89. 
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testimony of human weakness, so full is it of error and contradictionl l 
If one cannot find a criterion for ethics, much less can one expect to find 
one for law. Montaigne, reacting as usual to traditional concepts, challenges 
the concept of a natural law foundation for human or positive law; the in-
constancy of reason is a prime factor in his argument: 
But they are pleasant, when, to give some certainty to the laws, they say 
that there are some firm, perpetual, and immovable, which they call 
natural, that are imprinted in human kind by the condition of their own 
proper being; and of these some reckon three, some four, some more, some 
less: a sign that is a mark as doubtful as the rest •••• 
It is credible that there are natural laws for us, as we see them in 
other creatures; but they are lost in us, this fine human reason every 
where so insinuating itself to govern and command, as to shuffle and con-
found the face of things, according to its own vanity and inconstancy.2 
On the foundation of the justice of laws, Montaigne makes reference 
to Protagoras and Aristo, who "gave no other essence to the justice of laws 
than the authority and opinion of the legislator."l Montaigne also sees the 
authority of law supported only by a mystique: 
Now the laws keep up their credit, not because they are just, but be-
cause they are laws; that is the mystic foundation of their authority; 
they have no other of any service. They are often made by fools; more 
often by men that, out of hatred to equality, fail in equity; but always 
by men who are vain and irresolute authors. There is nothing so much, 
nor so grossly, nor so ordinarily faulty, as the laws. 4 
Montaigne further emphasizes the element of relativity in law as in 
ethics (which he sees primarily as custom): 
Truth ought to have a like and universal visage: if man could know equity 
and justice that had a body and a true being, he would not fetter it to 
~onta1gne, Bk. III, chap. xiii, p. 496. 
2 ~., Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 271. 
3Ibid • 
4 Ibid., Bk. III, chap. xiii, p. 497. 
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the conditions of this country or that; it would not be from the whimsies 
of the Persians or Indians that virtue would receive its form. There i. 
nothing more subject to perpetual agitation than the laws •••• There is 
not any thing wherein the world is so various as in laws and customs. l 
In his later essay entitled "Of Experience," Montaigne writes of law that 
"there is as much liberty and stretch in the interpretation of laws, as in 
their fashion.,,2 
In ~. Melville's comic presentation of the law in the farcical en-
counters between Wilson and the seamen after the Lucy ~ revolt suggest that 
hi. mind was probably well attuned and susceptible to such sceptical treat-
ments of the law as he was soon to meet in Rabe1ais and Montaigne. In Mardi. 
when a group of islanders petition Media, who is sitting in judgment, and 
ask for a jury of twelve men to decide alleged offenses, Media retorts in a 
sceptical vein: "If upon a thing dubious, there be little unanimity in the 
conflicting opinions of one man's mind, how expect it in the uproar of twelve 
puzzled brains?,,3 Melville also satirizes the lawyers of isle of Minda who 
are masters of extortion rather than justice. 4 
In Moby-Dick, Melville treats the vagrancy of law in his chapter called 
"Fast-Fish and Loose-Fish,,:5 justice, so-called, becomes aligned with the 
power of possession. It is also in Moby-Dick that Melville most noticeably 
1 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. xii, pp. 270-271. 
2 Ibid., Bk. III, chap. xiii, p. 493. 
~ardi, I, chap. lx, 215. 
4 Ibid., II, chap. xl. 
5Moby-Dick, II, chap. lxxxix. 
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b i 1 h h " i k f h ,,1 eg ns to p oug up to t e pr mary roc 0 t e matter, i.e., to question 
the very foundation of law, of justice. If human, temporal, or positive law 
derives through natural law from divine or eternal law, Melville questions 
the nature of this law by questioning the nature of the Lawgiver. Although 
the passage has been cited which questions the guilt of a murderer "when the 
judge himself is dragged to the bar,,,2 it is again relevant because of its 
legal phrasing; the question is, in fact, a logical consequent of the thesis 
of fatalism or determinism. The idea of a governing benevolent providence 
with God Himself as the Supreme Governor is questioned by Stubb, who, like 
Timoleon, sees this governing power as "compromised in wrong": 
Damn the devil, Flask; do you suppose I'm afraid of the devil? Who's 
afraid of him except the old governor who daren't catch him and put him 
in double-darbies, as he deserves, but let's him go about kidnapping 
people; ay,and signed a bond with him, that all the people the devil 
kidnapped, he'd roast for him? There's a governor!3 
Justice, or--properly--injustice, is a major theme of Israel Potter. 
Israel works for two hundred acres of land in New Hampshire, but his employer 
. 4 
proved "false to his contract." Israel's sweetheart--the "dear, false girl" 
5 
--becomes another's. He does not receive the "compensation" for his dangerous 
mission to France: "The Brentford gentleman had flattered him with the pros-
pect of receiving something very handsome for his services 8S courier. That 
1 !ill. t 146. 
2 
.!ill. , chap. cxxxU, 330 • 
3 Ibid. , chap. lxxiii, 58. 
4 Israel Potter, chap. U, p. 9. 
5 
..!l?!!. , p. 12. 
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1 hope was no more." Unlike Paul Jones, Israel receives no glory, no swords 
or medals for his efforts: 2 "His scars proved his only medals." Finally, in 
old age, Israel '~as repulsed in efforts after a pension by certain caprices 
of law.") In the "Dedication" to Israel Potter, Melville somewhat snidely 
intimates that he is unable to conclude Israel's tale with poetical justice 
because of Providential injustice: 
I forebore anywhere to mitigate the hard fortunes of my hero; and parti-
cularly toward the end, though sorely tempted, durst not substitute for 
the allotment of Providence any artistic recompense of poetical justice; 
so that no one can complain of the gloom of my closing chapters more 
profoundly than myself.4 
Although Melville recognizes the fallibility and relativity of human, positive 
law--his "caprices of law"--his remarks on the "allotment of Providence" show 
that his thrust at inequity goes much deeper. 
In "Bartleby the Scrivener," another image joins the phalanx of Mel-
ville's terms and imagea for the impasse of encounter, for the cold, solid, 
and unresponsive--terms and images such as "indifferent," "impersonal," 
"stolidity," "iceberg,1f "stone," "marble," "dead walls." The additional image, 
"Tombs," is closely related in suggestiveness. The entire short story is, in 
fact, intricately connected and interwoven with the word "dead" and its imp11-
cations. 
The story, whatever its other implications, is concerned with justice 
and law: Bartleby is a law-copyist working for a lawyer, and the setting is 
1 ill!. , chap. xiii, p. 110. 
2 
.!!M. , chap • xxvii, p. 225. 
3Ibid • 
4 Ibid. , p. vi. 
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a law-office and the Halls of Justice. That Melville again goes beyond the 
proximate expression of law to test its foundation is first intimated by the 
lawyer-narrator's foreshadowing remark that he knew very little of Bartleby 
beyond what he saw with his own eyes "except, indeed, one vague report, which 
will appear in the seque1. tll In the sequel, the vague report is revealed to 
be that Bartleby had worked in the Dead Letter Office where he had seen man's 
2 
missives of love, pardon, and hope come to nothing. Against this larger back-
ground of injustice, Bartleby's vision of futility in the endless copying of 
foundationless and meaningless laws is comprehensible as are, also, his "dead-
wall" reveries3 in the law-office on "Wall Street"4 with its commanding view 
5 
of two walls. In his search for a criterion of conduct, for an objectively 
founded and benign system of justice and law, man, in his universal stymie, is 
again balked by the unresponsive walls of apparent inSignificance. When 
Bartleby himself becomes the subject of justice, he is conveyed to the "Halls 
of Justice," significantly named "the Tombs. ,,6 He is found it, a yard sur-
rounded with walls so thick that they "kept off all sounds behind them.,,7 
Bartleby finally dies "at the base of the wall, . . • his head touching the 
1 19. The Piazza Tales, p. 
2 Ibid. , p. 65. 
3 
.!ill. , pp. 41, 45, 53 • 
4 20. .!lli. , p. 
5 21. Ibid. , p. 
6 61. !!?!S. , p. 
7 64. Ibid. , p. 
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cold stones"l of lithe Tombs" or the "Halls of Justice." 
"Bartleby" first appeared in the latter part of 1853. Among the many 
incursions into the question of justice in The Confidence-Man, published in 
1857, the image of the "Tombs" again appears in the account of "A Soldier of 
Fortune. ,,2 The soldier, when asked at what battle he had been crippled--
3 
"Resaca de la Ps.lma?"--ans\1ers, "Resaca de la Tombs," thereby giving the 
credit for his lameness to the Halls of Justice. The soldier explains that, 
in a case of law, he, the innocent party, had been imprisoned in a wet, damp 
cell of the "Tombs," while the murderer went free. The story recalls Bayle's 
co~nterargument to the reasoning which sees Adam's fall and the subsequent 
sins of man as permitted in order to give occasion for God's justice and mercy 
--Bayle replies: 
This is to compare the Deity to a Father who should suffer his children 
to break their legs on purpose to show to all the City his great Art in 
setting their Broken Bones. 4 
~felville goes one better: his "Natural Bone-setter ft or "Happy Bone-setter," 
as the devil-god Confidence-Man calls himself,S leaves the duped Soldier of 
Fortune with his disabled legs--another of Melville's victim figures. Mel-
ville again challenges the justice of Providence or "divine" government and 
the "human government" or system of laws which is "subordinate" to the divine 
--the Confidence-Man addresses the crippled Soldier: 
lIbido 
2 The Confidence-Man, chap. xix, p. 122. 
3Ibid • 
4 Bayle, 1710 ed., IV, 2488. 
5 The Confidence-Man, chap. xix, pp. 123, 124. 
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Grant, for the lIoment, that your experiences are as you give them; in 
which case I would admit that govenua.nt lIight b. thought to have 1I0re or 
le.s to do with what .e ... und •• irabl. in thea. But it is never to be 
forgotten that human government, being subordinate to the divine. IIU.t 
ne.ds. therefore, in its degr... partake of the characteri.tics of the 
divine. That i., while in general efficacious to happin.s., the world'. 
law lIay yet, in some case., have, to the eye of reason, an un.qual op.ra-
tion. just as, in the s •• 11Ip.rfect view, sOlIe in.qualiti .... y appear 
in the op.rations of heav.n's law;l 
th.r. ta..diat.ly follow. th. Confidence~an's unctious and ironic .tateaant, 
"n.v.rth.l •••• to on. who has a right confidence, final benignity i •• in .very 
in.tance, as sur. with the on. law as the oth.r. ,,2 Th. lack of final benignity 
in human law, particularly in the concrete case of injustic. rendered the 
.oldi.r. lIakeS clear the conclusion about the "other" law. 
The r.lativity of law is al.o .vident in M.lville's later works. In 
Clarel (1876), Iolfe speaks of "laws .cribbled by law-br.aker •• ,,3 T11Ioleon 
beii.: 
If lIore than one., as annals tell, 
Through blood without compunction spilt, 
An egotist arch rule has .natched 
And st_ped the .eizure with his .abr.'. hilt, 
And, legalized by lawyer., .tood •••• 4 
A "central question" of Billy Budd (1924), as Rayford and S.alt. have not.d, 
is that of ''ailitary expediency verau. justice. ,,5 Several prominent questions 
already .een in Melville'. writing. including the que.tion of justice, are 
presant in Billy Budd. Th. capability of the Creator for .vil i •• uggest.d 
lIbid., p. 129. 
2Ibid., pp. 129-130. 
3Clar.l, Pt. II, canto xxvi. 1. 130. 
4Collect.d Poeaa, p. 209. 
SBilly Budd, .d. Hayford-Sealts. p. [28]. 
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in the consideration of "the scorpion for which the Creator alone is respon-
sible."l The idea of an indifferent deity is suggested when the "topm.en" 
are compared to ftlazy gods" who are frequently "amused with what was gOing on 
in the busy world of the deck. below."2 The question of fate and determinism. 
thread. its way through the novella. When "elected" by the boarding officer, 
"Billy made no demur. But, indeed, any demur would have been as idle as the 
protest of a goldfinch popped into a cage.,,3 Billy is "impressed" into serv-
ice. His is an "enforced enlistment. ,,4 Billy is called a "Fated boy. ,,5 
After being condemned, Billy lies between two guns, "as nipped in the vice of 
6 fate." Sometim.es Claggartfs expression showed that he "could even have loved 
Billy but for fate and ban.,,7 
Man seems to be fated not only from. without but from within (though 
the respcnaibility lies without): Melville again investigates man's indi-
vidual metaphysical m.ake-up as a determinant of his actions. Early in the 
story the narrator remarks: "The moral nature was seldom out of keeping with 
8 the physical make." Billy's endowments are presented as being constitutional 
1 leaf 142, [78] • Ibid. , p. 
2 leaf 104, [68] • Ibid. t p. 
3 leaf 12, [45]. Ibid. , p. 
4 Ibid. , leaf 31, p. [49]. 
5 leaf 226, [99]. Ibid •• p. 
6 leaf 303, [l19} • .!!!.!!. , p. 
1 !lli. , leaf 118, p. [88]. 
8 
.!!!.!!. , leaf 9, p. [44]. 
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or according to nature. Billy has no "sinister dexterity •••• To deal in 
double meanings and insinuations of any sort was quite foreign to his nature,,;l 
there is no "conceit or vanity in his c01lposition,,;2 further, "by his original 
constitution aided by the cooperating influences of his lot, Billy in many 
respects was • • • much such perhaps as Adam presumably might have been ere 
3 the urbane Serpent wriggled haself into his company"; Billy is "essentially 
4 5 honest" and his nature is marked by "innocence." Claggart t too, ~ as he 
6 predeterminately!!t. Claggart's is a "depravity according to nature." Clag-
gart has "no power to annul the elemental evil in han: the narrator asks 
what recourse is left to a nature like Claggart's, but "like the scorpion for 
which the Creator alone is responsible, [to] act out to the end the part 
allotted it.,,7 That Melville probably sees Vere under a similar consideration 
of fixed nature is revealed in such sentences as the following: "But con-
siderateness in such matters is not easy to natures constituted like Captain 
Vere's.,,8 
Further, Melville's image of a man-of-war world seems to be conjoined 
with his idea of fate: Billy is transferred from the merchantman Rights-of-
1 leaf 30, [49]. Underlining added. Ibid. t p. 
2 leaf 35. [SO]. Underlining added. Ibid. t p. 
3 leaf 44. [52]. Underlining added. .!!!.M. , p. 
4 leaf 220, (98]. Underlining added. Ibid •• p. 
5 leaf 111, [70]. Ibid. , p. 
6 leaf 130, [75]. Ibid., p. 
7 leaf 142, [78] • ~.t p. 
8 ~., leaf 87, p. [63]. 
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!e. to a seventy-four, a warship named 8ellipotent, "Warpower," with its 
accompanying concept of sartial power and law in which man ia controlled, 
fated, rather than controlling, free. Vere aska: "But in natural justice ia 
nothing but the prisoner's overt act to be con8idered?,,1 The answer, in the 
case of natural justice which recognize8 moral accountabili~, is, of course. 
no--but, Vere claims, their allegiance is not to natural justice (that which 
man ought to have) but, in this man-of-war world (the world as Melville most 
frequently sees it), to a martial "justice" which aeema closely aligned to 
fate: Vere aaya that in receiving their cOllllll1.ssions they "ceas.d to b. 
2 
natural free agents." In place of p.rsonal respon.ibility and recognition 
of the rights of man, V.re •••• '.artial law operating through us. • •• For 
that law and the rigor of it, we are not re.pon.ible.,,3 
In a fated world--to reason in r.verse from the u.ual sequence of this 
study--man doea not, in fact, need a criterion: fat.d, he n •• ds no .tandard 
againat which to m.aaur. his nonexistant reapon.ible actions. The lack of 
clear criteriona ia evident in the judicial proceedings againat Billy, pro-
ceedings which, in a certain 8ense, are marked by uncertainty. Like Rabelaia'a 
law case., the aituation is too tI_biguous, intricate, abatruse, p.rplexed, 
and obscure. ,,4 The nub of thia _bigu1ty ia. as V.re aaya, a "mystery of 
iniquity"S which ia _bodied in the person of Clauart; the narrator, in fact, 
1 ~., leaf 267, p. [110]. 
2 ~., leaf 268, p. [110]. 
3Ibid., leaf 269, pp. [110-111]. Underlining added. 
4aabelais, III, Bk. III, chap. zliii, 89. 
58illy Budd, ed. Hayford-Sealta, leaf 259, p. [108]. 
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claims that lithe point of the present story ••• [turns] on the hidden 
1 
nature of the master-at-arms" --and since Melville, by comparing Claggart to 
the scorpion for which the Creator is responsible, questions the Creator as 
being responsible for Claggart's evil nature, he questions, because of this 
presence of evil in creation, the ultimate foundation of justice and law. If 
good and evil, including moral and legal good and evil, are in Cod indiffere~. 
then it is perhaps even more accurate to speak of nonjustice rather than of in-
justice. The immediate element of uncertainty includes the question of the 
captain's sanity: "Was he unhinged?,,2 The manner of conducting the proeeed-· 
ings is questionable and "criticized by some officers."l The members of the 
drumhead court are marked by a questionable ability to eope with the case4 and 
they are filled with "troubled indecision. tlS But the core of uncertainty lies 
in the fact that proximate law seems to have no foundation in ultimate justice. 
The transactions of the trial are marked by a singular dichotomy be-
tween morality and legality. Conventionally, as based on the same natural and 
divine law, the two should ideally be fused, but, in actual historical prac-
tice, they were becoming more and more irrelevant to each other. Law, too, 
gave strong evidence of the inroads of scepticism, and the uncertainty of 
previously unquestioned criterions turned lawmakers to the expediencies of 
pragmatism. Oliver Wendell Holmes, jurist son of Melville's physician and 
I !!!!S. , leaf ll5, pp. [76-77]. 
2 leaf 235, [102] • Ibid. , p. 
3 leaf 241, [103]. Ibid. , p. 
4 Ibid. , leaves 246-247, pp. [104-105] • 
5 !!!!S. , leaf 261, p. [109]. 
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friend the elder Oliver Wendell Holmes, wrote in his The Common Law (1881) 
that law is based on the necessities of the time, that the substance of law 
is what is "convenient. ,,1 On the conjunction of morality and legality Holmes 
writes: 
So far from its being true, as is often assumed, that the condition of 
a man's heart or conscience ought to be more considered in determining 
criminal than civil liability, it might almost be said that it 1s the 
very opposite of truth. 2 
And later: 
Law only works within the sphere of the senses. If the external phenomena, 
the manifest acts and omissions, 8l.e such as it requires, it is wholly 
indifferent to the internal phenomena of conscience. A man may have as 
bad a heart as he chooses, if his conduct is within the rules. In other 
words, the standards of the law are external standards, and, however much 
it may take moral considerations into account, it does so only for the 
purpose of drawing a line between such bodil, motions and rests as it 
permits, and such as it does not. What the law really forbids, and the 
only thing it forbids, is the act on the wrong side of the line, be that 
act blameworthy or otherwise. 3 
With an almost ruthless intensity of logicality Melville pushes a 
similar line of thinking to its conclusion in the trial scene of Billy Budd. 
Vere judges quite logically within the novel's proposed terms for the human 
situation: if man is indeed fated, any consideration of personal morality is 
superfluous. Man's motives flow from his individual nature which is predeter-
mined; therefore, how can he be responsible for his motives? Vere subsequently 
divorces legality from morality. The narrator sets the stage: 
The essential right and wrong involved in the matter, the clearer that 
1 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The COIIDIon Law, ed. Mark De Wolfe Howe 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1963), p. [5]. 
2 ~ •• p. [42]. 
3;bid., F. [~8}. 
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might be, so much the worse for the responsibility of a loyal sea commander. 
inasmuch as he was not authorized to determine the matter on that primitive 
basis. l 
Vere insists: "Quite aside from any conceivable motive, • • • a martial court 
2 
• confine its attention to the blow's consequence." As for the must • • 
"mystery of iniquity," Vere say. it is a problem for psychologic theologians, 
the court is to be concerned only with the "prisoner's deed--with that alone 
we have to do. ,,3 As in the rising element of pragmati81ll in contemporary law, 
Budd is not to be judged by his individual conscience; neither is he given his 
rights as man--that is, independent, unfated man (it is significant that Budd 
is initially removed from the ship Rights-of-Man). Only Budd's manifest act 
is to be judged. Vere says: "But for us here, acting not as casuists or 
4 
moralists, it is a case practical," and he maintains that "Budd's intent or 
non-intent is nothing to the purpose.,,5 Law becomes connected with the neces-
sities of the time and, in a broad sense, with what is, in Holmes' term, 
convenient: if Billy is given a clement sentence, "Will they [the sailors} 
not revert to the recent outbreak at the Nore?,,6 That sentence must be 
1 Billy Budd, ed. Hayford-Sealts, leaf 240, p. [103]. However Melville 
sees this "primitive" order, whether within the context of "primitivism," 
s01la Golden Age or prelapsarian state, it seems to include some notion of 
pristine justice, the rights of man (individual man, the "self") and the no-
tion of independenca--Ahab speaks of the "man born in once independent Man, 
and now ull1llanned of Man" (Hoby-Dick, II, chap. cxxv, 300). 
2 ~., leaf 256, p. [107]. 
3 leaf 259, [108]. ill.!!. , p. 
4 leaf 266, (110). Ibid., p. 
5 leaf 274, [112J. ill.!!. , p. 
6 leaf 277, [112]. ill.!!. , p. 
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avoided which might "provoke new troubles" and be "deadly to discipline."l 
To the question, "Is nothing but the prisoner'. overt act to be considered?",2 
Vere, in effect, answers "yes." 
The inexorableness of Vere's path toward Billy's destruction has the 
cauterizing power of a Swift's "Modest Proposa!." It se81lls difficult to read 
the story as any sort of test_ent of acceptance. If the "point of the pre-
sent story" tums "on the hidden nature of the master-at-at'llls, ,,3 who 18 re-
spon.ible for this nature? and who is responsible for the individual conflict 
between Budd and Clagg art arising from these conflicting natures--a particular 
conflict that concretizes the larger conflict of a whole warring world that 
would not be possible without the presence of evil. Many men like the obtuse 
puraer and surgeon argue about proximate physical laws (whether or not Billy's 
hung body should have twitched) when they would do better to question the 
ultimate metaphysical foundation of law--so Melville subtly suggests. Vere 
actually points the direction of Melville's question when he assigns the 
"mystery of iniquity" to the realm of the "theologians,·.4 Melville's earlier 
tlclerical proficients" in his superseded chapter, "Lawyers, Experts, Clergy," 
5 
a chapter he later chose to suppress in favor of dramatizing its material. 
The only character who comes near being a hero in Billy Budd is Nelson, 
and, in the heavily fated atmosphere of this story, there is, again, the 
1 
.!!?!!!. , leaves 277, 278, p • [113]. 
2 leaf 267, [110] • .!!?!!!. , p. 
3 leaf 135, [76-77] • !k!!. , pp. 
4 leaf 259, [l08J. .!!?!!!. t p. 
5 !k!!., pp. [36-37]. 
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contradictory suggestion of free will. Like Ahab, who claims to the "im-
personal" that a "personality" stands before him, Nelson, too, is a "declarer 
of his person. ,,1 In a man-of-war world Nelson is the great fighter. Nelson, 
too, like Ahab, is a victim: he is "adorned ••• for the altar and the sacri-
fice,,2_-but he is his own priest. 3 His is an "heroic personality";4 he has 
"jewelled vouchers of his ~ shining deeds,,5--Melville's selection of matter 
and rhetoric are significant: he sounds the note of the independent, free 
man capable of accountability and personally ascribable merit. Nelson is a 
man, like Allab, who is capable of standing up for the "Rights-of-Man," for 
justice, in a world that is apparently void of justice. 
To the end, Melville questioned the universe around snd within him. 
The narrator in Billy Budd claims that B111y is no "conventional hero, tI 
6 
neither is the story s "romance" --this is for real. Later in the story it 
is again claimed that this story is "a narration eSBentially having less to 
do with fable than with fact. n7 Vere says of Budd's motive: "At the Last 
Assizes it shall acquit. But how here?" 8 As we shall investigate in the next 
I leaf 65, [58] • .!ill. , p. 
2 leaf 67, [58]. Ibid. , p. 
3 leaf 66, [58]. 
.!ill- , p. 
4 leaf 72, [59]. ~-, p. 
5 leaf 67, [58] _ Underlining added • .!!!!!!- , p. 
6 leaf 48, [53] • .!ill- , p. 
7 leaf 335, [128]. ll.!,g,., p. 
8 leaf 273, [111] • .!l!.!!. , p. 
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chapter, this is precisely what Melville questions--if man, including his 
motives, is fated, how shall these motives acquit or not acquit? and, if man 
cannot expect justice in this world, what can he expect in the next? 
CHAPTER VI 
THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY AND THE RETRIBUTIVE RATIONALE 
nAnd life once over, who shall tell the rest? 
Life is, of all we know, God's best" 
Battle-Pieces. 
Melville's sceptic sources and the problem of immortality 
Melville's presiding view of ethics, his predominant fatalism, caused 
him to doubt seriously the possibility of sanct1ons, i.e., rewards and punish-
ments, in a state of immorta11ty in an eternal afterlife. Again, his thought 
closely follows that of Montaigne: Monta1gne says of lithe immorta11ty of the 
soul" that tI, tis the part of human sc1ence that 1s treated of with the 
1 greatest doubt and reservation." For Melville, as for Monta1gne, if life 
is only illusion or dream, an unreasonable maze of unsubstantiality, an 
"ungraspab1e phantom" through which man is moved by an indifferent, fortuitous 
force outside hiBself (and is, therefore, neither responsible for virtue nor 
for vice), then rewards and punishments, retributive sanctions are meaningless. 
In a section entitled "The foundation of rewards and punishments in another 
11fe," Montaigne argues from the premise of fatalism: 
Moreover, upon what foundation of their justice can the gods take notice 
of or reward man after his death for his good and virtuous actions, since 
it was themselves that put them in the way and mind to do them? And 
why should they be offended at or punish him for wicked onces, aince 
themselves have created in him 80 frail a condition, and when, with one 
~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 257. 
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1 glance of their will, they might prevent him from falling? 
As Kontaigne's statement shows, the idea of justice, including final 
justice and recompense, is related to and consequent upon the concept of 
ethics--the possible right or wrong of freely performed human actions. Kon-
taigne thrusts even deeper and questions the nature of justice in the t'gods. It 
showing at the same time his own inclination for a secular ethics: '~ow 
[can] justice, which distributes to every one what appertains to him. a thing 
begot by the society and community of men, how is that in God?ft2 
Given his sceptical outlook on epistemology, ontology, and ethics, 
the inconsequence of a retributive rationale led Montaigne to argue, rationall~ 
against the possibility of immortality. He argues further from the premises 
of man's weakness and transienc:y--he asks: 
Can we believe that Plato • • • believed that the weak holds we are able 
to take were capable, or the force of our underatanding sufficient, to 
participate of beatitude or eternal pains?3 
Of the transiency of man, Montaigne remarks: "It were an unreasonable dis-
proportion • • • to assign an eternal recompense in consequence of so short 
a life.-4 In what is perhaps an echo of this thought, Melville has Babbalanja 
quote Bardianna (through whom some of Montaigne's thought is distilled) on the 
presumptuous fact that "we demand eternity for a lifetime. ,,5 
Montaigne had already concluded in Book I of the essays that "the 
1 240. lh!J!. •• p. 
2 229. 1l!!!! •• p. 
3 
.ill!!. , p. 239 • 
4 1l!!!!. , p. 255. 
5 Kardi, II, chap. lui, 299. 
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. 1 deadest deaths are the best." Perhaps even more significant for Melville was 
Hulitt's observation in a footnote to the foregoing statement: "Death is 
here considered as the introduction and actual passage to a state of insenai-
bility which puts a period to our life.-2 Montaigne quotes from the ancients 
who speak of the death of the soul as well as the body and image death as 
sleep in a sense that is close to MelVille's use of the metaphor, i.e., in 
a more restricted, negative sense, with implications of annihilation, rather 
than in the more common, general and loose application of the metaphor of 
"sleep" for death: 
Moreover, they [philosophers] perceived the soul tending towards death, 
as well as the body • • • which, according to Zeno, the image of sleep 
does sufficiently demonstrate to us; for he looks upon it "as a fainting 
and fall of the soul, as well as of the body.tt3 
Later, in Book III, Montaigne presents Socrates' thoughts on death as they 
are contained in his plea before his judges: 
If it [death] be an annihilation of our being, 'tis yet a bettering of 
one's condition, to enter into a long and peaceable night; we find nothiUB 
more sweet in life than a quiet and profound sleep without dreams. 4 
After showing the variety of opinion and the uncertainty and incon-
elusiveness of human reasoning on immortality, Montaigne offers a fidaistic 
solution to the problem in a section of the "Apology" entitled "It 1& by reve-
lation we are .. sured of the soul's immortality. ft Montaigne writes: 
It was truly very good reason that we should be beholden to God only, and 
~ontaigne, Bk. I, chap. xix, p. 30. This statement may have inspired 
Melville's: "Death ••• is the deadest of all things I. (Hardi, II, chap_ !ix, 
255). 
2 rug., n. 2. 
3 ~., Bk. II, chap. Xii, p. 257. 
4 ~., Bk. III, chap. xiii, p. 488. 
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to the favour of his grace, for the truth of so noble a belief, since 
from his sole bounty we receive the fruit of imaorta1ity, which consist. 
in the enjoyment of eternal beatitude.1 
The .eriousne •• of Montaigne's fidei. tic .tatements--often lurching up, as 
they do, incongruously--i. a debated que.tion, and it i. likely that Melville 
did not take them .erious1y, particularly since the.e statement. do little to 
diminish the force of hi. negative arguments. 
Sir ThOllas Browne, too, relies on a fideistic answer and maintains 
that "faith, not phi1o.ophy, hath yet thoroughly disproved" the mortality of 
the sou1. 2 Browne explains how the devil tries to estab1i.h that there i. no 
God by "extinguishing in minds the caapensation of virtue and Vice, the hope 
and fear of heaven and hell. tt3 
The impr.ssionab1e Pascal wrote with an anguished passion on the .ub-
ject of imaorta1ity: 
This i. not a que.tion about the petty interest. of SODle strang.r. Our-
se1ve. and our all are involved in it. 
The immortality of the soul is a matter of such main importance, .0 
profoundly int.resting to us. that we must be utterly dead to every good 
feeling. if w. could be indifferent about it. And all our actions and 
thoughts would take .0 diff.rent a cours., according as we keep this 
point ever in view, as our main and ultimate object. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
It requires but little elevation of .ou1 to discover. that h.r •• 
there is no substantial delight; that our pleasures are but vanity, that 
th. ills of life are iMua.rab1e; and that, after all, death, which 
threatens us every mCII.nt, must, in a few years, perhaps in a few days, 
place us in th •• terna1 condition of happiness, or mi •• ry, or nothingn •••• 
B.tween us and heaven, hell or annihilation, no barrier i. interpo.ed 
but life, which is of all thing. th. mo.t fragile; and as they who doubt 
the fmaortality of the .ou1, can have no hope of heaven. they can have 
no prospect but hell or nonentity. 
1 Ibid., Bk. II. chap. xii, p. 258. 
2 Browne, II, 11. 
3 lW., 248. 
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• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
It is vain for men to turn aside from this coming eternity, as if a 
bold indifference could destroy its being. It subsists notwithstanding. 
It hastens on; and death, which must soon unveil it, will, ina short time, 
infallibly reduce them to the dreadful necessity of being annihilated for 
ever, or for ever wretched. 
Here then is a doubt of the most alarming importance; to feel this 
doubt is already, in itself, a serious evil. But that doubt imposes on 
us, the indispensible duty of inquiry. 
Re, then, who doubts, and yet neglects inquiry, is both uncandid and 
unhappy. 1 
The rankling element of doubt in the foregoing presentation would not have 
escaped Melville if he was acquainted with this section of Pascal's Thoughts. 
Melville's doubt and consequent "inquiry" concerning man's condition after 
death developed into a lifelong inquiry. 
Bayle, like Montaigne, and probably influenced by him, shows the 
logical inconsequence of the concept of retribution issuing from a theory of 
fatalism: 
The Ancient Poets • • • ascribed • • • all sorts of Crimes to Jupiter and 
the other Gods, and even ••• that of inducing Men to Bvil, yet wi!hout 
saying that the same God who moved them to it punished them for it. 
Hume, in his essay "On the Immortality of the Soul," offers several 
arguments against the soul's immortality. It is highly probable that Melville 
knew this essay. Re did know Hume's essay "On Suicide,,;3 the essay liOn the 
Immortality of the Soul" accompanied the essay "On Suicide" in print, and 
Melville's continued interest in the problem of immortality would seem surely 
to have led him to read it. Following Montaigne and Bayle, Rume also argues 
~ascal, 1835 ed., pp. 530-531. 
2 Bayle, 1710 ed., IV, 2495. 
3The Confidence-Man, chap. xxiv, pp. 180-181. 
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from foreordination to the rationally inconsequential theory of rewards and 
punishments: 
As every effect implies a cause, and that another, till we reach the first 
cause of all, which is the Deity; every thing that happens is ordained by 
him, and nothing can be the object of his punishment or vengeance.-By 
what rule are punishments and rewards distributed?l 
Melville and the retributive rationale 
A passage in Mardi gives evidence that Melville was overtly aware 
that a theory of sanctions does not logically issue from a fatalistic position 
in ethics. The passage comes from the section of Mardi, previously discussed, 
in which Babbalanja reasons that man is fated and hence an irresponsible being. 
Melville has Media remark: "Do you take me, then, for a fool, and a Fatalist? 
Pardie! a bad creed for a monarch, the distributor of rewards and punishments.' 
It is also in Mardi that Melville first mentions annihilation. William Bras-
well has shown how Melville, in Mardi, makes use of Seneca's Morals by Way of 
Abstract. 3 After reading from this antique pagan, Melville's Babbalanja 
comments: 
And is it not more divine in this philosopher, to love righteousness for 
its own sake, and in view of annihilation, than for pious sages to extol 
it as the means of everlasting felic1ty?4 
Babba1anja, however, 1s not "content" with Seneca's way of 11fe--or death. S 
Melville's growing interest in the problem of immortality may be traced in 
1 Hume, IV. 572. 
~ardi, II, chap. xxxi, 121. 
3t'Melvi11e's Use of Seneca," &, XII (March, 1940), 98-104. 
4 Mardi, II, chap. xx, 79. 
5 ~., 80. 
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1 the numerous references to it in Mardi, and his interest is probably indebted, 
in significant measure, to his readings in sceptic sources. 
Calvinistic influence on Melville's view of imaorta1ity.--In his view 
of immortality, Melville was, again, probably affected by his Calvinistic 
background. Although Melville reacted against his Calvinistic childhoOd train-
ing, his thought was greatly shaped by it. His views on merit and success 
have been discussed previously in the light of the "Protestant ethic," as 
it is called: with a Calvinistic. Old Testament mentality, Melville believed 
that the meritorious man should be the successful man, should receive his 
sanctions here and ~ in this present world almost, as it were, as a sign of 
his election. Because he felt that these sanctions were not given, he ques-
tioned the justice of God and sometimes argued that if justice were not 
rendered in this world, a fortiori, one should not look for it in the next. 
Babba1anja seriously questions the often presented contrary argument that the 
injustices of this world will all be rectified in the world to come. The 
oblique but basic thrust is, again, at God's justice: 
Yet vain our surmises. Still vainer to say, that all Mardi [earth] is 
but a means to an end; that this life is a state of probation; that evil 
is but permitted for a term; that for specified ages a rebel angel is 
viceroy.--Nay, nay. Oro delegates his sceptre to none; in his everlast-
ing reign there are no interregnums; and Time is Eternity; and we live in 
Eternity now. Yet, some tell of a hereafter, where all the mysteries of 
life will be over; and the sufferings of the virtuous recompensed. Oro 
is just, they eay.-Then always,--now, and evermore. But to make 
1 In addition to references given in the text of this chapter, eee, 
e.g., Mardi, I, chap. lxii!, 224-225; chap. lxix, 243-245; chap. lxxv!i, 272; 
chap. lxxvi!i, 275-277; chap. xciv, 335-336; chap. xcv, 337-338; chap. xcix, 
348-353; II, chap. ix, 32-34; chap. xxiii, 93; chap. 1i, 214; chap. lxxi, 
299-300, 302; chap. lxxiv, 314-315; chap. lxxx, 353-354; chap. lxxxi, 356-358. 
238 
restitution implies a wrong; and Oro can do no wrong. 1 
A passage, in Mardi,. on merit and immortality has a general relevance 
to the preceding chapter and the present one in their considerations of free 
will, fate, merit, and immortality. Babbalanja reads from his favorite, Bar-
dianna: "And if, after all, we should be no more forever;-far better to 
2 perish meriting immortality than to enjoy it UDIleritorious." Ever aince Aclaa, 
when accused by God of having eaten from the Eorbidden tree, blamed Eve for 
having given him the fruit, part of human frailty--from which Melville waa 
not exempt--has been to lay guilt at someone else's door but to claim merit 
aa one's own, advantageously, if not logically, dividing the theory of respon-
sibi1ity. Impressed by, but reacting against, Calvinistic determinism, Mel-
ville was quite willing to trace guilt and culpability back to "Oro," i.e., 
God, but while impressed with the Calviniat ethic that aaw imaediate. proxi-
aate sanctions in this world as the hallmark of the "elect" or the aeritorious, 
and apparently piqued at God's injustice when these sanctions were not forth-
coming, he was not so willing to credit "Oro" with the ndeteraining" of aerit 
but claims it as aan' s own. 
The fear of annihilatiop.--Running through a number of Melville's works 
is a persistent and dark strain of negativism concerning the prospect of 
immortality. In Moby-Dick. Ahab looks into the vacant eyes of the deranged 
Pip and exclaims: "Oh God I that man should be a thing for immortal 80uls to 
1 1h!!., II, chap. lxxxi, 359. 
2 llWl., chap. lxxi, 303. 
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sieve through!"l The word "immortal" is the significant word. Even this 
brief concession to the prospect of eternal survival is deflated but a few 
pages later as Ahab contemplates the unused coffin which has been converted 
to a lifebuoy: 
A life-buoy of a coffinl Does it go further? Can it be that in some 
spiritual sense the coffin is, after all, but an immortality-preserver I 
I'll think of that. But no. So far gone am I in the dark side of earth, 
that its other side, the theoretic bright one, seems but uncertain twi-
light to me. 2 
In Pierre, the hero's invocation to the Stone to fallon him--an 
action which emblematically occurs--includes the condition that he wishes the 
Stone to crush him .!f. there are no subsequent sanctions, if virtue is "un-
meaning and unsequelled with any blessing • and all things • • • allowable 
3 
and unpunishable to man." In Melville's next novel, Israel Potter, his 
tendency is, again, to argue from the premise of the lack of justice in this 
world to the lack of justice in the next. In view of the many inequities dole 
out to Israel during his lifetime (see the section on "Law" in the previous 
chapter), the narrator, in his dedication to the Bunker Hill Monument, comment 
that Israel, now dead, "may never have received other requital than the solid 
4 
reward of your granite." Granite is associated with Melville's images of 
"stone" and "marble," the "primary rock of the matter," and carries with it 
all the previous connotations of indifference and unresponsiveness on the 
part of the deity. 
~obY-DiCk, II, chap. cxxv, 301. 
2 ~., chap. cxxvii, 310. 
3 Pierre, Bk. VII, chap. v, p. 189. 
4 Israel Potter, vi. 
240 
The Confidence-Man,written from the depths of Melville's darkest 
period and thick with lacerating irony, contains several barbed references to 
immortality and the afterlife. The Sophomore, the "wise-fool," says: "We 
shall all be happy after we are no more."l The Confidence-Man calls the 
husband of Goneril a "Lucky Dog." 
To wbich the merchant replied, that he earnestly boped it might be so, 
and at any rate he tried his best to comfort himself with the persuasion 
that, if the unfortunate man was not happy in this world, he would, at 
least, be so in another. 
His companion [the deceiving devil-god Confidence-Man1 made no ques-
tion of tbe unfortunate man's happiness in both worlds. 2 
The stock that the Con-Man offers for sale in The Black Rapids Coal Co. (bell) 
and the New Jerusalem (heaven) are both hoaxes. Finally, in the closing 
Chapter,) an, "old man," who is Simeon-like, is reading a Bible. Simeon, the 
New Testament priest, waited for the coming of the Savior that he might die. 
At this juncture, it is tbe Con-Man wbo enters. The gospels, which the old 
man is reading, contain the promise of eternal life aud reward; The Con-Man 
remarks to the old man that he is reading "good news" (the etymological mean-
iug of gospel), and a voice from a "curtained berth" (suggestive of death) 
4 
calls out, "Too good to be true." The narrator remarks that those in the 
berths already only want to sleep, not see. The Con-Man learns (if he needs 
to "learn") that tbe old man has his savings on him, and he offers to show him 
to his "berth." He turns out the light baving the symbols of the Old and New 
1 The Confidence-Man, chap. ix, p. 63. 
2 
.!k!4. , chap. xiii, p. 86. 
) Ibid. , chap. xlv. 
4 
.!!!!!. , p. 322. 
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Testament on it--this action and the remark that the gospels are "too good to 
be true" show that, unlike Montaigne, Browne, and Bayle, who, at least, paid 
lip service to revelation, Melville, in the present novel, rejects it, and, 
with it, its promise of immortality. The Con-Man then leads the "old man" 
away. Melville ends by saying that something more may come of this masquerade 
--but the impetus of deception of the entire novel hurries the picture along, 
and the "old man" is seen left in the dark with nothing. Some critics have 
1 questioned whether the novel ends, but it may have one of the most final of 
all endings, an ending in which nothing is left but nothing. In "The Conflict 
of Convictions," one of Melville's civil war poems published in the 1866 
volume Battle-Pieces, he writes: 
And death [shall} be busy with all who strive--
Death, with silent negative. 2 
Because of his somber considerations on man's mortality, Melville 
seriously considered the possibility of annihilation. During his 1856 visit 
to Hawthorne in England, he confided that he had "pretty much made up his 
mind to be annihilated, t1 although he did not seem able to "rest in that anti-
cipation.,,3 In the sceptical self-argument that Melville conducted with 
himself, when he was not considering man as a fatherless shadow "from no 
~ewis Mumford, Herman Melville (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 
1929), p. 252; Richard Chase, Herman Melville: A Critical Study (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 205; Howard C. Honford, "Evidence of Mel-
ville's Plans for a Sequel to The Confidence-Man," £" XXIV (March, 1952), 
85-89. 
2 Collected Poems, p. 7. 
3 Nathaniel Hawthorne, The English Notebooks, ed. Randall Stewart 
(New York: Modern Language Association of America, 1941), p. 432. 
242 
1 
substance cast," his variant speculations often brought no added reassurance. 
Melville saw a certain kind of immortality granted to life in general as 
contained in Time, but he seriously doubted the preservation of the indivi-
dual in Eternity. In Mardi, he writes: "Through all her provinces, nature 
seems to promise immortality to life, but destruction to beings.,,2 In Moby-
~, Melville says of the whale: I~e account the whale immortal in his 
3 
speCies, however perishable in his individuality." But it is precisely in-
dividual, personal survival with which Melville is concerned. 
Somewhere in his philosophical wanderings or delvings into physics, 
Melville seems to have met the argument on the eternity or indestructibility 
of matter. He writes of the force of leviathan's tail: "Could annihilation 
occur to matter, this were the thing to do it.,,4 But Melville is not so con-
cerned with man's material "stuffn"'-if man is so composed and 1s not merely a 
fatherless shadow "frOl'll no substance cast"--as he 1s with the survival of 
personal consciousness. His fear of annihilation after death, probably in 
the sense of this loss of personal consciousness, seems to be contained in the 
metaphor of sleep which he frequently uses when writing of death. Media, in 
Mardi, claims that mortals are too apt to talk in the dark. Babbalanja ans~ 
"Ay, my lord, and we mortals may prate still more in the dark when we are 
dead; for methinks, that if we then prate at all, 'twill be in our sleep.nS 
1 Collected Poems, p. 215. 
~ardi, I, chap. lxix, 244. 
3 Moby-Dick, II, chap. cv, 228. 
4 ~., chap. lxxxvi, 119. 
SMardi, II, chap. xxxi. 128. 
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In Moby-D1ck, Stubb interprets the zodiac on the Doubloon as "one round 
chapter" on man's life; in Aquarius the Water-bearer he sees symbolized death, 
i.e., drowning, and winding up "with Pisces, or the Fishes, we sleep."l In 
I1The Haglets," the ship is wrecked and the Admiral of the White is drowned: 
Imbedded deep with shells 
And drifted treasure deep, 
Forever he sinks deeper in 
Unfathomable sleep.2 
In both Moby-Dick and "The Haglets," the imagery of sinking to sleep in the 
sea, suggestive as it is of a "state of insensibility which puts a period to 
our life"--to borrow Hazlitt's note--seems to point ahead to the closing 
lines of "Billy in the Darbies l1 in Billy Budd: 
Fathoms down, fathoms down, how I'll dream fast asleep. 
I feel it stealing now. Sentry, are you there? 
Just ease these darbies at the wrist, 
And roll me over fairl 3 
I am sleepy, and the oozy weeds about me twist. 
The imaging of death followed by annihilation as a sinking in the sea "forever 
and aye" is prepared for in one of 11elville's early poems in Mardi; although 
Melville does not specifically mention the metaphor Hsleep ," night imagery is 
employed and the absence of personal awareness is suggested in the line "The 
dead reck not of aught": 
We drop our dead in the 8ea, 
The bottomless, bottomless sea; 
Each bubble a hollow sigh, 
As it sinks forever and aye. 
We drop our dead in the 8ea,--
~ObY-Dick, II, chap. xcix, 192. 
2 Collected Poems, p. 193. 
3 Billy Budd, ed. Hayford-Sealts, leaf 351, p. [132]. 
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The dead reck not of aught; 
We drop our dead in the aea,--
The sea ne'er gives it a thought. 
Sink, sink, oh corpse, still sink, 
Far down in the bottomless sea, 
Where the unknown forms do prowl, 
Down. down in the bottomless sea. 
'Tis night above. and night all round. 
And night will it be with thee; 
As thou sinkest, and sinkeat for aye'l 
Deeper down in the bottomless sea. 
Death is not seen as a sleep from which man may be again recalled; Clarel, in 
dream, sees Greek pilgrima shipwrecked on their return home, and he describes 
them aa 
Asleep upon beach Tyrianl 
Or is it sleep? no. rest--that rest 2 
Which naught shall ruffle or molest. 
In some of his later poems. e.g. "Buddha,1t Melville may have been endeavoring 
to gild the pill of possible extinction by enfolding the fear with the more 
positive ambiances of oriental nirvana. Buddha is again mentioned in the 
unfinished poem "Rammon." The prince R8IIIIDon, who desires the "cessation of 
being,"] and the iaporter lardi discuss death: this general background gave 
rise to the only finished segment of the poem published in Melville's life-
time, nThe Enviable Is1ea.'.4 Melville's concern over the possible loss of 
consciousness may be reflected in the image of sleep in the poem, for it is 
~ardi. I, chap. xcix, 352. 
2 Clarel, Pt. I, canto v, 11. 130-133. 
3collected Poems, p. 411. 
4 ~., see ed. Vincent's note pp. 472-473. 
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said that in these enviable isles myriads lie "unconscious slumberers mere."l 
The "hope against hope."--Melville's dark meditations on mortality 
were, again. but one side of his expression, albeit the weightier side. Two 
lines from Clarel provide a point of transition. Like the Greek pilgrims to 
the Holy Land, the pilgrims from India also die, 
Arrested, with the locusts sleep, 2 
Or pass to muster where no man may peep. 
In the first line, the image of sleep, though a fairly common image for death, 
is probably used with Melville's more specifically limited and dark connota-
tions of annihilation. But, because he simply does not know with certainty, 
an alternative is offered ("Or pass to muster") though still shrouded with 
uncertainty ("where no man may peepl1). Melville was capable of positive 
statements and hope, a hope that, if not always active, was at least latent. 
He wrote in a letter to Sophia Hawthorne, 8 January 1852: 
Life is a long Dardanelles, ••• the shores whereof are bright with 
flowers, which we want to pluck, but the bank is too high; & so we float 
on & on. hoping to come to a landing-place at last--but swoopl we launch 
into the great seal Yet the geographers say. even then we must not des-
pair, because across the great sea, however desolate & vacant it may look, 
lie all Persia & the delicious lands roundabout Damascus. 3 
In the poem "The Battle For the Mississippi tl Melville declares: 
I 
2 
3 
4 
There must be other, nobler worlds for 1hem 
Who nobly yield their lives in this. 
Ibid., p. 204. 
Clare1, Pt. I, canto v, 11. 197-198. 
Letters, p. 147. 
Collected Poems, p. 44. 
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Concerning the hope of a future life, Melville speculates, possibly with the 
help of Montaigne's observations on animals, that there is no "creature, fish, 
flesh, or fowl, so little in love with life, as not to cherish hopes of a 
future state."l In Mardi, Babbalanja contemplates the account of Lazarus's 
resurrection from the tomb and concludes: "At best, 'tis but a hope," but 
goes on to declare that such an instinct 1s not necessarily a guaranteed "pre-
servative. 1I2 
Unlike the endings of Hoby-Dick, Pierre, and The Confidence-Man, the 
closing lines of Clarel, positive and hopeful in tone as they are, may seem 
like something of a ~ sequitur to the ponderous doubt and gloom of the poem 
itself; nevertheless, beautifully hopeful they are: 
But through such strange illusions have they passed 
Who in life'. pilgrimage have baffled striven--
Even death may prove unreal at the last, 
And stoics be astounded into heaven. 
Then keep thy heart, though yet but ill-resigned--
Clarel, thy heart, the issues there but mind; 
That like the crocus budding through the snow--
That like a swimmer rising from the deep--
That like a burning secret which doth go 
Even from the bosom that would hoard and keep; 
Emerge thou mayst from the last whelming sea, 3 
And prove that death but routs life into Victory. 
Melville, however, sometimes saw even hope as a harrowing thing, 
particularly the Christian hope of immortality. Before the dominance of 
Christianity, man could accept or steel himself aga.inst the prospect of 
mortality, but with the yearning caused by an alluring hope of immortality 
~ardi, I, chap. xciv, 335. 
2 ~., chap. lxxviii. 276-277. 
3 Clarel, Pt. IV, canto xxxv, 11. 23-34. 
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came the accompanying unsettling fear of its unfulfillment. In "The Age of 
the Antonines" Melville writes 
The sting was not dreamed to be taken from death, 
No Paradise pledged or sought. l 
In Clarel, Celio thinks of Chr1st--
Even he who in the pastoral hours, 
Abroad in fields, and cheered by flowers, 
Announced a heaven's unclouded days; 
And, &h, with such persuasive lips--
Those lips now sealed while doom delays--
Won men to look for solace there; 
But, crying out in death's eclipse, 
When rainbow none his eyes might see, 
Enlarged the raargin for despair--
!!l: God, !!I. God, f orsabs t me '1 
Upbraider! we upbraid again; 
Ill!! we upbraid; our pangs constrain 
Pathos itself to cruelty. 
Ere yet thy day no pledge was given 
Of homes and man.ions in the heaven--
Paternal homes reserved for us; 
Heart hoped it not, but lived content--
Content with life'. own discontent. 2 
The hope and the fear.-~?n a final appraisal, the problem of immortal-
ity, a. in other areas of Melville'. inquiry, ends with a question mark. If 
the present world is so little known, how 
dare 
To pledge indemnifying good 
In worlds not known[?]3 
Because of attending uncertainty, neither fear of annihilation nor hope of 
heaven can be precluded from Melville's query about man's condition after 
1 Collected Poems, p. 235 
2 Clarel, Pt. I, canto xiii, 11. 38-55. 
3Ibid., Pt. III, canto iii, 11. 14-16. 
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death. He asks in Clarel: 
If Luther's day expand to Darwin's year, 
Shall that exclude the hope--foreclose the fear?l 
After the burial of Nehemiah two opposing natural signs, one of fear and one 
of hope, suggest an ambiguous aftermath: an avalanche of rock falls 
"horribly," but a "counter object" and "thing of heaven" is revealed, a "frail" 
2 
rainbow--symbol of hope. At Mar Saba, crowning s crag and surrounded by a 
desert "waste whose king is Fear," stands an isolated palm, symbol of hope. 3 
Though hope is frail and solitary, it does, nevertheless, remain. 
The eleaent of uncertainty surrounding immortality exhibits itself in 
the form of questions. In hia poem "At the Canon's Mouth" Melville asks, 
And life once over, who shall tell t~e rest? 
Life is, of all we know, God's beat. 
In Clarel is asked 
How then? Is death tbe book's fly-page? 
Is no bereafter?S 
In one of the more extended considerations of immortality, also in Clarel, 
Melville eaploys a aeries of six questions. Of coaparative significance in 
tbe same section is tbe fact tbat, whereas, in Mardi, tbe proposal of a 
"bereafter, where all tbe mysteries of life will be over" is, in effect. 
negated, in Clarel it is couched in a question: 
1 
.lli!!. , Pt. IV, canto xxxv, 11. 1-2. 
2 
.lli!!. , Pt. II, can to xxxix, 11. 139, 151-152. 
3 Ibid. , Pt. III, canto x, 1. 26. 
4 Collected Poems, p. 83. 
5 Clarel, Pt. It canto XViii, 11. 36-37. 
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'W:h.;at reveries be in yonder heavell 
Whither, if yet faith rule it so, 
The tried and rana.ed natures flow? 
If there peace after strife be given 
Shall hearts r .... ber yet and know? 
Thy vista, Lord. of havells dear, 
May that in such entranc .. ent bind 
That never atarts a wandering tear 
lor wail and willow left behind? 
Then wherefore. chaplet. quivering throw 
A dusk e' en on the martyr' a brow 
You crown? Do seraphim ahed balm 
At last on all of earnest aind, 
Unworldly yeamers, nor the palm 
Awarded St. Teresa, ban 
To Leopardi, Obermann'l 
Translated where the anthea's sung 
Beyond the thunder, in a strain 
Whose haraony unwinds and solves 
Each mystery that life involves; 
There shall the Tree whereon He hung, 
The olive wood. leaf out again-
Again leaf out. and endles. reilll 1 
Type of the peaee that buds fro. sinless patn? 
It se .. s somewhat aisleading to speak in senatorial tone. of Billy 
~ as Melville's final stat_ent, a label whieh almost unwittingly begin. 
to infer that the work is a stallation. culaination. and conclusioll of all 
Melville's thought and there would simply be no more to say if he had lived 
another hundred years. It is the last work he wrote before he died. but one 
wonders what he would have written a year later, or, given Melville's aercuria 
moods, an hour later. It has been observed that the many separate works 
written in an author's lifetime are so illterconnected as actually to fora one 
Ireat work: if IlOt pushed to extraes, this observation contains aucb v1s-
dom. While certainly bavilll ita own individuality as a work of art, Billy 
Budd is, ill many re.pects, a continuation of Melville's life's work; it asks 
1 ~ •• Pt. III, canto i, 11. 1-24. 
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many of the same questions. including that on immortality, that Melville pur-
sued in earlier works and, while typically tending toward the darker side, 
leaves as many questions, finally, unanswered. 
The closing lines of "Billy in the Darbies," discussed earlier in 
this chapter. use imagery that is suggestive of annihilation. Conversely, 
the dedication to Jack Chase mentions that he may be "harbored in Paradise. ,,1 
Without necessarily evincing belief or disbelief in such a state, Melville 
saaetime. use. the term "Paradise" rhetorically as he does in his "The Para-
di.e of Bachelors and Tartarus of Maids." a story in which he subtly con-
siders woman's difficult role under the burden of gestation. Such a rhetori-
cal use is also present in Pierre in the de.cription of Isabel'. face a. 
"hovering between Tartarean misery and Paradiaaic beauty.,,2 Melville does, 
however. use the tera in the sen.e of a state of reward or happiness after 
death-as in the "Paradise pledged" of "The Age of the Antonine .... 3 His 
manner of using the term in the dedication is at least a moot question. 
Writing to James Bill.on as late a. 20 December 1885, about the time of the 
4 inception of Billy Budd, Melville .ays of Jame. Thom.on: "It is good for me 
1ailly Budd. ed. Hayford-Sealts, p. [42]. 
2Pierre, Bk. III, chap. i, p. 58. 
lCollected Poems, p. 235. 
4In their edition of Billy Budd Hayford and Sealts write: "The 'un-
finished work' of 1885 may have included the short poem of three or four 
leaves on which he was working early in 1886, the poem that ultimately became 
the ballad "Billy in the Darbies" with which the novel concludes. The novel 
it.elf developed out of a brief pro.e headnote .etting the .cene and introduc-
ing the speaker of this POetll"--p. [1]. 
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to think of such a mind--to know that such a brave intelligence has been--
and may yet be, for aught anyone can demonstrate to the contrary."l 
As in earlier works, the signs of nature after a death, in this case 
Billy's, are significant: Professors Hayford and Sealts have devoted a long 
note to an investigation of possible meanings, and their findings lean toward 
2 
a dark view of possible survival. As an added observation, the serene air 
is cOllpared to "81Ilooth white marble," an image which may be another in Mel-
Ville's long line of images utilizing stone, rock, marble, and granite to 
connote a cold, impenetrable, and indifferent deity--perhaps Melville's 
"marble-dealer" in the same paragraph. 3 Possibilities seem negative, but Mel-
ville does not leap frOll appearance to conclusion. Appearance is often decep-
tive, and deception works both ways; another part of his total sceptical self-
argument was stated earlier in Clare1--of deception and illusions he writes: 
But through such strange illusions have they passed 
Who in life's pilgrimage have baffled striven--
Even death may prove unreal at the lfst, 
And stoics be astounded into heaven. 
Such a statement is rare, but, like the bobbing buoy on the dark oceanic 
vastness, it's there and cannot be ignored without ignoring the total Melville. 
1 Letters, p. 281. 
2 Billy Budd, ed. Hayford-Sealts, pp. [196-l98J. 
3Ibid., leaf 334, p. [128]. 
4 Clare!, Pt. IV, canto xxxv, 11. 23-26. 
PART III 
MELVILLE: SCEPTIC 
CHAPTER VII 
MELVILLE: SCEPTIC 
"Faith 1s to the thoughtless, 
doubts to the thinker" 
Mardi. 
Melville's sceptic sources correspond in varying degrees to some of 
the most outstanding figures in the history of scepticism. Thought stated in 
various ways and with various intentions, the ingredients of common metaphysi-
cal problems, beginning with the epistemological problem. emerge frota the page 
of these writers. The problems undergo a process of augmentation even in thos 
philosophers, like Descartes and Kant, who endeavor rather to answer scepticis 
but whose answers, for some, are not intellectually convincing. These pro-
blems became Melville's own. Melville's scepticism does not seem to derive 
from any single philosopher but from the aggregate of his sources, although 
Montaigne and Montaigne's disciple Pierre Bayle give evidence of effecting a 
more pronounced influence on him. Special emphasis has been given to Mon-
taigne because of his influence, direct or indirect, on almost all of the 
sceptic writers considered as Melville's sources in the present study and, 
more importantly, because of his direct and abiding influence on Melville, 
who owned Hazlitt's edition of Montaigne. 
Melville probably read much of Montaigne and Bayle ironically, and 
it would be highly questionable that he considered them fideists. MelVille 
made it sufficiently clear that his own scepticism did not lead to fideism. 
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Like the "willful boy" of Mardi, he would "climb high Ofo with hope, not 
1 faith," that is, not an anti-rationalistically structured and externally 
imposed creed. In Mardi, when Melville writes the dictum used as an epigraph 
to the present chapter, "Faith is to the thoughtless" it is probably this 
2 
anti-rationalistic, organized and imposed faith that he is considering. For 
Melville, who so aought a faith unmistakably and integrally subatantiated by 
reason and experience, a faith so demonstrably certain that it merged into 
knowledge rather than faith, such a position was untenable. With his great 
regard for reason, ltaited as it was. to be a fideiat, for Melville. would be 
equivalent to making reason the thrall of faith. But to 8ay that Melville did 
not have faith in the sense of an established creed is not to imply that he wag 
void of all faith: he admired Hume's faith, a "firm, creedless faith that 
embraces the spherea. ,,3 William Braswell writes that "when Melville read in 
his New Testament St. Paul's counsel to the Romana, 'Hast thou faith? Have 
it to thyself before God,' he annotated, 'The only kind of faith--one'a own. ,II 
Hume had taught that the baais for religion was fear,5 and, in "The Lightning-
Rod Man," Melville rejects the dark lightning-king who tries to drive fta brave 
6 trade with the fears of man" and insists upon standing on his own hearth. 
Melville's scepticism did not devolve to libertiniam: many of hi. questions, 
~rdi, II, chap. v, 19. 
2 Ibid., II, chap. xxxi, 126. 
3Redburn, chap. lviii, p. 377. 
4Braswsll, Melville'. Religious Thought, p. 19. 
5 Hume, IV, 449, 498. 
6 The Piazza Talea, pp. 180, 173. 
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in fact, arose from his great moral preoccupation, and his own keen sense of 
justice caused him to question an apparently unjustly governed universe. 
The basic problem of scepticism is epistemological. In the treatment 
of Melville's sceptic epistemological problem in Chapter III of this study 
some distortion is admittedly inflicted on Melville as artist by subordinating 
his themes, dialogue, and images to a predominantly philosophical schema (al-
though this concluding chapter endeavors to resolve this difficulty). This 
approach has the advantage, however, of enabling one to see, with some facility, 
what the implications of scepticism are in order to see Melville's works in 
relation to them, and since the present thesis concerns Melville as sceptic, 
it is necessary to see scepticism in more detail than is usually offered in 
the broad designation of scepticism as simply doubt. kmay be asserted that 
this approach does, finally, effect greater appreciation of Melville as artist 
by enabling the reader to bring to Melville's often predominantly sceptical 
themes and imagery a richer understanding of their implications and connota-
tions. Some of these themes and images will be discussed in the conclusion of 
this concluding chapter on Melville as sceptic, since they offer some of the 
most consistent and compelling clues to his scepticism. Melville briefly 
touches then vaults over many of the particular arguments of scepticism to 
subsume scepticism's more general tendencies and attitudes in his own works. 
Nevertheless, as the third chapter endeavors to show, Melville's works give 
evidence that he did explicitly reject the final trustworthiness of all man's 
faculties, the senses, reason, and intuition. Because of their dependence on 
a fallible sense knowledge and reason, the disciplines are also undermined. 
Man himself is shown to be an inconstant and variable subject, and from this 
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fallibility and variability no universal consensus, no criterions or stable 
truths can be elicited. Melville's world is wrapped in doubt. 
The epistemological problem gave rise to an ontological problem. 
Because ultimately and transcendentally Truth and Being are convertible, if 
the very existence of Truth is doubted, it is but one step further to doubt 
the existence of Being--even one's own being. Pierre comes to the point where 
he declares: 1 "I am a nothing." In his effort to know, Ahab wants to strike 
through the wall of phenomenon or appearance and voices his suspicion: "Some-
times I think there's naught beyond. ,,2 Pierre, looking for "subs tance," be-
gins to see the whole world as 
nothing but surface stratified on surface. To its axis, the world being 
nothing but superinduced superficies. By vast pains we mine into the 
pyramid; by horrible gropings we come to the central room; with joy we 
espy the sarcophagus; but we lift the 1id--and no body is there!--appa1l-
ingly vacant as vast is the soul of a man!3 
"Surface" or appearance, for Melville, is not "substance," and he suspects 
that unsubstantial appearance itself is delusory. Melville probably knew 
Bayle's question quoted previously: 
Ever since the beginning of the World all Men, except, perhaps, one in two 
hundred Millions, do firmly believe that Bodies are coloured, and yet 'tis 
a Mistake. I ask, whether God deceives Men with respect to those Colours? 
If he deceives them in thal respect, what hinders but he may deceive them 
with respect to Extension. 
In Moby-Dick, Melville considers thia theory of the natural philosophers and 
I,ierre, Bk. XIX, chap. ii, p. 382. 
~Oby-Dick. I, chap. xxxvi, 204. 
3Pierre, Bk. XXI, chap. i, p. 397. 
4 Bayle, 1710 ed., IV, 2620. 
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remarks that 
earthly hues--every stately or lovely emb1azoning--the sweet tinges of 
sunset skies and woods; yea, and the gilded velvets of butterflies, and 
the butterfly cheeks of young girls; all these are but aubt1e deceits, 
not actually inherent in substances, but only laid on from without. 1 
In the above quotation from Moby-Dick, "surface" or appearance is found to be 
deceptive, and the last given quotation from Pierre shows Melville doubting 
the existence of substance. In The Confidence-Man, subtitled His Masquerade, 
appearances are shown to be deceptive due to the machinations of the devil-god 
Confidence-Man. Melville's metaphor of the "dream" became a vehicle through 
which he concretized and projected his abstract, metaphysical query on the 
possible nonexistence of objective reality, of being. His epistemological 
difficulties contributed toward this dream query: the sceptic does not find 
the permanent beneath the transient, the ultimate beyond the proximate and 
without criterions. the world seems to be drifting and shifting direction-
lesa1y as in dream; it is a world that, like the dream-wor1d, is precarious, 
incalculable, unreasonable, and unaequentia1; phantasms (Melville 's ttphantoas n 
simply appear and then as inexplicably disappear. In Clarel, Melville writes 
2 
of illusions that they are "void ••• I As phantoms which accost in dream." 
The average man of the street judges the inconsequence of his subjective 
dream-reality by measuring it against objective reality. But what is the man 
to do who seriously questions objective reality itself as being void? Against 
what is he to measure his fears? 
The epistemological and ontological problems, in Melville, gave rise 
~obY-Dick. I, chap. xlii, 244. 
2 C1are1, Pt. IV, canto xvi, 11. 135-136. 
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to an ethical problem. Man must perceive truths, standards, guides, or cri-
terions with which to measure his actions and in order to be self-directive, 
to act freely. Ontologically, man is not responsible in a dream world--it is 
not really meaningful. Man becomes anchorless, suspended and passive in dreams 
and feels fated or controlled rather than free and controlling. When Melville 
has Pierre speak out on how the world and self ttseem" to him, he says: "It 18 
1 
all a dream--we dream that we dreamed we dream." His next ques tion is: 
"From nothing proceeds nothing. How can one sin in a dream?,,2 A sense 
of sin, if it exists at all, is rare in Melville's works; he returns again and 
again to the idea of man as fated, both within and without. A certain inc on-
gruent dichotomy exists in Melville's view of fate or determinism, however. 
Influenced by, but reacting against, Calvinism, he lays man's "sin" at God's 
door as having determined man; conversely, he blames God for not recognizing 
and rewarding man's merit here and now, a merit which he frequently implies is 
freely man's own. Both sides of the issue therefore provide cause for him to 
find fault with God's justice, a justice and Providence that is further ques-
tioned because of the presence of evil in the world. 
Melville's doubts concerning survival and sanctions in an afterlife 
are consequent to his view of ethics. Since ethics are meaningless without 
criterions and objective reality (man is not responsible for "sins" committed 
in dreams), ethical sanctions also become meaningless. Because of his predomi-
nant fatalism, Melville questioned why the gods should reward or punish man for 
1 Pierre, Bk. XIX, chap. i1, p. 382. 
2~. 
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acts they determined him to? Also, because Melville did not see justice being 
rendered in this world, he argued a fortiori not to expect it in the next. 
In the end, however, immortality remains an open question; as Melville wrote 
to James Bi11son 20 December 1885,1 it cannot be demonstrated that immortality 
is not any more than it can be demonstrated that it is. 
The preceding sequence of prob1ems--epistemological, ontological, 
ethical, and retributive--is not only a logical sequence, but it is suggested 
by Melville himself. 2 In Pierre, where truth is elusive and criterions and 
maxims fluctuate and invert,3 Pierre asks "if tife be a cheating dream, and 
virtue • • • unmeaning and unsequelled with any blessing • • • and all things 
4 
••• allowable and unpunishable to man." Earlier in this study a skeletal 
sequence of these problems was presented, and it may again serve as a recapi-
tu1ation here: the fundamental thesis of this study is that Melville's basic 
problem (logically) is epistemological, a lack of noetic certitude which gave 
rise to an ontological difficulty concerning the nature of a consequently un-
certain reality, which, in turn, engendered an ethical question, since ethics 
depends on one's view of being or reality, and finally, the ethical inCODse-
quence which Melville envisioned rendered the retributive rationa1e--immor-
tality and sanctions--meaningless, until nothing was left but nothing. This 
course of reasoning is Melville's predominant one. While the element of 
1 Letters, p. 281. 
2 Pierre, Bk. XXV, chap. ii1, p. 472. 
3 ~., Bk. IX, chap. i, p. 231. 
4 ~., Bk. VII, chap. v, p. 189. 
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nihilism (also the existential Angst over meaninglessness) is evident, in the 
end, Melville no more trusted the powers of a fallible and' limited reason to 
reach negative dogmatic conclusions than to reach more positively sanguine 
ones, and, for Melville the sceptic, the case of the universe ends with a 
question mark. 
Some of the most compelling clues to Melville's scepticism are to be 
found in his artistic imagery. Pyrrhonistic scepticism is a quest for truth. 
All philosophy is, of course, a quest for truth. Scepticism differs in the 
area stressed--in a certain sense, the "quest" is more emphasized than the 
"truth. tI Doubt is cultivated: the adequacy of man's cognitive faculties is 
questioned, and a system of polarities is set up. Impregnated with doubt, 
scepticism's quest is unceasing and never rests in truths or dogmas positive 
or negative. Thus Ahab, though blinded, continues to grope. Each apparent 
"truth" is seen to be countered by an equally apparent truth. Sceptic doubt 
with its quest has affinities to and is one of the progenitors of existential-
ism: like Sisyphus rolling his rock, the sceptic pushes his quest toward an 
immovable position on the pinnacle of truth or significance. Though always 
checkmated and never reaching the apex, the quest is not abandoned. Early 
Greek Pyrrhonistic sceptics attempted to achieve a median position between 
opposites and find rest in an indifference to both extremes. As Pyrrhonistic 
scepticism was adapted by later writers such as Bayle, it was often used to 
construct a position of sceptical polarity against an opposite position which 
was, it was felt, receiving too much unwarranted adherence. In writers such 
as Bayle, scepticism became the devil's advocate in the canonization process 
of established and assumed truths--as such, it often apparently lost sceptical 
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balance by overemphasizing the opposing position. Actually, however, it 
assURed the already existing strength of the position being opposed. Some 
hint may be given of Melville's own efforts to provide a counterpoise to exist-
ing attitudes by his remarks to James Billson. in a letter of 22 January 1885, 
on the poet James Thomson: 
As to his pessimism, altho' neither pessimist nor optomist [sic] myself, 
nevertheless I relish it in the verse if for nothing else than as a 
counterpoise to the exorbitant hopefulness, juvenile and shallow, that 
makes such a bluster in these days--at least, in some quarters. l 
It is highly probable that Melville, as his observation of Thomson suggests, 
purposely cultivated the darker questions of existence to balance Victorian 
complacency. This constant delving into darkness, however, took its psycholo-
gical toll. Nevertheless, his efforts toward a counterpoise and suspension 
of judgment are evident not only in his remark to Billson, but in such state-
ments as that in his poem "Pontoosuce": 
Light and shade are equal set 2 
And all revolves, nor more ye know. 
The theme and symbol of the constant quest are of significant recur-
rence in Melville's works. The action and significance of Mardi are, finally, 
dOll1inated by the quest or hunt. Taji, the hero, becomes "the hunter that 
never rests! the hunter without a home."l The business of Moby-Dick might be 
described as a colossal hunt: "Ahab had purposely sailed upon the present 
voyage with the one only and all-engrossing object of hunting the White 
1 Letters, p. 277. 
2 Collected Poems, p. 398. 
1Mardi, II, chap. lxxxv, 382. 
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Whale,,;l Ahab is described as "the scheming, unappeasedly steadfast hunter of 
the White Whale.,,2 111e action of Moby-Dick is climaxed by the three days of 
the chase or hunt. Ahab dies still engaged in the hunt. Among the many 
, 
different kinds of "hunters" aboard the Fidele in The Confidence-Man are the 
"truth-hunters.,,3 Much of the action of Clarel occurs during a pilgrimage or 
spiritual quest for truth. A "major pattern of the poem," according to 
Bezanson, is "the lost hero in search of a guide. ,,4 
The sceptic quest for truth or knowledge is beset with doubt. Melville 
sublimates the physical act of seeing to symbolize the intellectual act of 
knowing, and he frequently uses the symbol of mist, fog, cloud, or haze to 
connote uncertainty and doubt, the difficulty of knowing without criterions 
and directives. In Moby-Dick, during the first lowering for the "hunted sperm 
5 
whale" the boat runs through a "suffusing wide veil of mist." Melville 
launches into universal dimensions: as the night grows darker with "driving 
scud, rack, and mist," Queequeg holds a lantern stretched on a significantly 
named Itwaif-pole"--"There, then, he sat, the Sign and symbol of a man without 
faith, hopelessly holding up hope in the midst of despair. ,,6 Half stupefied 
after discovering that he has an illegitimate half-sister, Pierre watches 
~obY-Dick, I, chap. xli, 232. 
2 Ibid., chap_ xliV, 252. 
3111e Confidence~an, chap. ii, p. 8. 
4 Clarel, p. liv. 
5 Moby-Dick, It chap_ xlviii, 283. 
6 
.!ill., 284. 
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while the "morning dawned in1llist. ,,1 After resolving to help his half-sister 
Isabel, Pierre remains in uncertainty concerning his future relationship with 
Lucy: 
Standing half befogged upon the mountain of his Fate, all that part of the 
wide panorama was wrapped in clouds to him; but anon those concealings slid 
aside, or rather, a quick rent was made in them; disclosing far below, half 
veiled in the lower mist, the winding tranquil vale and stream of Lucy's 
previous happy life; through the swift cloud-rent he caught one glimpse 
of her expectant and angelic face peeping from the honeysuckled window of 
her cottage; and the next instant the stormy pinions of the clouds locked 
themselves over it again; and all was hidden as before; and all went con-
fused in whirling ~ and vapour as before. 2 
It is predicted of Israel Potter that be will end by "wandering forlorn in the 
coal-fogs of London. ,,3 Israel drifts directionlessly through life and, as an 
old man, is, in fact, seen wandering in "fog so dense" that "the dimmed and 
massed blocks of houses, exaggerated by the 100m, seemed shadowy ranges on 
ranges of midnight hills.,,4 "Benito Cereno," published in 1855,S is close in 
time and tenor to The Confidence-Man, which Melville finished writing in 1856. 
In both works, Melville's concentration upon the epistemological problem is so 
6· 
intense as to seem, at times, verging on an obsession. The aura of ambiguity 
1rierre. Bk. V, chap. iii, p. 129. 
2 lh!d., chap. v, p. 147. Underlining added. 
3Israel Potter, chap. i. p. 6. 
4 ~., chap. XXVi, p. 219. 
SHerman Melville, Piazza Tales, ed. Egbert S. Oliver (New York: 
Hendricks House, Farrar Straus, 1948), p. 230, n. 55-140. 
6The vocabulary of "Benito Cereno" is almost surfeited with such terms 
.s "suspicion" (pp. 79, 85, 92, 104, ll4--pagination given here and throughout 
this note is that of the Hendricks House edition of Piazza Tales), "secret" 
(pp. 80. 89, 90). "mysterious" (p. 80), "seem" (and forms of "seem"-pp. 56, 
57, 85. 86, 87, 89, 93, 99, 103, 107), "trust" (pp. 79, 80). "distrustful" and 
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and uncertainty, the fear of deception, is prepared for in the initial para-
lJ'aphs of "Benito Cereno" with Melville's images of mist: again, the diffi-
culty of seeing syaboUzes the difficulty of knowing. Gray fowl are mixed 
1 
with "troubled aray vapours"; Captain Delano haa difficulty studying the 
approaching ship because of the "vapours partly mantling the hull, through 
2 which the far matin light frOil her cabin streaed equivocally enough," and 
"fog here and there [was] raggedly furring her. ,,3 In Clarel, the riders begin 
another day of their pilgrimage in 
The gray of daw. A tr_or sliaht: 
The trouble of imperfect liaht 
AIln begins. In floating cloud 
Midway suspended dow the gorge, 
A long mist trails white shreds of 4 shroud. 
"distrusts" (pp. 81, 114), "mistrust" (p. 77), "certain" (p. 80), "deceive" 
(pp. 80, 116), "el11ga88" and "enigmatical" (pp. 81, 115, 83), "delusive" (p. 
81), "equivocally" (p. 56), "illusory" (p. 77), "subterfuge" (p. 82), "dUpli-
city" (p. 77), "apparent" (and fol'lU of "apparent"-pp. 56, 82, 104, lU, 116, 
117), "appearance" (and forms of "appearance't--pp• 56, 57, 83, 113, 121), "ob-
scure" (p. 85), "inquisitively" (p. 85), "thought" (pp. 85, 93, 105), "confi-
dence" (pp. 87, 88, 92, 111), "images" (p. 88), "puzzled" (p. 90), "eoaprehend" 
(p. 90), "1Ieaning" (p. 90), "1I8I1ifest" (p. 92), "speculative" (p. 93), "con-
tradictory" and "contradictions" (pp. 94, 115), "vagary" (p. 101), "incredu-
lity" (p. 102), "credible" and "credence" (pp. 103, 123), "11Iagined" (p. 103), 
"1apressionu (p. 109), "dubious" (p. 123), "deceptions" (pp. 56, 139), "baf-
fling" (p. 56), "uncertainty"' (p. 56), "suntising" (p. 56), "scrutiny" (p. 59). 
"inkling" (p. 65), "imposture" (p. 76), "suppositions" (p. 76). Also present 
are many turns of phrase such as "what was the truth?" (p. 82); "if there was 
ground for mistrusting his veracity" (p. 82); ''What .eant this?" (p. 89); 
"puzzled to cOIIlprehend the aeaning of such a knot" (p. 90). The above list is 
by no 1Ieans exhaustive and could be multiplied 1Iany ti1les in the longer work 
of !be Confidence-Man. 
lrhe Piazza Tales, p. 66. 
2 Ibid., p. 67. 
3 llli., p. 68. 
4 Clarel, Pt. III, canto xxxii, 11. 1-5. 
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Again using sight to represent insight in the quest for truth. Melville 
symbolizes the intensity of the quest by portraying the strain placed upon the 
eyes or by portraying near blindness in the effort to "see." To a cOlllpany dis-
cussing blind Haaeric bards, Babbalanja, in Mardi, reaarks: "Few grand poets 
have good eyes; for they needs blind must be. who ever gaze upon the sun. ,,1 
In a letter to Evert A. Duyckinck 3 March 1849, Melville, after praising Emer-
son for diving into truth, praises the '~hole corps of thought-divers, that 
have been diving & coming up again with bloodshot eyes since the world be-
2 gan." In Moby-Dick. the spout of the White Whale is connected with "deep 
thoughts" and "incOfllDlunicable cont_plationa," and the observation is made: 
"I have heard it aaid, and I do not much doubt it, that if the jet is fairly 
spouted into your eyes, it will blind you ... 3 The captain of the Samuel Enderby 
(a ship also "hunting" the whale) tells how he and his crew tried to capture 
Moby Dick. They are accidentally drawn right next to the Whale. and the cap-
tain declares: "I was blind as a bat-both eyes out--all befogged and be-
deadened with black foam. ,,4 In language that points back to the sun image of 
Mardi included in the quotation given at the beginning of this paragraph, Ahab 
says: "Cursed be all the things that cast man's eyes aloft to the heaven, 
whose live vividness but scorches him, as these old eyes are even now scorched 
~rdi, II, chap. lxxvi, 320. 
2 Letters, p. 79. 
~Oby-Dick, II. chap. lxxxv, 116. 
4 ~., chap. c, 199. 
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with thy light, 0 sunt"l And in "The Candles" chapter of Moby-Dick, Ahab 
accosts the fiery "supernal powertf: "Thou canst blind; but 1 can then grope. 
• • • Take the homage of these poor eyes. • • • The lightning flashes through 
my skull; mine eye-balls ache and ache. • • • Yet blindfold, yet will 1 talk 
2 to thee." The sun is a COlllDon symbol for God, the Whale is Melville's own. 
In his first close encounter with the Whale on the three climactic days of 
chase, Ahab comes off with "blood-shot. blinded eyes. ,,3 On the third and last 
day of the chase, in statements that show the integration of "The Fountain" 
and ItThe Candles" chapters, it is said that nAhab was fairly within the sUloky 
1Iountain mist" of the Whale's spout;4 shortly after, Ahab cries: "I grow 
5 blind; handa t stretch out before me that 1 may yet grope my way." The indOl1li-
table Ahab refuses to give up the quest. In Melville's next novel, Isabel 
warns Pierre: "Thou shalt not strain thine eyes in the tw1light.,,6 After des-
cribing Pierre's search for truth-"the deeper and the deeper that he dived, 
Pierre saw the everlasting elusiveness of Truth,,7_-the narrator tells how 
Pierre's "incessant application told upon his eyes. • _ • Sometimes he blindly 
1 Ibid. , chap. cxviii, 274. 
2 
.!.lUJ1. , chap_ c:xix, 282. 
3 
.!.lUJ1. , chap. c:xxxiii, 338 • 
4 Ibid. t chap. c:xxxv, 363. 
5 Ibid. , 364. 
6Pierre. Bk. XXII, chap. ii, p. 420. 
7 Ibid. , Bk. XXV, chap. iii, p. 472. 
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1 
wrote with his eyes turned away from the paper." The mysterious spirit spout 
2 
of Moby-Dick becomes, in Pierre, the "1Ilysterious tap-rooms" --with a double 
entendre; finally, while winding in and out of the "obscurest warehousing 
lanes," Pierre is afflicted with "blindness, and vertigo, and staggering,,3 and 
he falls. The Lawyer in "Bart1eby" notices that Bartleby' s vision is becoming 
impaired, and, in a bit of dialogue that is rich in both humor and dark impli-
cations, Melville has the Lawyer ask Bart1eby: "How would a bar-tender's 
business suit you? There is no trying of the eye sight in that. ,,4 
According to Melville, man, for all his efforts to "see," is not able 
to come to unquestionable stable truths, to standards and criterions that he 
may ~, and, what is perhaps even more important for Melville, that he may 
use as guides to correct, moral action. This inability to come by criterions, 
guides, and directing principles, whether natural or supernatural, is also 
symbolically expressed in Melville's art: it is the "chartless" voyage of 
Mardi;5 it is the "infallible" guidebook of Redburn that turns out to be a 
"delusion. ,,6 In his "Apology," Montaigne wrote: tlWhere the compass, the 
square, and the rule, are crooked, all propositions drawn thence • • • must, 
1 473 • .!lWt. , p. 
2 474. lli!. , p. 
3 lli!. , pp. 474, 475. 
4The Piazza Tales, p. 59. 
5 Mardi, II, chap. lxv, 276. 
6 Redburn, chap. xxxi, pp. 192, 193. 
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of necessity, be also defective."l Although Melville's mariner's compass is 
of a different kind than Montaigne's there is an affinity of thought in their 
use of the example of fallibility in the two instruments. In an episode that 
probably points shead to Pierre and the wholly "inverted" thought and maxims 
2 
of men that are due to the capricious "heavens, f1 Ahab's instruments of direc-
tion, his compasses, are exactly "inverted" by an electrical storm (often con-
nected with heaven and the deity by Melville), so that the Pequod is unwittin~ 
going in the opposite direction from that of her intention. 3 Melville again 
uses the figure of the inverted compasses in "The Haglets" and in Clarel, and, 
in both poems, the wrecked ships are presided over by the Fates symbolized by 
three birds4--symbols of heaven. The numerous references to "wrecks" in Mel-
ville's works probably derives from his view that man is voyaging through life 
without guides. The other means of ascertaining the course of the Pequod are 
also ineffective: Ahab tramples his quadrant because it cannot tell him what 
S 6 he wants to know, and the sea snaps the log-line and the log is lost. Ahab 
then makes his own instruments, but, in the end, the quest is not resolved but 
simply ends with Ahab's destruction. Melville, in The Confidence-Man, plays 
up the inefficacy of the Counterfeit Detector. The Simeon-like old man of the 
~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 281. 
2 Pierre, Bk. IX. chap. i, p. 231. 
3 Moby-Dick, II, chap. exxiv, 296. 
4 Collected Poems, p. 187; C1arel, Pt. III, canto Xii, 1. 97. 
SMoby-Dick, II. chap. CKviii, 275. 
6 ~., chap. cxxv, 301. 
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closing chapter remarks of the Detector: "I don't know, I don't know •••• 
There's so many marks of all sorts to go by, it makes it kind of uncertain. ttl 
Man has no infallible faculties, no flawless instruments, no "incontestable 
2 
vouchers" by which to steer his course. 
Melville's world is a wildly wandering one without direction or cri-
terions. The ship, Melville's microcosmic world, is "chartless" voyaging: 3 
in Melville's view, there are no sure maps, no routes laid out for man's un-
questioning adherence. At the beginning of Moby-Dick, Ishmael, the signifi-
cance of whose name, for Melville, includes the concept of an orphan,4 embarks 
on the world-ship Pequod, whose wake is described as "the devious zig-zag 
world-circle of the Peguod's circumnavigating wake,,;5 at the end, he is picked 
up by "the devious-cruising 'Rachel, ,tI as just "another orphan. ,,6 Sceptically, 
the novel comes full circle with Ishmael's uncertainty intact. The quest of 
Clarel follows a like pattern: the pilgrims reach, 
1 
2 
At last, Jerusalem! 'Twas thence 
They started--thither they return, 
Rounding the waste circumference. 7 
The Confidence-Man, chap. xlv, p. 331. 
Pierre, Bk. VII, chap. viii, pp. 195-196. 
~ardi, II, chap. lxv, 276. 
4 See Pierre, Bk. V, chap. i, p. 125. Pierre has an "orphan-like" 
feeling like Ishmael without a maternal Hagar. 
5 Moby-Dick, It chap_ xliv, 251. Underlining added on "devious." 
6Ibid., II, "Epilogue," [368]. Underlining added. These two quota-
tions are in italics in the Standard edition. 
7 Clarel, Pt. IV, canto xxix, 11. 11-13. 
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111e microco81D.ic world of "Benito Cereno," the ship San Dominick, is marked by 
the "uncertainty of her movements."l In -the Confidence-Man, the ship Fidele 
2 
wends her way through eddies. Melville also used symbols of forests, woods, 
and wilderness to show man's plight. Pierre is seen "wandering through the 
3 forest, his eye pursuing its ever-shifting shadowy vistas." 111e hero of 
Israel Potter is fitly named Israel, "since, for more than forty years, poor 
Potter wandered in the wild wilderness" of the world. 4 Like the traveler in 
5 
"The Piazza," man follows a Itzigzag, perilous road." In the enigmatic world 
of "Benito Cereno" Melville joins his sea and ship imagery with that of the 
forest: "The San Dominick had been battledored about by contrary winds, 1n-
veigled by currents, or grown weedy in calms. Like a man lost in woods, more 
6 than once she had doubled upon her own track." Melville's world is traveling 
blind, all ships devious cruising, man an IShmael, a spiritual nomad wandering 
through a wilderness of contradictions. Melville was well aware of the l1mita-
tions of the human intellect. The narrator in Pierre declares that it is only 
If the miraculous vanity of man" that would allow him to think he has "come to 
the Ultimate of Human Speculative Knowledge ... 7 Even when man does seem to find 
1 The Piazza Tales, p. 68. 
2 111. Confidence~an, chap. xvi, p. 100. 
3 Pierre, Bk. VII, chap. Viii, p. 196. 
4Isra.l Potter, chap. i. p. 5. 
5The Piazza Tales, p. 12. 
6 ~., p. 81. 
7 Pierre, Bk. IX, chap. it p. 233. 
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significance, it is an "unconfirmed Significance."l 
Finally, all is left in a state of doubt. Montaigne had asked during 
his .planation of PyrrhoniS1R: "Can any thing be proposed to us to grant, or 
2 deny, which it shall not be permitted to consider as ambiguous?" Melville's 
Pierre, which, like his other philosophically influenced novels, questions the 
nature of God, man, and nature, is significantly subtitled Or, The Ambiguities. 
Further, in Rabe1ais's chapter on the Pyrrhonian philosopher Trouillogan, the 
"abnegation of both extraes" is called "neuter.,,3 Ephraim Chambers, in his 
article on scepticism, says that one of its maxims is "neutrality. ,,4 Pascal 
proclaimed in his Pensees that "he who would think to remain neuter, is a Pyr-
rhonist par excellence. This neutrality is the very essence of Pyrrhonl81ll. ,,5 
In the penultimate chapter of Pierre, Pierre entirely claims neither Lucy nor 
Isabel with what they symbolically represent (light and darkness, goodness and 
evil), and he declares: 6 "Pierre is neuter now!" 
In the "Apology," Montaigne explains that it is practically impossible 
for a sceptic to speak without making a judgment whereas he is supposed to 
suspend jud&llent and maintain doubt. Therefore, if the sceptic says, "I know 
not" or "I doubt," he is accused of maklng a judgment or of being sure that he 
I Clarel, Pt. I, canto xllv, 1. 31. 
~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 231. 
31labelus, III, Bk. III, chap. xxxv, 50. 
4Chaabers, p. 31. 
5Pascal, 1835 ed., p. 529. 
6Pierre, Blt. XXVI, chap. vi, p. 503. 
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does not know or that he doubts. Montaigne suggests that the sceptic would 
be less vulnerable to such accusation and that it would be more accurate if 
he used the interrogative form to express his doubt; instead of saying "1 
know not" or "1 doubt," he would ask ''What do 1 know?"l It seems, however, 
a rather picayunish philosophical quibble to assert that the sceptic should 
logically not make any statements at all; statements may be made that are still 
unconfirmed and highly doubtful to a much greater degree than like statements 
made by a man who is unquestioning in intention and attitude. Further, in the 
dialectical approach of scepticism, with its consideration of polarities, 
statements are often made on both sides of an issue in the sceptic's se1f-
debate, an approach which exemplifies his pervading and final questioning and 
doubtful attitude. An example of these counter considerations may be seen in 
Melville's short but significant chapter "Sailing On" in Mardi, Melville's 
first novel to give evidence of his growing scepticism. Melville writes in 
nautical terms of launching off and sailing on in the "world of mind" toward 
the attainment of truth--the "golden haven." His first consideration or 
statement is quite positive: 
Those who boldly launch, cast off all cables; and turning from the common 
breeze, that's fair for all, with their own breath fill their own sails. 
Hug the shore, naught new is seen; and "Land ho!" at last was sung, when 
a new world was sought. 2 
A few lines further he considers the negative prospects: 
So, if after all these fearful, fainting trances, the verdict be, the 
golden haven was not gained;--yet, in bold quest thereof, better to sink 
in boundless deeps, than float on vulgar shoals; and give me, ye gOGS, an 
~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 244. 
~ardit II, chap. lxv, 276. 
1 
utter wreck, if wreck I do. 
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The particular emphasis of the sceptic quest is, however, best expressed in 
the form of the question. In accordance with Montaigne's suggestion, Mel-
ville places many of his most prominent and persistent doubts in the inter-
rogative form: "Where is the Ultimate?"; "What think you lies beyond?"; "Have 
we mortals naught to rest on, but what we see with eyes?"; "To what end your 
eternal inquisitions?"; "And what are men?" "What is it, to be something?"; 
"To what final purpose do I walk about, eat, think, dream?"; "What is death? ft2 
"Where lies the final harbour, whence we unmoor no more?"t "Where is the 
foundling's father hidden?"; "Great God, where art Thou?"; "Faith? w'hat's 
that?") "How can one sin in a dream?,,4 "Can !!£. final good h!. wrought?"; "Is 
life but !.. dream?"; "And life once over, who shall tell the rest?"; "Have we 
gamed and lost?"; "Is that high Providence, or Chance?"; "Yea, ~ ye, gods?"; 
"What basis then?,,5 "How long wilt make us still to doubt?"; "What for 
earth?"; "What is stable?"; "Is life indeed a dream?"; "What clew, what clew?"; 
"What may man know?,,6 "But aren't it all sham?,,7 Finally, to the question, 
1 Ibid., 277. 
2 . ~., chap. xx, 81, chap. xxix, 115, 116; chap. xxxi, 126; chap. 
xxxii, 131; chap. xxxix, 159, 160; chap. 11x, 255. 
~obY-Dick. II, chap. exiv, 264; chap. cxxiii, 293; chap. cxxvii, 309. 
4 Pierre. Bk. XIX, chap. ii, p. 382. 
5Collected Poems, pp. 62, 65, 83, 88, 209, 215. 
6 Clarel, Pt. I, canto xiii, 1. 74; canto xxxiv, 1. 35; Pt. II, canto 
iv, 1. 93; Pt. III, canto xiv, 1. 118; canto xx, 1. 42; Pt. IV, canto iii, 1. 
109. 
7 Billy Budd, ed. Hayford-Sealts, leaf 349, p. [132J. 
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"What is truth?", Uelv1l1e the sceptic remarks through Babbalanja: 
That question is more final than any answer. l 
~ardi. 1, chap. xciii, 329. 
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$10 50. Pnris, J845 
BWIFT'S WORKS, ",tited by Sir Walter Scott. ~"edltion, 
to vol~. Bvo., calf, vrrY.'ical"cc, $50. Ellinhllrg, 11:!24). 
TAYLOR'S IHRTOH1C :'lTItVEY OF GERMAN 1'0[':-
try. 3 vul~. Bvo.! calf", $7 :-II). London, 1830. 
TEMPLJ<;'S (Hir WILI.[AM) WORKS, fino edition. 4 
vols. BV(J., Inrgo p:qH'f, calC $B. London, 1770. 
A CONTINUATION OF 
WILEY & PUTNAM'S 
LAST WEEK'S LIST 
OF 
TIMOUR: InHtitllto~ j'olilirni n.nd ~tilitary: wriHl~n hi AI l\fo~111 by tho ~rcllt '!'imollr (TlIIHr-rlnne). Tran::;ll1lrrl )P(SON'S ,YORKS -The l\lIscclll\neou9 Works or 
STANDARD LIBRAHY WORKS. 
by Mnjor Dnvcy. 41."., (l\(t coif, $4 :)0. .LOIlfJOll l l~flJ. .fr i!~ph Addison. 4 vols. 12mo. calf, nent. $725. 
VO[,TAIRIANA. t"kIN;tr~!l Ilnd Tnn;.;hltr;tl frolll ~)I(' r' .. ,. Oxford, J830. 
French, br ~bry .Jnli:.J. Young. 4 ndEl. I'~n)') .• olr\ 'f1:~; u·::! Ibn S ORIENTA.I .. CUSTOMS i or, nn Jlllifilrn ... 
8carC6, $4 50. . j~nll(I()!1. 1 ~()"" ' ! of tho Sacred ~~f1pturcB. A new edition f'nluccd. 
.;. 8vo. cnlf. $3 Jil. 1.on".ISIO. 
XENOPIIO/ll'S EXPEIJITI()N (n' CYRl frl. '1'"",,:, I' .i ... " . 
by E. Spolmnn. 2 \,UI8. 8vo., l\·lnp',l..:.c., fill!.: 01,1 (')'if', ( I, S YO"\: AGES.:-·The VOyA~e8 or Cnpt;'lm J!1fl1f'A 
clllf, $3 25. ] ,ondo,l, 1 i·.i:!, l:( 1\. I1lustrnted With Mops anti nmn~rnu, En~ruvlllg~ 
h. ·'/00(1; with on Al'ponlilx, &.c. 2 vol:!. It0rlll Hvo. 
WEnER'S (HENRY) ~lETRJGA I. nom,ncc. of Ihe 1:1111, <.,1: exlrll. $12 SO. L"n". 18·16, 
l·1th, and J.ith centnrles-fJuhll~hud from Ancient Mf1I111~ ,. ,., ~ ~ "crlp~', WlIh Inlro""clory Note., and Gi".sary. 2 vol •. D 1~ltAI;LI S MISCEr.r~ANIES OF T.ITERA:rURb.-
12mo. calfexlra,scRrce $8. London 1810, 1.Ilo.rnry Mlsccllnnlc .• , Qunrrel. of A~thor •. C"lnlllitlc. 
, 'of Authors, ehnrncter of .James the « lrst, 'rhe I...ll~rnry 
VOLTAIRE'S WORKS. Trnnslatod by Frnnklln, Smol- Chnrncter. I vol. 8vo. cnlf. 65. Lond. HHO. 
lell, Ilnd oIlier., 36 vol •. l~mo., old calf, r~~d~n$~7~~. DUNLOP'S HISTORY OF FIGTION; oolng n crilleol 
~ _________________ -,'__ Account of tho mORt celebrated wor.11S of Fiction from 
A SMALL CONSIGNMENT OF 
RARE BOOKS ON AMERICA, 
THE JESUITS, &C., 
FOR BA.LE 
the enrHest Greek Romnnce to the novels of the Ilfesent 
age. Third edillon, In 1 vol. 8vo. c.lf. $6 50. 
Lond.1845. 
HUME'S HISTORY OF EN,GLAND, wllh 8mollell'. 
Continuation. Complete In one vol. Portraits of 11111110 
nnd Smollett, and 0. short memoir of Hume, written hy 
himself. 1 vol. 8vo. coif. $8. Lond. 1840 • 
BY WILEY & PUTNAM NEW YORK I LEIGH IIUNT'S SEER AND INDICATOR. In 1 vol. 
, • Bvo. morocco extra. $5. Lond. 18,10. 
AMERICA; or, nn Exncl Dc.crlption of the Wesl rndlo., 
kc. Fallhfully repre'enled by N.N. Gent. 18mo. hnlf 
moroceo. $5 50. Lond. 1657. 
BLOME (Rhd.)-Dcscrlptlon of Iho I.lnnd of Jnmnlcn, 
with the other Isles nnd 'rcrriloricB In America. to 
which Ihe Engll.h Rre relared, 18100. halfcnlf. $125. 
. Lond, 167Z. 
CHAUI~MER (Ch ••. )-I.c NOllvenu-Monde or L'Amcrl· 
que Chrl.tlenno, kc. 2 vole. 18mo. $7 50. PRris, 16;;g· 
CONSIDERATIONS for Ihe Plnntncon of Now England. 
lIISS. D pp.8mall quarto, hnlfbound. $750. N. D. 
'.' 'Vrillen nbout 1640. 
HERRERA. lIIotorlo Genoml ,10 I". lIecbo. do los 
Ca.lellnno. en In. hl"8 y Tierra fillne do <I Mar 
Ocoano. E.crll" par .~ntonlo de I1errern Cnronl,I., 
Mayor de."u M. do In. Indl". y "" Coronlals ric Co.lll1n. 
"vol •. Col\o, hnlf bound, uncut, flne copy. $'25. 
IIIlldrld, 1730, 
HOSPINIANO (Rodolpho)-IlI.torIB Je.uUlcn: hoc e.~ 
de Orlglne, Reguli., Con.mullonlbn., Prl.llegll., Incre-
menlla, Progreeau, el Propag~llohe ordinis Jesultarurn· 
Folio, old calr. $2 75, Tlillrl,171e. 
MIDDLETON'S LIFE OF CrCERO. !I Tol •. 8vo. cnlf, 
nool. ;S6. Lond. 1819. 
PAI,EY'S WORKS. With R Blo~rnphlcnl Rkelch of tho 
Author. By the Itov. D. S. Wayland, III.A. 5 vol •• 
8vo. hllif calf. $9. Lond. 11137. 
RITTER'S HISTORY OF ANCIENT PlII!.O~OP[[Y. 
'l'ronsloted from Ihe Germnn, by A. J. W. III0rrl.on. 3 
vol •. 8vo. cnlf, nellt. $12 SO. Lond. 1838. 
ROOERTSON'S COMPI,ETE WORKS-
1II.lory ofChnlo. V. 
1lI.loryof AmeriCA. &'c., kc. 
With nn Acconnl of hi. Llf" nnd Writing.. By Dugald 
(·tc\vRrl. Porlrnl~ I large vol. 8vo. clllf, $7 50. 
Lond.I840. 
STERNE'S WORKS: eonlolnlng the Life, ke., of 
Trl."om Shondy; Il Srnllmenlnl Journey; Sermon,; 
I.cUers, &'0, Wllh Il Lifo of Ihe AUlhor, wrillen by 
!Iim.clf. I vol. 8vo. coif. &C. Lond,I845. 
W AI~TON'S LlVES of Donne, Wotlon, nooker, nNbelt, 
Ilnd Sllnderson, A new Edition, wIth lIIu.m.llve NOlO', 
PorlloU., &C. IA.,. P4P'" cop1, III1perbly hound In 
..alf, In ancient ,tyle, V. Lond, J8411_ 
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From the extensive Colleotion of Ohoioe and Standard Books, 
Including many New Importations, and in Fine Bindings; 
PUT N A M, 
160. 1I110ADlVAY, l 
NEW YORK. f Publisher, Illlporter, and' Agent for Public Libraries. ~ 
FORF.IGN AGF.NCY, 
PATERNOSTER ROW, 
LOMDO". 
Prvfrssional Papers of the Royal Corps of }:oglooc", nUOleruUS plbles. 8 vols. 410. CIOlh, $65. 
rAnd .... ". 
Plutarch Fran,aise, Vie des Hommes et 
femme.i IIhlitrc8 tlo 11\ Franee-r\Vec leurs Portrfltta. 
It "!lIe. roYll18vo. h:llr rnorncco, $35. Pftri,. 
Prirhard's Researches into the Physical His-
lOr)' of M;.nklnd. 4 vols. Bvo. wllh plales, &e. S18. 
pront's Picturesque Sketches in Flanders, 
Inr~o foll~, hnlfbou.,I,SI6. 
Popc's Complete Works, edited by ROSCOE, 
be,lcdlllon. 8vols. 8vo.cnlrexlro, S30. 
Public W(lrks of Great Britain-R~i1ways­
CanRI •. Docks. Bridge., &c. Numerous IIIUSIrBllons, large foliO, hnlr morocco, $'l.~. 
Pictorial Bible, with copious Commentary, by 
John Kitto, Rnd numernll!!l It~crnl tIIae.rotions on wood. 
• vol •. 4l0. clolh (he.1 edillonl. $18. 
paxton's Magazine of Dotany, with several 
hundr.,1 lIIuol",lI"no. beaullrully colo,.,d. 13 yol •. 
roynl 8vo. hair morocco, 8117. 
Pugin's Examples of Gothic Architecture. 
3 vols. 4(0. $375U. 
- Specimens of Gothic Architecture in 
Enlla.d. !I vols. 410. hoI( morocco, $19. 
- and Le Keux's Architectural Antiquities 
or Normand)', 410. holf morocco, S13. 
Quain's Anatomy of the Human Body; a 
Series of III,n'ralion., beaullrully ueculed, In • IRrile 
I"'rlrollo, wilh letlcr·pro •• In 8",. $00, , 
Roasini's Antiquities of Rome, a Series or 
hold and oe<'l"I" lIIuslratlons of the Anclenl BUildings, 
Arches, Coll1mn~, &.c. Large folio.. lewed, ~5. 
Rom., 1847. 
Robinson's Rnral Architecture-practical De-
8Ign~. 4lo. half buund, $10. 
- Ornamental Villas. 4to. $Hl. 
Ricauti's Rustic Architecture, Picturesque 
Decorallon. or Rurol BuUdlnp. &c. 410. half morocc", 
til. 
Reynolds (Sir J.) DiscourRes on the Fine Arts, 
wilh nol ... nnd 1,IMes by John I1u rnel. 410. eiolh, $11. 
Smith's Literary and Historical Curiosities, 
wllh Aul,,~ .. ph Leiters. Vie ... of Resldenee. or Llle· 
rory lIIen, &c. 410. httlfmorocco, $16. 
Sotheby's Typography of the Fifteenth Cen-
IlIry, wllh fRc·sln,1I0., &c. Folio, holl" vellull1, $18. 
Swift's (Dean) Workd, Complete in 2 vols. 
rornl8vo. hnlrll1orocco, gill lops, $9; enlfexlro, $10. 
Shakspeare, Collier'ft edilion. 8 vols. 8vo. half 
. calf, $3!!. 
-- Illustrated by Kenny Meadows. 3 vols. 
r~y!\1 8vo. cnlfextra. S2~. 
---The .ome, Clolh, 815. 
-- Novels. 9 vols. post 8vo. BEST EDITION, 
$10. 
Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman 
Biography, Vois. 1 and 2. 2 large vols. 8vo. clolh. 
Lond. 1847. 
Strutt's Sylva. Dritannica, Illustrated. 4to. 
clolh. S6. 
Shaw's Illuminated Ornaments, Selected from 
Ihe MBS. oflhe Middle Ages. 410. hair morocco, gill. $30. . 
Sotheby's Fac-Similes of the Hand-Writing of 
Luther And Alclnnclhon. Published 81 4 gulne .•. Hnlf bound folio, 812. Lond. 
,Sollthey's Poetical Worb, best edition, ilIus-
IrRted. 10 vola. I~mo .. clolh. Lonj,,,,,nn, Lbnd. 
Selby's Forest 'j'rccR of GrCllt llritain, with 
Inpertor iIIust'RUonB on WOOfl. 8vo. cloth, $7. 16ond. 
Shakspeare-Singer's E'dition, 10 vols. 12mo., 
lorge type, morocco elegant, ~'!5. Chisw;ck. 
Shaw's Encyclopredia of Ornnmcnt, 4to. $8. 
Tresse's Illustrations of Modern Churehes,folio, $8. 
'I'aylor's (Jeremy) Complete Works, 3 vols. 
ImpelJal 8vo. cloth, 816. 
Thompson's Collection of Songs, the original 
edlli(ln. compriSing Burns's Sonls as firsll!lucd nnrillel 
10 Mn.lc. 6 vols. It. 8vo. hnlf morocco, gilt e"~o .. 
$'H 50. F.di.6. 
Transactions of the Institution of Civil Engi-
neen. 2 vnl~. 4tu.lJIu8trfttcd, $18. . 
Telford's Works on Civil Engineering, large 
folio nud qnnrto, $35. 
Tredgold on Cast Iron, 2 vols. Bvo. $6 60. 
Wild Flowers and their Teachings, illustrated 
with REAL FLOWERS nt!nlly prcssed Rnd Inserted with 
Ihe lext. R.8vo. clolh, $7; mor. ulra, $12. Batll,I848. 
Willoughby's Diary-Times Charles I.-Fur-
ther I'"rtlons. 410., quaintly 1"lnled In slylo of Ihe pe-
riod, $a 50. 
Waverley Novels, new edition, 25 vols. 12mo., 
hnlr morocco, gilt, compl.le, $32 . 
Westwood's Paleographia Sacra Pictoria, beau-
Ilfully liIumlnnled. A Bcri •• or lII".lrnlionsof AnCient 
V."lons oflhe Dible. Large 410., h,oI( mnrocco, $25. 
Westwood's Arcana Entomologica; or, lilliS-
Irllllons or New, Rare, and Inleresllugln •• cls. g yol •. 
R.8vo. $'13. 
-- British Butterflies and their Transforma-
tI"n., 4~ finely colored plales. 410. c10Ih, $11. 
Wilkinson's Ancient Egyptians, new edition, 
COlIII,Iele In 5 vnl •. 8vo. $U. 
Wright Rnd HalIiwell: Reliqum Antiqum.-
Ellrly MBS.lllullrnling Englllh Llluraluro, "0, I vol., Bvn.,U 50. 
Wellinglon's Despatches, R. 8vo. cloth, $6 50: 
WcaJCS'fi «:reat Work on Bridges,R. 8vo, and 
11Irf'E: i()I1,~ ,(Lof plates. IIHlfmorocco,tJ3. 
'\VOl,k,Vl I·'s Poetical Works, 6 vole. 12mo., 
'1'(1 '(' () r 1 (yery .fineeot), $14. 
Well ·if< " ), :, gns for Furniture-[the best and 
nlf'" recc l' ,vorkJ, large fOlio, !,Iuln 811 ; col'd, I$Il'l. 
Selections frolll recent Importations of Books, at about one4w/f former prices. 
Aristotle's Metaphysics. 'franslated by Tay-, Gardener's (The) Monthly Volumes, 8 pub'd" Oxford English Prize Essays, 
lor. 4to. bdl, $3. 12100.85 5<>. $650.' 5 vols. Bvo. O,,/ord, 
Ainsworth's Annotations on the Pentateuch. 
! vols. Bvo; $4 50. 
Artis' Antediluvian Phytology. 4to; $3. 
Boccacio's Decamerone, in English. 8vo. 
clolh, $225. 
Be:tuties.of Flora. One elegant volume, with 
lII"slrallon8 e~qul.ltely colored, folio, $3 5O.-(publl.hed 
$7 SO). • 
Burton's Cromwellian Diary. Scarce, 4 vols. 
Bvo. $8. 
Ben Jonson's Dramatic Works, complete. In 
1 vol. Roy,,18vo. (Moxoo) $4. Lond. 
Breese's Glossary of Civil Engineering. Bvo. 
s~. 
Billington's Architectural Director. 
5325. 
Cnrran's Speeches. Bvo. $2. 
Chateaubrialld's Memoirs of his own 
~ vol8. 8vo. $3. 
Cowper's Works. Poems, Letters, aud Life. 
II)" Grim.howe, new ·edillon, 8 vols. 121110. clolh gill, 
SO 50. • Lond. 1847. 
Don (~uixotte, Illustrated. Good edition, 1 
..,1. a.o. clolb, $~ 50. _ Lond. 1846. 
I::n;:lctipl,J Gallery of Vases. Illustrated royal 
P.o. ),nlrbollnd, $3. . . 
Erskine'fI Speeches, ~ew edition, 1 vol. royal 
avo. $175. 
Falconer's Mari!,e Dictionary. 1 vol. large 
41n. $0. 
Fuseli's Life and Lectures on Painting. 3 
Yol •. Svo. $5 25. 
Fox's Speeches, new edition, 1 vol. R. 8vo. 
~. " . . 
••• Old edlliOll .. priced at abolli P. .,.:', ,'.' i l<' 
Bvo. Vol. I. Gibbon's Miscellaneous Works, I vol. 8vo., O'Connell's Life and Speeches. 
~~ ~K 
Hall's Interesting Facts in the Animal King- Opinions of Eminent Men on the Bible. 
dOln. Bvo.81 50. ,12010.81. 
Hand, Book of Heliography, IBmo. 37& cents. Paterculus' History of Rome, translated. Bvo. 
Hogarth Moralized, edited by 'I'rusler, illus- $1., . • 
trated. 8vo. Clolh, $4. Penn s MosaiC Geology. 2 vols. 8vo. $2 25, 
Knowles's Pronouncing Dictionary, R; Bvo. Roby's Traditions of Lancashire. 3 vols. 
S!! 50. . 12100. $3. 
Lyra Harmonica.-A Collection of Clroice MOo Riley's Itine~nt. 9 vols. 12mo. half bound, 
dern Music. Folio cloth, 83 50. old and 8CRrce. $3. 
Library of Entertaining Knowledge, numerous Scott's Engineers' and Machinists' Assistant 
illustration.. 12100. elolh, per vol. 75 cenl.. uom.rouo plnles. 2 vols. half morocco, S~4. .' 
Murra~'~ r;G'Rw§gn~ iour of the Thames, Glalp",,1847.' 
-1J s:i ·un.. 8vo. $. Snowe's Legends, &c., of the Rhine. 2 vall, 
8vo. hall' morocco. lIIuslrllled, $3 75. by 
Sheridan's Speeches. 3 vols. Bvo. $5 25. 
In Italy. "vols.l~o. 8~. Sheil's Speeches. 8vo, $1 75. 
Murray's World of London, 12mo. $1 50. Shreds all':. Patches of History.' 2 vols, IBmo. 
Martin's Statistics of the British Colonies. SCIOlh, S7 ,,1:1. d d" 1 I B $2 5 ' 
Il. 8vo. $4. pectator-goo e Itlon. vo, vo. O • 
Mirabaud's System of Nature. 2 volli. R. 8vo, Temple's (Sir Wm.) .Memoirs of, by Courte-
bound (old) $6 60. . nay. 2 vol •. ~v". $4 SO. . 
.. ... Very scarce. .. Table Wit 18mo. 75 ets. 
Moss's Clas.sical Bibliography; with additions WebAter's Dictionary, London quarto edition, by n. G. Bohn. 2 yol •• evo. 8~ 23. ' 
Marsden's History of Sumatra. 4to. half 2.v.~I.: 410.$850. Published 1l1411ulnou •• 
bound. $6 50. Wllhams's Steam Manual for the Brltash Navy. 
Nnttall's Classical and Archeological Diction- 12m ... 87 el8. . ' . .. 
11'7. 8",.$2. Xenophon's Works, Translated, complete In 1 
Nellon (Lord), Life of, 8vo. eloth. $1 50 •. j nl.8Yo. fl 00. , . ... ..... . 
.. '. . . ;." '" .. " . l_d,I847, " ". :., In .... '''' ....... J 1".' J.. -l.r. 
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,_,,' ,; whereas every other-thing, , ' 
whether an animal Of a vessel, which enters into the 
, dreadful gulph of this mon~tcr~s mouth, i~ ins!antly',. 
'lost and swallowed up, tillS little fish retlfes mto It, ' 
" with the greatest'security, and.there sleeps, :-----
~...,.,"_~~.,~_~';",, __ '-" ___ . -,-- _""'_,,".1" -.~- ,-""~-~-- - ----~,-~ 
[,paasage,from 1811 Essaya, II, 100.] 
"., " ,whereas all the lother things,' whether bea.,t or vessel, that enter· into the dreadful gulf of this monster's mouth, are" I,' m, ,mediatelY lost and s, wallow, ed up, this little 
fish retires into it in great security, and there 
.!~eps,·· ' 
[Passage from 1842 and 1845 Haz1itt edition of 
Montaigne's Works, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 219_] 
" And whcl'eas nIl the olh,,( things, "hcth". ')e~,st or ,"esse], 
that enter into the Jrentitill g,llf ()f this mon~l"J"s (whale's)' 
mouth, are immediately lost nnd swallowed up, l;IC liea-gudgeon 
retires into it in great secnrity, and there slceps/' 
MONTAIGNE.-.• Jpo[0.'l!l for Raim(Jlld Schond. ' 
[Extract from 1851 first American edi-
tiOD of Melville's Moby-Dick, p. xii.] 
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